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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Soviet Union**

## ***Political Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

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### CONTENTS

14 February 1990

#### NATIONAL PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Commentary on Interregional Group [G. Popov; <i>MOSCOW NEWS</i> No 1, 7 Jan 90] .....	1
Conference of USSR Academy of Sciences Party Organizations [L. Usacheva; <i>POISK</i> No 32, 7-13 Dec 89] .....	1
Estonian Poll on 2nd Congress of Deputies [A. Saar; <i>SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA</i> , 30 Dec 89] .....	4

#### REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Zaslavskaya on 1990 Elections [T. Zaslavskaya; <i>MOSCOW NEWS</i> No 1, 7 Jan 90] .....	6
Estonian Social Democratic Party Program [ <i>MOLODEZH ESTONII</i> , 28 Dec 89] .....	6
Free Democrats of Estonia Issue Manifesto [ <i>MOLODEZH ESTONII</i> , 4 Jan 90] .....	10
Kirghiz CP Organizations Criticized for Slow Pace of Change [ <i>SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA</i> , 30 Nov 89] .....	11
Pre-election Changes Noted by Kirghiz Party Official [Zh. Ibraimov; <i>SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA</i> , 5 Dec 89] .....	12
Violation of Nomination Procedures Noted in Kirghiz Rayon [N. Dubrovin; <i>SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA</i> , 5 Dec 89] .....	14
Ukrainian 'Counterrevolutionary' Group Rehabilitated [V. Pristayko; <i>SOYUZ</i> No 2, 8-14 Jan 90] .....	15
Uzbek Supreme Soviet Meets on Implementation of Civil Unrest Laws [A. Baranov; <i>PRAVDA VOSTOKA</i> , 10 Dec 89] .....	18
Writer Alleges 'Dozens' of Election Law Violations in Uzbekistan [T. Pulatov; <i>MOSCOW NEWS</i> No 3, 28 Jan-4 Feb 90] .....	20

#### NATIONALITY ISSUES

Estonia's Sillaste on Economy, Ethnic Relations Link [Yu.Kh. Sillaste; <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 6 Jan 90] .....	22
Anti-Georgian Intrigues at People's Congress Alleged [L. Esvandzhiya; <i>ZARYA VOSTOKA</i> , 29 Dec 89] .....	23
Kharkov Oblast Informal Groups Profiled [M. Yurchenko; <i>TRUD</i> , 12 Jan 90] .....	25
Uzbek Commission Faults Slow Progress in Language Law Implementation [ <i>PRAVDA VOSTOKA</i> , 20 Dec 89] .....	27
Rapid Economic, Social Action Urged to Attack Roots of Fergana Unrest [V. Panamarev; <i>PRAVDA VOSTOKA</i> , 20 Dec 89] .....	28
Demographic Aspects of Nationality Conflicts in Uzbekistan [O. Ata-Mirzayev; <i>PRAVDA VOSTOKA</i> , 13 Dec 89] .....	30

#### LAW AND ORDER

RSFSR Justice Minister on Court Reform [V. A. Abolentsev; <i>CHELOVEK I ZAKON</i> No 12, Dec 89] ....	33
Railway Freight Losses Cited [Ye. Kolesnikova; <i>PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK</i> No 3, Jan 90] .....	36
Latvian NFL Accused of Illegal Interference in Military Electoral District [V. Myakov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 6 Dec 89] .....	39
Omsk Citizen Awarded Damages For Confiscation of Literature [N. Kutorgin; <i>RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA</i> , 11 Jan 89] .....	40
Rise in Youth Crime Rates in Armenia Examined [M. Akopyan; <i>KOMSOMOLETS</i> , 23 Dec 89] .....	42
Baku Official Questioned on Increase in Crime [G.I. Odzhadov; <i>BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY</i> , 15 Dec 89] ..	46
Jurists' Union Created in Azerbaijan [ <i>BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY</i> , 19 Dec 89] .....	47
Roundtable in Turkmen SSR on Stricter Law Enforcement [ <i>TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA</i> , 29 Dec 89] ....	47
Abuses in Kiev Co-op Activity Detailed [S. Ryabov; <i>PRAVDA UKRAINY</i> , 21 Dec 89] .....	52
Fight Against Organized Crime in Kiev Viewed [S. Ryabov; <i>PRAVDA UKRAINY</i> , 3 Jan 90] .....	55
Uzbekistan: Statistics Reveal Rising Youth Crime Rates [S. Svetlov; <i>KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA</i> , 29 Dec 89] .....	56

## MEDIA AND JOURNALISM

Vremya Seen as Obsolete, Seven Days Praised	57
<i>[E. Chekalova; SOVETSKAYA KULTURA No 5, 3 Feb 90]</i>	
NASH SOVREMENNICK Staff Defends Conservative Views	58
<i>[L. Razuvayeva; KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA, 7 Dec 89]</i>	
Journal VYBOR Seen Transformed From Unofficial to Official Status	
<i>[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 4, 24 Jan 90]</i>	62
RODINA Chief Editor on Reasons for Journal's Rapid Growth	
<i>[Yu. Sovtsov; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 14 Jan 90]</i>	62
OUR FEELING OF GORBACHEVISM NEWSPAPER, Editor Reviewed	
<i>[A. Romanov; MOSCOW NEWS No 3, 28 Jan-4 Feb 90]</i>	65
Soviet Firm Plans To Publish Western Siberia Topographic Maps	
<i>[A. Chepkasov; IVZESTIYA, 11 Dec 89]</i>	66
Turkmenistan CP Announces Periodical Changes For 1990	
<i>[TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 10 Oct 89]</i>	66
Soviet Printing Industry Abilities Scored	
<i>[V. Abramov; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 31 Jan 90]</i>	67
Ukrainian Writers Protest Press Reorganization	
<i>[Yu. Mushketyk, O. Musiyenko; LITERATURNA UKRAYINA No 47, 23 Nov 89]</i>	68

## HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY

Ukrainian CP to Publish Book on Famine	
<i>[S. Kulchitskiy; SOYUZ No 3, 15-21 Jan 90]</i>	71

## ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

Belorussian Chernobyl Clean-up Criticized	
<i>[V. Samoylov; KOMMUNIST BELORUSSII No 12, Dec 89]</i>	74
Estonian SSR Draft Law on Environmental Protection in Estonia	
<i>[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 6 Dec 89]</i>	79
Uzbek Researcher Links Chernovtsy Illness to Nonchemical Cause	
<i>[V. Luskanov; MOSCOW NEWS No 2, 21-28 Jan 90]</i>	85

## SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

Latvian Komsomol Head on Crisis of Communism in Youth Union	
<i>[I. Prieditis; KOMMUNIST SOVETSKOY LATVII No 12, Dec 89]</i>	87
Ukrainian SSR Women's Political Role Discussed	
<i>[PRAVDA UKRAINY, 7 Dec 89]</i>	90
Importance of Vocational-Technical Schools	
<i>[V. Konkin; PRAVDA, 5 Dec 89]</i>	91
Counternarcotics Measures in Turkmenistan's Mary Oblast Noted	
<i>[D. Musayev; TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 22 Dec 89]</i>	93
Soviet Operation Interdicts Afghanistan-Iran Drug Dealing	
<i>[Ye. Kharchenko, A. Bushev; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 16 Jan 90]</i>	94
Recent Counternarcotics Operations in Turkmenistan Detailed	
<i>[Yu. Dmitriyev, V. Svirin; TRUD, 18 Jan 90]</i>	94
Belorussia Extends Chernobyl Relief Allowance	
<i>[MOSCOW NEWS No 2, 21-28 Jan 90]</i>	96
Church Charitable Activities Censured	
<i>[L. Raykova; SOVETSKAYA TORGOVLYA No 155, Dec 89]</i>	96
Orthodox Church Reorganized in Belorussian SSR	
<i>[Maksim; SELSKAYA ZHIZN, 6 Jan 90]</i>	97
Writers, Editors Censure RSFSR Writers Union Plenum	
<i>[OGONEK No 51, 16-23 Dec 89]</i>	97
Women Writers Federation Adopts Resolutions	
<i>[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 2, 13-19 Jan 90]</i>	99
Burlatskiy Recalls Backlash Against Criticism of Culture Ministry	
<i>[F.M. Burlatskiy; ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 2, 13-19 Jan 90]</i>	100

**Commentary on Interregional Group**

*18120100A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 1, 7 Jan 90 pp 6-7*

[Commentary by Gavriil Popov, USSR people's deputy and co-chairman, inter-regional deputy group: "Deputy Pluralism"]

[Text] Two contradictory processes are under way in the inter-regional deputy group (IRDG). On the one hand, there are growing and fully legitimate demands to set up a more effective structure with a permanent leadership in the centre, Republics and regions, an apparatus, institutions of consultants, experts and advisers; to organize a system of disseminating information; to have premises; to set up a monetary fund with donations from electors; and to start issuing an IRDG newspaper available by subscription. The solution of many of these problems will be easier now, thanks to the 2nd Congress's decision concerning the procedure of the Congress and the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the status of a USSR people's deputy.

On the other hand, a certain polarity has appeared in the IRDG as well. At first, deputies rejected the principle of democratic centralism, accepted the idea of the deputy's responsibility not to the IRDG, but to his electors. But the ineffectiveness of the IRDG's actions, built into this scheme, has led deputies to conclude that stricter coordination is needed. But more control over individual deputies is only possible given substantial unanimity among them. Such a degree of unanimity for the whole IRDG is impossible.

Therefore, I believe that factions will start being formed within the IRDG and that they will be much better organized than the IRDG itself. The role of factions will also be assumed by regional associations of the IRDG members. These factions will have a right to independent acts in the framework of the IRDG's common platform, and their representatives will make up the IRDG Coordinating Council.

To sum up, given the worst-case scenario, the IRDG will remain in its present amorphous shape. Given the best-case scenario, the IRDG will consist of organized factions having not only their complementary platforms, but also their structures, including newspapers. But the most likely scenario is somewhere in between these poles.

Some of each of these three scenarios will become practice. This depends not so much on the IRDG itself as on developments outside it. But forecasts in relation to the development of events in the USSR and its leadership's course are another matter.

*Gavriil Popov,  
USSR people's deputy, co-chairman,  
inter-regional deputy group*

\* \* \*

People's deputy Yuri Boldyrev shares his opinions on the tasks and role of the inter-regional deputy group in our parliament and society.

I think that it isn't worthwhile to stress everywhere that we're the opposition, the parliamentary minority. To define ourselves in this way once and for all is the best method of escaping responsibility. Opposition is found only where there is a parliamentary majority, i.e., opposition doesn't name itself but becomes the opposition. The task of our faction, as I understand it, is not to struggle only for our own rights—to issue a newspaper, have a bank account, etc., but to give maximum aid to the forming of parliamentary groups and, making coalitions with different associations of deputies, to achieve a majority of all important questions.

We shouldn't forget that a considerable part of the IRDG members are working actively and successfully in the commissions and committees that turn our ideas into draft laws, and here the task of the IRDG is to coordinate individual activities.

But, besides these, internal parliamentary functions, the IRDG also has external functions—to issue appeals to voters, and to maintain regular association with them. The IRDG members who are also leaders of democratic movements are orientated mainly towards these external functions.

I'd consider justified for myself, as a deputy, and for the IRDG as a whole, to see our priority as the internal matters, because the parliamentary methods of struggle are far from exhausted as yet.

**Conference of USSR Academy of Sciences Party Organizations**

*90UN0785A Moscow POISK in Russian  
No 32, 7-13 Dec 89 pp 1, 3*

[Article by Lidiya Usacheva, POISK special correspondent: "Frank Dialogue: What Kind of Party Do I Want To See?"]

[Text] Like it or not, every delegate asked himself this question and attempted to answer it. Some did so from the podium, others asked only themselves. It would have been hard to find a communist without a stance on this question at the conference of USSR Academy of Sciences party organizations held on 25-26 November in Zvenigorod, a city near Moscow. An information report on this was published in POISK No 31. Today we feature a more detailed account from Lidiya Usacheva, our special correspondent.

\* \* \*

"I do not believe that our conference can arrive at any decisions," categorically stated Sergey Sukhinin, party bureau deputy secretary at the Institute of Hydrodynamics

in Novosibirsk. "This is not an auditorium, it is a patchwork quilt, so diverse are the opinions represented here."

How true that was! Party activists had gathered from 180 different institutes and scientific organizations around the country. As for the diversity, is that not what we were striving for when we declared war on unanimity of thought and action?

But, quite frankly, at first I, too, was worried about whether the conference would produce any results. From its very first moments it reminded me of a dam that had just burst. The presidium heard shouts of "Who elected you, anyway?"; the chairman heard "Why are you conducting this conference as if you were the leader and we just a mob?" The first comment on the proposed agenda was this: "When the ship is sinking the captain does not have time to discuss the menu!"

These demonstration-like sentiments were cooled by the delegates themselves. They merely wanted to remind their comrades why they had gathered and urge them not to waste time:

"There is no need to discuss the reports which were planned in advance. We should focus our attention on the most timely issues of today: the situation in our country, the party's role and tasks, preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress, and drafting of proposals on the draft CPSU Program and changes in the Party Charter."

Naturally the talk immediately turned to the party's sources and its real lifeblood: its primary organizations. There is an opinion that by taking part in their work a communist is participating in the work of the CPSU. But today this statement is more likely to be the subject of debate. Primary organizations are still making too few decisions. And it was no coincidence that B. Rakitskiy, a doctor of economic sciences and one of those presenting reports, posed this question: "Have you ever thought about why today party members are working actively in informal organizations, yet are not leading the struggle for restructuring in their own primary party organizations?"

Many delegates talked about primary party organizations' lack of rights, the fact that they are not allowed to use their dues as they like or publish materials, and that they do not participate in political decision making or have an influence on the outcome of elections in higher-level party organs.

Their words confirm a real-life example from the Sverdlovsk City Party Organization. Immediately after the election of USSR people's deputies, which illustrated the political weakness of a number of party and soviet leaders in Sverdlovsk Oblast, the city party committee held a plenum. Sensitive to the mood of the city's communists, the gorkom proposed that an unscheduled oblast party conference be convened. Logically it should have been time for the leaders who had lost the people's confidence to think about resigning. If they did not, then

the right to entrust them with power or not belonged to communists, and this could be decided at a party conference. However, despite the burning desire of city and oblast party organizations to evaluate their leaders and lend support to the gorkom's bold actions, everything remained as it had been. The obkom soon thereafter held a plenum at which it rejected the decision by the lower-level party organization as inappropriate. Virtually no attention was paid to the opinion of rank-and-file communists. The whole problem lay in the fact that there is no mechanism for taking opinions into consideration. Thus no one made it clear how many people were in favor of changes: one-third of all the communists in the oblast party organization, as required to convene an unscheduled conference under the CPSU Charter, or not?

Delegates from Novosibirsk also talked about a lack of rights on the party of primary organizations. Communists from a certain organization made a decision concerning nomination of delegates to the 19th All-Union Party Conference but after not receiving any support from the raykom decided to publish their proposal in the press in order to draw attention to it. Yet not a single local newspaper could find space for their resolution.

Nowadays, when one hears a case like that or thinks back to an incident in one's own journalistic experience, it is simply impossible to comprehend: how could we live like that? Going to meetings, discussing any old thing and making decisions that were of no use to anyone? Essentially we were fooling ourselves. The public consciousness that has been aroused by restructuring has forced us to take a critical look at the party and at our participation in it. Millions of suggestions from communists concerning the need for fundamental changes in the party and a review of the outdated CPSU Program and Charter poured in, addressed to the 19th All-Union Party Conference. The party conference adopted many highly important resolutions, yet some of them are being realized too slowly.

The meeting in Zvenigorod was valuable precisely because the scientist party members assembled there themselves began, without waiting for recommendations from higher up, to reinterpret the party's strategic course and the principles of intraparty life, things which until recently seemed immutable. This event was preceded by meetings of institutes' primary party organizations where communists expressed their opinion of the matters under discussion and proposed alternate versions of draft programmatic documents. I happened to be present at one such meeting held at the USSR Academy of Sciences Urals Branch Institute of Philosophy and Law. It was memorable not merely for the fact that Sergey Vishnevskiy, at that time still a CPSU candidate member, gave a report analyzing contradictions in the provisions of the Charter. For example, he noted that "our elected offices are without responsibility, while positions of responsibility (referring to appointment to high-level party posts) are not elected." I was pleased by the desire of the communist socialist scientists attending

the meeting to find their own niche in the present political situation. It is significant that the idea of drawing up an alternative CPSU Charter was approved by acclamation. That means that the documents discussed at the Zvenigorod conference also contained a message from scientists in the Urals.

Speaking about the academic conference overall, party program provisions evoked greater unity. And, to the surprise of the participants themselves and of the commission which prepared the document, those provisions were accepted without substantial amendment. The chairman of that commission, doctor of economic sciences Lyudmila Vartazarova, who was recently elected Oktyabrskiy CPSU Raykom second secretary (Moscow), clearly outlined proposals on the party's strategy and its place and role in the functioning of society. Thus, what are we building, and where are we headed?

If human beings are the greatest treasure and humanistic ideals the highest ideals, then of course communism is the social structure which most closely corresponds to the ideals we proclaim. Thus the party feels that its strategic objective is, as noted in the document adopted by the communist scientists, progress toward communism, understood as a society of consistent humanism...

During discussion of this draft party platform to be presented at the 28th Party Congress the greatest debate centered on the section regarding the party's social base. What is that? For example, Yu. Yudin, an associate of the State and Law Institute and doctor of juridical sciences, while affirming the commission's conclusion that the CPSU has already ceased to be the party of the working class (since the interests of that class do not differ substantively from the interests of the other social strata in our society), nonetheless did not agree with the assertion that it is a party of all the people. In Yuriy Adolfovich's opinion it would be more correct to state that the CPSU is the political vanguard of working people.

"But what is 'the people'?" asked V. Shukov, from the Institute of Philosophy, during the discussion. "A meaningless abstraction. The motive force behind restructuring in this country is the radical intelligentsia, not the people."

The questions of society's class nature and of whether the party belongs to the working class were addressed by delegates to V. Medvedev, CPSU Central Committee secretary and Politburo member, who attended the conference. Vadim Andreyevich gave this unambiguous reply: yes, since a class structure continues to exist in society.

This topic was explored further in discussion by candidate of historical sciences A. Davydov from the Institute of the International Workers' Movement, doctor of physical and mathematical sciences V. Rozanov from the Physics Institute, and many others. It was suggested that humanitarian scientists review the social structure of society and provide a new definition of classes.

In response to an urgent request from a number of delegates the editorial commission added a special section on the development of society's intellectual culture to the document. Proposals were also made that neither programs nor charters be adopted on a long-range basis. The party should have a platform at each stage of its progress which would change with the times.

The draft charter was not so fortunate. The conference rejected the version proposed by the editorial commission. In fact it did seem somewhat flat and mediocre, although its proposals were of a very fundamental nature, for the delegates quite clearly and unambiguously stated their position. They favor:

- "direct secret elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from among multiple candidates in production-related and territorial party districts." Conference participants called for a party-wide referendum on this matter to be held by 1 March 1990.
- "repeal of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution in its present form." Just yesterday this demand sounded almost extremist when it was made at informal organizations' rallies, yet today we can see the experiences of communists in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, who have acknowledged that respect for the party cannot be won with a phrase in the Basic Law. Over one-half of those surveyed in a sociological study conducted during the conference were in favor of repealing this article. But other opinions were expressed as well. For example, Yudin feels that repeal of this constitution provision would deprive the party of its legal basis.
- "a party-wide referendum on the creation of an RSFSR Communist Party."
- "the right of the minority to defend its platform at any level; development of a mechanism which would make it possible to take the minority's opinion into consideration."
- "consolidation of the CPSU and other public organizations which hold the same ideological positions as the CPSU."
- "establishment of independent control and auditing commissions, to function in parallel to party committees, not as part of them."
- "elections of editors-in-chief of central party publications at the party congress, and accounting by them to the congress."
- "the right for primary party organizations to determine what is done with their membership dues." The opinion was also expressed that rank-and-file communists could use these funds to finance the apparatus of party raykoms and gorkoms, and that in the event that the apparatus' work was no longer up to primary organizations' standards they would simply cease funding it.
- "complete openness and glasnost in the party."

The list of things of which they were in favor goes on. Naturally much of what has been stated here requires further detailed development. But the very fact that so many proposals were made attests to the need for changes in the party.

Even at the very start of the conference, as they were outlining its agenda, delegates were talking about the need to adopt the kind of documents which would become the object of consideration by the highest-level party organs. But the delegates' proposals will not immediately come before the Central Committee. As POISK has already written, from here they will go back to primary party organizations, where amended and concretized versions of them will be returned for further discussion by the conference delegates. The time and place for that meeting are currently being decided.

And what did the meeting that was just held give to those who attended it?

L. Vartazarova: "It is important that such a powerful force as the Academy of Sciences party organization express itself."

G. Kozlov, conference organizing committee chairman: "People matured during these two days. I am confident that the charge they got from our discussions will be transferred to their primary party organizations. Our organizing committee's immediate task is to publish conference materials."

S. Ilyashenko, USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium Party Committee deputy chairman: "The conference illustrated communists' striving toward consolidation in discussion both of intraparty affairs and of the functioning of the Academy of Sciences. Our party committee deems it essential to provide primary organizations with up-to-the-minute information on the work of the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium and the Academy's branches and other divisions."

Yu. Kovalev, associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences State and Law Division: "An attempt has been made to create a party-based civil society."

Even though it was not adopted at this time, the resolution entitled "On the Situation in the Country and the CPSU's Tasks" received applause. Only one line gave the delegates pause. They removed that line, deeming it immodest, since it was in their own assessment.

But I will put it back in: "This conference demonstrated communists' ability to participate in restructuring." And that was the truth.

### Estonian Poll on 2nd Congress of Deputies

90UN0710A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA  
in Russian 30 Dec 89 p 2

[Article by A. Saar: "Public Opinion on the Congress"]

[Text] The results of a routine survey by the Information Center of Journalism and the All-Union Sociological Institute enables each of us to compare them with previous data and draw the appropriate conclusions. In the tables below we cite some of the data of the initial surveys. This time, 410 people responded to our questions.

#### 1. How do you intend to follow the work of the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies?

Response	Tallinn Estonians	Tallinn Non-Estonians	Rural Residents
Constantly	16%	33%	2%
More or less constantly	38%	32%	39%
From time to time	40%	28%	58%
Do not follow	6%	7%	1%

#### 2. Do you think the measures proposed by Minister of Internal Affairs Bakatin will help reduce crime?

Response	Tallinn Estonians	Tallinn Non-Estonians	Rural Residents
Yes	5%	10%	1%
Probably	20%	23%	12%
Probably not	13%	21%	37%
No	12%	14%	12%
Hard to say	50%	32%	38%

#### 3. What do you think about creating a constitutional oversight committee today?

Response	Tallinn Estonians	Tallinn Non-Estonians	Rural Residents
It is necessary	15%	56%	14%
It is premature	66%	20%	73%
Hard to say	19%	24%	13%

#### 4. Relying on the debate that took place at the Congress, give your assessment of the activities of the Gdlyan group.

Response	Tallinn Estonians	Tallinn Non-Estonians	Rural Residents
Approve completely	5%	17%	4%
Basically approve	21%	32%	17%
Probably do not approve	13%	5%	17%
Oppose	4%	5%	8%
Hard to say	57%	41%	54%

**5. Do you agree with the decision of the Congress on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact?**

Response	Tallinn Estonians	Tallinn Non-Estonians	Rural Residents
Agree	71%	56%	44%
Have doubts	15%	16%	4%
Disagree	6%	8%	43%
Hard to say	8%	20%	9%

**6. Do you agree that the Congress gave (will give) the right orientation to resolving economic problems?**

Response	Tallinn Estonians		Tallinn Non-Estonians		Rural Residents	
	Before Congress	After Congress	Before Congress	After Congress	Before Congress	After Congress
Agree	21%	7%	51%	16%	19%	3%
Have doubts	31%	33%	25%	36%	47%	42%
Disagree	41%	49%	8%	28%	25%	49%
Hard to say	7%	11%	16%	20%	10%	6%

**7. Do you agree that the Congress will give (gave) the right orientation to resolving nationalities problems?**

Response	Tallinn Estonians		Tallinn Non-Estonians		Rural Residents	
	Before Congress	After Congress	Before Congress	After Congress	Before Congress	After Congress
Agree	20%	5%	34%	16%	26%	3%
Have doubts	33%	24%	32%	33%	41%	27%
Disagree	44%	59%	16%	37%	28%	58%
Hard to say	3%	12%	17%	14%	6%	12%

**8. What do you think of the activities of the Interregional Group of Deputies?**

Response	Tallinn Estonians		Tallinn Non-Estonians		Rural Residents	
	Before Congress	After Congress	Before Congress	After Congress	Before Congress	After Congress
Approve		23%		12%		15%
Basically approve		41%		14%		52%
Probably do not sympathize		11%		7%		18%
Denounce		4%		13%		2%
Hard to say		21%		54%		13%

**9. Do you agree that the work of the Congress (will be) was successful as a whole?**

Response	Tallinn Estonians		Tallinn Non-Estonians		Rural Residents	
	Before Congress	After Congress	Before Congress	After Congress	Before Congress	After Congress
Agree	38%	13%	49%	28%	44%	2%
Have doubts	36%	32%	27%	39%	39%	31%
Disagree	11%	47%	7%	21%	10%	61%
Hard to say	15%	8%	17%	12%	8%	6%

**10. How do you assess the importance of the 2nd Congress in comparison with the 1st Congress?**

Response	Tallinn Estonians		Tallinn Non-Estonians		Rural Residents	
	Before Congress	After Congress	Before Congress	After Congress	Before Congress	After Congress
More important	63%	26%	52%	40%	60%	17%
Same	16%	20%	21%	28%	18%	23%
Less important	2%	38%	6%	9%	5%	45%
Hard to say	18%	16%	21%	23%	17%	15%

In less than 1 year, the Information Center of Journalism has participated in almost 30 public opinion research projects. Thousands of people were polled in Estonia. We hope for fruitful cooperation with our activists in the future, too. Our workload will increase even more. We ask that anyone who would like to help our cause to contact us by telephone at 42-52-17 or 43-29-11. We wish you the best in the coming year.

### Zaslavskaya on 1990 Elections

18120101A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 1, 7 Jan 90 p 6

[Commentary by Tatyana Zaslavskaya, people's deputy to the USSR: "Wake Up, Voters!"]

[Text] After last spring's elections of people's deputies of the USSR even greater enthusiasm was expected during the elections to the local and Republican Soviets. But at the same time I heard the apprehension that the little energy our society had accumulated might be depleted prior to the next elections.

To our regret, reports from all over the nation say that grassroots elections activity has largely expired. The work of congresses of People's Deputies of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR seems to have given rise to something very near to disappointment in society. But I wouldn't agree to a pessimistic assessment of the work of, at least, the Supreme Soviet which, in my opinion, has done a pretty good job and has honestly and successfully fulfilled its legislative function: new and unusual work for lots of members.

Yet the fact remains: voters are failing to show much enthusiasm. People are withdrawing into themselves and from the candidates nomination campaign. Many people do not care whom they vote for or against.

We are also facing another problem: politically active voters are still very few indeed, and there are not enough serious politicians eligible for nomination as deputies, especially on the level of district Soviets. At the same time, the traditional power has quiet enough candidates for people's deputies, the availability of whom has always been a minor problem for it. But they are deputies from the "old days", and their possible election to Soviets could immensely increase the danger that local Soviets would be practically in no aspect different from the current ones.

Unquestionably, the process, as well as the outcome, of elections are going to greatly vary in different regions and Union Republics, because the political situation in, say, the Soviet Baltic Republics and in Soviet Central Asia is different due to certain traditional peculiarities. The rate of political awareness and activity of the voters in each particular district will nevertheless be of crucial importance. However, it is possible that in some districts voters will simply outvote all the nominated candidates and those backed by the old power, without nominating their own alternative candidates.

Tatyana Zaslavskaya,  
people's deputy of the USSR

### Estonian Social Democratic Party Program

90UN0716A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII  
in Russian 28 Dec 89 p 2

[Statement of party platform signed by 10 founding members of the Estonian Social Democratic Independence Party in the "Platform Planks" column: "On the Way to an Estonian Social Democratic Independence Party"]

#### [Text] 1. Introduction

Today's Estonia, freeing itself from oppression, is just feeling its way into the future. The world around us is expanding and opening. We do not want to turn into an isolated and underdeveloped region in this world.

We have gained the conviction from history's terrible ordeals that it is impossible to design or construct a humanistic society like a house or a machine. A democratic and just society can take shape only in the plexus of human aspirations that give rise to the self-organization of social forces and the balanced interaction of these. We are convinced that such a development process can be ensured in Estonia only by revival of the free Estonian State. We must revitalize the capacity for critical self-knowledge in Estonian society, and restore the opportunity for political choice over the widest range of convictions, from radicalism to conservatism and from leftism to extremely rightist views.

We shall try to restore the spiritual ties with the many-sided world experience gained over the centuries, and with the most diverse trends in contemporary European thought. Our goal is to associate the national revival's energy with the general thinking and principles of international cooperation. The fundamental values of European social democracy are our motto: **FREEDOM, JUSTICE, and SOLIDARITY**.

The Estonian Social Democratic Independence Party (ESDPN), which is being formed, sees its role in the future Estonia's politics as defending the cultural and universal human values and sense of responsibility. We realize that destitute elderly people will constitute a fourth of the Estonian population, even in a free and independent Estonia; that the young people's wishes and aspirations will be limited by material resources; that those persons, upon whom the people's education and health and the heritage of our culture directly depend, will require particular attention from the society; that a certain element of people will take advantage of freedom primarily for self-serving purposes; and that it will become significantly harder to make a living. The social, political, and economic upheaval will bring, not only joy and liberation, but a feeling of uncertainty and disappointment as well. We shall be entering the family of European nations and states, not only as unequal economic partners, but also as underdeveloped people on the political and social planes. Therefore, a heavy load of responsibility rests on the shoulders of the future Estonia's creators. We have no right to put our people's and

the homeland's fate at the mercy of a ruthless economic competition and struggle for existence. This is just as dangerous to our national and cultural identity as the Soviet imperialism that still holds sway. The future Estonia needs social democracy because the selfless cooperation and altruism included in social democracy's traditions will be able to support and protect every person's self-realization vitality and opportunity in a free Estonia. We want to create the kind of sovereign Estonia that will be a suitable home for our people, not an arena for the clashing of hostile opposing interests.

## 2. Historical Digression

Social democracy has a history that is more than a century long in Estonia. Prominent political figures and representatives of culture, such as Eduard Vilde, Mikhkel Martna, Peeter Speek, Gustav Suys, August Rey, Karl Ast-Rumor, and many others, created and continued the tradition.

The spreading of social democratic ideas, which began in the 1880's, took shape in a party movement at the start of the present century. The principles of freedom, justice, and democracy acquired tremendous importance in the struggle for national self-determination. The social democracy in Estonia, as well as in the countries of Eastern Europe, was developed in ideological and political clashes with Russian Bolshevism.

Estonian social democracy described the power structures that were formed after the October 1917 Revolution as "*socialismus asiaticus*." A parliamentary national state system, which was in accordance with social democratic principles, created the best conditions for organic development of social groups and national self-governing communities [obshchiny] in the Estonian Republic. The social democrats had strong popular support in the Estonian Republic and close contacts with their ideological counterparts from neighboring countries. The party was disestablished in 1935 after the coming to power of President Konstantin Pyats. Both the party and its leadership were totally annihilated after the Stalinist regime's establishment in Estonia. In recent decades, our social democracy has continued its activity in the form of the Estonian Socialist Party Association Abroad, and in the consciousness of a great many of our countrymen here.

## 3. The Experience of International Social Democracy

By creating opposition to flagrant self-seeking, eliminating inequality, and defending the interests of the poor and weak, social democracy promoted the formation of a society in the West having stable and general prosperity. At present, the social democratic movement is on an exploratory path. One may even speak of a crisis in social democracy. It seems that social protectedness concepts are beginning to lose their former attractiveness. Freedom to take risks and seek something new, even at

the cost of rejecting social protectedness, is becoming an alternative to a society's security and stability of prosperity.

International social democracy's activity is aimed at ensuring stable peace and security in Europe. For the sake of stability, the social democrats' rules and activity have been revised according to the realities of a world split into blocs in the postwar period. The tumultuous changes in Eastern Europe, as well as in the Baltic countries, have revealed the weak side of social democracy's peace policy: a tendency to preserve the *status quo*, sacrificing even the freedom-loving aspirations of nations. The fear of risking the loss of attained blessings, and an excessive pragmatism in making important political or moral choices, are threatening Western social democracy's prestige.

The revival of social democratic ideas amid the ruins of "real socialism" in Eastern Europe is a continuation of international social democracy, but, at the same time, it is a challenge of Western social democracy's excessive circumspection and caution. We shall bring the energy of national democratic liberation movements with us to a Europe superabounding with well-being.

Social democracy in Estonia will consolidate the concepts of social justice and national self-determination into a new whole. It will thereby oppose the vested party interests [the "partocracy"] protecting their power and the technocracy aspiring to power.

## 4. Goals of the Estonian Social Democratic Independence Party

Uniting the people who wish to participate in the independent democratic Estonian Republic's reestablishment and its formation based on the principles of social justice and societal openness is a goal of the Estonian Social Democratic Independence Party [ESDPN].

The ESDPN sees Eastern Europe's freeing from the ideological, political, and military shackles of the postwar "socialist camp" as prerequisite to the independent Estonian Republic's reestablishment. The ESDPN will make every effort to ensure that the Baltic nations' historical right to self-determination, and to the restoration of their sovereign statehood abolished during the Second World War, receives recognition and support at the Second Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We view a just resolution of the Baltic issue as part of Europe's new political, economic, and ecological order, which is removing the military blocs' strict barriers and setting the league of states and nations on the path of free choice and reciprocal economic cooperation.

The ESDPN considers a balance of individual and societal interests and a fair and equal attention to the needs of all social groups and strata to be basic principles of social life.

The ESDPN firmly opposes the state's being identified with any social group or party pressure apparatus. Neither one political institution nor one party or ideology can be an end in itself. The ESDPN considers the separation of powers, a multiparty system, the removal of ideology from education and culture, the priority of moral values over political goals, and equal respect for the rights of the individual and the nation to be fundamental.

The ESDPN recognizes societal life's self-organization and self-development, and rejects the absolutizing of any social order and the building of an idealized future socialist society on the basis of theoretical and ideological principles worked out beforehand. Recognizing the humanistic goals reflected in democratic socialism, the ESDPN attaches particular significance to understanding the significance of democratic socialism's ideas on the prospect of forming an information society [infoobshchestvo], which will entail entirely new economic and social relations. It is impossible to describe the ideas in terms of the 19th- and 20th-century industrial society's experience. The ESDPN wants to further the development of an Estonian society on the way to becoming an information society. In this society, a person's freedom is in harmony with his or her education and social responsibility. The aspiration to economic success is accompanied by deliberate cultural and ecological self-restraint. Such a society provides for and esteems competence, professionalism, and moral education, in the crop farmer no less than in the teacher, the engineer, and the shrewd businessman.

The ESDPN recognizes a growing role for nations at the present juncture. This role lies in the preservation, development, and protection from spiritual-resource leveling and coarsening of an informed, versatile, and developable mankind. The nation, as historical agent of collective cognition, is the repository of social memory and self-organizing capacity, and it safeguards the cultural environment that provides for the individual's free development, uniqueness, and autonomy.

The ESDPN sees in national statehood the most important mechanism for protecting the independence and continuity of small nations' cultures. The ESDPN is convinced that the rights of nations need more widespread international recognition and defense as an inseparable element of human rights.

The ESDPN is against all class privileges, and, among other things, it is against a special mission for the working class. The ESDPN regards the idea of dictatorship of the proletariat as erroneous, and forced change of social order as fatal to modern civilization.

The ESDPN defends the right of every family to make and protect its own home, and the right of every nation to create and defend its own state. The great and the small and the strong and the weak have equal right to

peace, freedom, and a secure future. That society is just which provides for the protection of the small and the weak.

The ESDPN takes a stand firmly against the national nihilism presently being manifested under the name of "proletarian internationalism." The ESDPN sees true internationalism in the free self-determination of nations and the mutual aid and cooperation of all nations for the sake of their freedom and sovereignty.

The ESDPN defends every person's right to keep his or her national identity wherever he or she may live, as well as the right of every nation to create all necessary conditions to preserve and develop its own culture in its own historical homeland.

The ESDPN considers the prevention of ethnic conflicts and ethnic inequality to be one of its main tasks in the future Estonia. The ESDPN considers the assuring of citizen's rights to all permanent residents of nonindigenous nationality and the creating of opportunities for their voluntary and equitable participation in the future Estonia's political, economic, and cultural life to be necessary, but on the condition that they respect the Estonian Republic's laws and way of life.

Non-Estonians' democratic participation in the independent Estonian State's reestablishment should become possible even today, when arguments about the state's revival and nature are in progress. It is natural that forces representing state institutions located beyond Estonia's borders and basing their activity, not on Estonian laws, but on those of some other state should be deprived of free participation in the Estonian State's internal political life.

The ESDPN sees development of the future Estonia's economy in accordance with the principles of free enterprise and diversity in forms of ownership, at the same time considering the establishment of public institutions for control over the distribution of public wealth and the careful use of national resources to be vitally necessary for the Estonian society's development.

We think that increase in industrial democracy serves as an important mechanism for ensuring balance in the economic attitudes and sense of confidence in the working person. In order to enhance rural life, it is necessary to give ownership of the land to those who work it.

The ESDPN supports ecological thinking and ecological action principles, and it cooperates with all organizations and institutions that fight for the protection of nature and preservation of the natural environment vital to man in Estonia.

The ESDPN regards the present stage of social development in the USSR as a breakdown in the ideological and political power structures. The intensifying struggle for power entails a danger of the rebirth of totalitarian dictatorship and neo-Bolshevist ideology. The deepening

economic crisis and social discontent may lead to violence and anarchy. Such a situation demands the readiness of all the democratic forces for a decisive struggle to continue and expand reform. In this regard, a multiparty system, free self-determination for the nations, a market economy, and decentralization of state power are mandatory requirements.

The ESDPN fights against the society's militarization. We are trying to bring about withdrawal of the USSR's troops from Estonia, and special negotiations should be undertaken to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union Government, in which the security of the Baltic States and Northern Europe, as well as the USSR, will be taken into account.

### 5. Prospects for Cooperation

The ESDPN's principles and activity are aimed at enlisting the participation of all Estonian patriots, regardless of ethnicity, to whom the idea of establishing a future sovereign Estonia as a democratic state in which economic struggle is combined with social and cultural enhancement goals, and in which freedom is not sacrificed for wealth, and nature and Estonia's vitally important environment are not sacrificed for the temptations of consumer civilization, is dear. We prefer to be free and poor rather than wealthy and dependent. We believe in our people's fondness for work and love of their homeland, but we also believe in their willingness to cooperate with other peoples.

In its conception of the future Estonia, the ESDPN relies on the belief that the younger generation, like young bees having flown about the wide world, has enough vigor and sense of responsibility to return from its flying after a few years, filled with willingness to build a new life in Estonia.

The ESDPN considers it its rightful mission to mobilize Estonian intellectuals in a struggle for their interests and the people's education because the interests of the teacher, the scientist, the physician, and the culture worker coincide with the interests of preserving and enhancing spirituality in the future Estonia.

The ESDPN considers the creation of an equitable life for that generation which has already completed its working career, and thanks to which a living link has been maintained between the past and the future, and the nation's memory and traditions have been preserved, to be its programmed responsibility. The status of retirees and the care for the very old and destitute are indicators of a society's development level.

Revitalized trade unions could become the ESDPN's natural partners because trade unions play a decisive part in protecting human rights. Furthering this is a social democratic tradition.

The ESDPN has a high regard for the political importance of the revitalized women's movement for Estonia's future—from it there is beginning a new attitude toward

the family and home as guarantor of the nation's continuation and moral self-purification. We attach great significance to participation in the international movement against the menace of war.

The relationships between the various parties and groups will be determined as a result of the way in which the future Estonia's political order takes shape. At the present time, the ESDPN sees the Estonian Democratic Labor Party, the goals of which largely coincide with ours, to the right of itself, and the Reform Party, which is striving for the Estonian Communist Party's independence—to the left. In this regard, we feel that the present communist party members' joining the ESDPN can occur, trustworthily from a moral standpoint, only on the basis of personal choice, not collective decision. This choice presupposes uncompromising self-purification and rejection of the Stalinist past and state socialism.

The aspirations of the Russian social democratic groups operating in Estonia are attractive and understandable to us. The members of the Estonian Socialist Party Association Abroad, who have carried the traditions of social democracy through all the trying years, are our ideological counterparts.

The ESDPN hopes for collegial and creative relations with the liberal and centrist associations that are springing up.

Having developed out of the People's Front, the ESDPN intends to further the former's reshaping into a free national democratic association.

The ESDPN will go into the elections on 18 March with the platform of the People's Front. In this regard, we are supporting the formation of a broad union of people's movements and the creation, after the elections, of a representative coalition government appropriate for the present crisis situation in Estonia. The replacability of the government and the existence of a strong opposition, which are intrinsic to democratic societies, are goals which will be realized in the process of getting out of the crisis situation. The ESDPN expresses willingness to remain in opposition, even in the future, because balance in a society can be ensured only when everyone who is in power has his or her strong ideological opponent. The ESDPN is not trying to gain popularity as an end in itself. Freedom, justice, and solidarity are values that do not depend upon political whims and advantages of the moment.

Peeter Vikhalemm, Reyn Vikhalemm, Yulo Vooglayd, Yulo Kayevats, Peet Kask, Maryu Lauristin, Mikhkel Pyarnoya, Reyn Ruutsoo, Mart Tarmak, Reyn Veydemann.

[Announcement:] On 11 and 12 January 1990, an Estonian social democratic mass meeting on the theme "Social Democracy in Modern Europe and Estonia's Political Future" will take place UNDER SPONSORSHIP of the

**People's Front of Estonia, the Estonian Democratic Labor Party, and the Estonian Social Democratic Independence Party's founding group.**

**Registration of mass-meeting participants and information, until 3 January, in Tallinn: People's Front of Estonia [NFE] Center (28 Uus Street), Sirye Trey (Tel: 44-92-36, from 1300 to 1500); in Tartu: 2-5 Kyuyutri Street, Margit Raudmyae (Tel: 34-323, from 1400 to 1600).**

**We ask that you send your opinions of the ESDPN's platform planks and applications for participation in the founding group's work to Tartu State University [TGU], Department of Journalism (Tartu 202400, 18 Yulikooli), addressed to Peeter Vikhalemm, or to the editorial office of the magazine RADUGA (Tallinn 200031, 30 Toompuyestee), addressed to Reyn Veydemann.**

**Free Democrats of Estonia Issue Manifesto**

*90UN0724A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII  
in Russian 4 Jan 90 p 4*

[Statement signed by 18 prospective founding members of new political party: "Manifesto of the Free Democrats of Estonia"]

[Text] Our guiding star is the experience of European liberal humanism and freedom, which, on the one hand, opposes the despotism emanating from the East, and, on the other, opposes the untrammelled spirit of gain as a distorted reflection of the Western life-style in our everyday consciousness.

We neither express nor defend the special interests of any one social group. We are oriented upon people of an independent and tolerant way of thinking. We want to oppose narrow-mindedness and fanaticism, regardless of whether the possessors of these champion a new or old common good or compulsory ideology. No ideology should be compulsory. We reject a policy that depends upon mass psychological influence.

Our policy is profoundly individualistic. We prefer individualism to collectivism.

At the same time, we do not forget that ethics are the fountainhead of the human spirit's activity, or that the highest manifestation of this activity is a sense of mission aimed at serving an ideal.

Our ideal is freedom.

We do not conceive of well-being without freedom.

We mean by freedom, not just political and economic freedom, but spiritual freedom as well. Only then will we be assured of the appearance of the prerequisites for the individual's and the society's self-governed development and the individual's freedom of self-realization in any walk of life.

The various forms of ownership, economic entities rendered autonomous, the market, free enterprise, and

private initiative must become the foundation of economic freedom. Socialist and pseudo-socialist ideas of society's transformation have compromised themselves.

We consider reduction of the state's importance in the society's life to be inevitable.

We think that the individual's rights are above state demands. We recognize the inviolability of private life and the primacy of human rights.

Even now, observing the society of the future arising before the Estonian people's eyes, we consider it necessary to call attention to the fact that economic achievements devoid of spiritual values lead to a blind alley. Therefore, we believe that, having become a political force, we are called upon to support the creation in Estonia of such a system of education, science, and culture as will be free of an ideology's strict regimentations and oppressions.

In advancing the attainment of well-being as our goal, we also view well-being as an economic and spiritual value. Well-being implies material and informational security, as well as a protected environment, a favorable spiritual climate, and a humanistically inclined, civilized society.

Democratic political rights are the only guarantee of any positive changes.

Only great spirituality, culture, an inner need for work, and true education can be the guarantee of democracy. These are our sword and shield.

Our goal—it is a society that will give every opportunity to the strong, and charity and sympathy to the weak. An individual's duties must be contingent upon his or her rights.

Favoring freedom and tolerance, we reject the use of force; however, we recognize every person's right to defense—whether the use of force originates with fellow citizens or with some state.

**Only in a free and independent Estonia, oriented upon Europe, can all of these principles be effectuated.**

We consider choice of the specific means for Estonia's attainment of independence a matter of tactics. We must be ready to take advantage of any opportunity for this purpose.

At the same time, we consider it essential to devote greater attention to the future Estonia, and to its state apparatus and the preparation of its political structure. A new Estonia is being born before our eyes, and our status in the changing world will be a new one, and we shall have new problems.

In joining in the preparation for the preelection campaigns, we will not be guided in the campaigns by aspiration to political dominance. We want to become the sort of political force, the platform planks of which will be taken into account by the government.

We want to have our representatives in both local self-government and the parliament; but, at the same time, we are counting on cooperation with other political forces that primarily take ethics, not self-aggrandizement, as the basis of their activity.

Based on the foregoing, we set about forming the Party of Free Democrats of Estonia.

**Ado Eygi, Ene Khion, Yaak Yyeryuyut, Tiit Kalyundi, Teet Kallas, Raymo Kangro, Ando Keskkyula, Andres Komtsus, Viivi Luuk, Enn Pyldroos, Ilmar Rattus, Paul-Eerik Rummo, Yaan Ruus, Mari Saat, Lepo Sumera, Khagi Sheyn, Kheynts Valk, Andra Veydemann.**

The telephone number for calls, from 1000 to 1200 on working days, is: 44-49-85.

### **Kirghiz CP Organizations Criticized for Slow Pace of Change**

*90US0381A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA  
in Russian 30 Nov 89 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "The Meeting of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee Commission on Organizational-Party and Cadre Work"]

[Text] A regular meeting of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee Commission on Organizational-Party and Cadre Work took place. The commission thoroughly analyzed the activity of the republic party organizations during the course of the preparations for and the conduct of the elections for USSR people's deputies. The report of N. Isanov, leader of the working group of the Central Committee commission to study the given issue, was heard.

It was noted at the session that under current complex conditions, individual party committees have proven unprepared for the political work in the election okrugs; they frequently lost the initiative, and manifested their incapacity to conduct organizational, ideological, and mass political work in a non-standard fashion. In connection with this, various proposals regarding the activation of the work of the primary party organizations in the election of deputies to local soviets of people's deputies were expressed and adopted for their recommendation for the period of the electoral campaign.

The commission heard the reports of the secretaries of the Tash-Kumyr party gorkom, and the Leninopolskiy, Oktyabrskiy, and Tyupskiy party raykoms on the strengthening of the political methods of perestroyka leadership in light of the decisions of the 12th Plenum of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee. The commission members noted the positive changes which have taken place in the work style and methods of the party committees. The practice of their work comprises constant meetings with communists, workers, party, trade union, Komsomol, and management collectives, and with veterans. Spending days in collectives, hearing open letters, having direct contacts with leaders, roundtables, press

conferences, visiting buro meetings, and plenums have become standard phenomena for party raykoms and gorkoms.

In consideration of the changing functions, content, and methods of work, proposals on departments of party committees, and the officials' positional responsibilities were confirmed. Long-term and current work plans which transfer the accent of the party committees' activity to the provinces, to the primary party organization, and to labor collectives were considered. In fact, they became plans for the restructuring of their work. "Passage" [skovznoye] curatorship was introduced.

The enterprises' positive experience in the transition to a leasing order, and the development of cooperative forms of labor organization came to be studied and generalized to a greater degree in the party committee economic leadership. Seminars to exchange work experience are being held on the basis of such enterprises.

Work with people at their place of residence is being restructured in the Oktyabrskiy Rayon. Community councils, headed by authoritative people, have been created and are functioning in all micro-districts of the private and public housing sector; non-charter party and Komsomol organizations are being created. The practical introduction of elements of public self-management and the concomitant increase in residents' social activity have allowed to a significant extent the resolution of matters of organization of public order, youth indoctrination, and public services organization, leading to more than a two-fold decrease in the volume of letters and complaints about social issues being addressed to the party raykom.

In supporting the work being conducted, the commission members simultaneously noted that the reorganization of the apparatus has not led to radical changes in the functions, content, or methods of its activity. Administration by injunction, duplication, and substitution of soviet and economic organs are still being manifested.

The commissions on trends in party work played a positive role in elevating the role and authority of the party electoral organs. However, due to the fact that their rights and responsibilities have still not been determined, a systematic approach is absent from their actions; for the time being, they are working ineffectively. Many of them have a fairly approximate idea of the work of the party electoral organs under modern conditions, and of interrelations with the apparatus. A lagging behind the processing taking place is frequently observed; mechanisms of political work capable of adequately reflecting the rapidly changing situation and expeditiously reviewing the party organs' activity have not been worked out. In particular, in the bodies of the party gorkom and raykom organizational departments, a group of instructors in effect is executing the operational-administrative functions in the area of economic management. During the course of the meeting, the

commission members introduced proposals on the creation of a republic discussion club of party committee secretaries.

The draft document "On the Course of the Execution of the Decisions of the 12th Plenum of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee on Strengthening the Political Methods of Perestroyka Leadership" was developed on the results of the commission's work.

The commission also discussed and confirmed a work plan for 1990.

The commission meeting was chaired by N.M. Chepelev, Kirghiz CP Central Committee second secretary.

### Pre-election Changes Noted by Kirghiz Party Official

90US0341B *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA*  
in Russian 5 Dec 89 p 2

[Interview with Zh. Ibraimov, first deputy department head, Kirghiz CP Central Committee Department of Organizational-Party and Cadre Work, by correspondent V. Chernyshev: "Time Has Chosen Us"]

[Text] **The Party Apparatus. From whom is it not getting grief today. It is accused of all evils from all sides. Some, in passing; some, by using arguments and facts, juggling them, more often than not, into a convenient order. Demands to take the apparatus in hand come from both high tribunes and dark gateways, releasing definitions of the "party chinovnik" type, the functionaries, the bureaucrats, etc. They attempt to turn the atmosphere of glasnost and democracy, created at the party's initiative, against the party itself. This is why the work style and methods of the party itself require renewal under the conditions of a political system renewing itself.**

**How is this process proceeding in the apparatus of our republic's party committees? What do they see as the chief meaning of their own perestroyka? This is the topic of conversation between SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA's correspondent and First Deputy Department Head, Kirghiz CP Central Committee Department of Organizational-party and Cadre Policy Zh. Ibraimov.**

[Correspondent] Zhumbek Ibraimovich, if I am not mistaken, you are from a working background; you have great experience with managerial work. You headed the labor collective of one of the industrial enterprises of the city of Rybachye. That is, your principles and views on life were formed in a production environment. And now you are the representative of the leading apparatus. In view of this, have your views on the work of the party apparatus changed, especially regarding the new conditions of its activity?

[Ibraimov] This is what I would like to talk about above all. In speaking of the apparatus, many people still try to represent it as before, as almost a special class of bureaucrats occupied only with bureaucratic games and concerned with their advancement on the nomenklatura

ladder. Obviously, there were such apparatchiks, but the majority of the current representatives of the apparatus are yesterday's workers, kolkhoz workers, and employees, nominated thanks to their business-like qualities.

True, speaking about people's qualities and capabilities, they should be delineated. Bureaucrats, you will agree, are also not devoid of capabilities. For example, what sort of mediocregualities are needed in order to create the appearance of bubbling activity while doing nothing? And any apparatus consists above all of people: creative people with initiative, and simple executors. And what is the paradox here? For example, we do not take it upon ourselves to judge an entire labor collective by the deeds of a single person. But here, having come up against a bureaucrat, we hasten to accuse the entire apparatus to which he belongs.

[Correspondent] And that, in my view, can be fully explained. After all, over the course of many decades, the command-order work methods of the party apparatus, and the exchange of functions of the soviet and economic organs was a determining factor in the style of party leadership.

[Ibraimov] Yes, naturally, such a conception of power generated blind obedience, and created the party apparatus's halo of infallibility. But today, when perestroyka has presented the party with completely new demands, when the Leninist principles of persuasion and indoctrination are being reborn in its work style, the people's attitudes to the party are changing as well. They are already not indifferent to how the party implements its leading role. That is why the party has taken up radical perestroyka. And it has begun above all with itself.

[Correspondent] Meaning, a new apparatus is needed under the new conditions?

[Ibraimov] It was stated simply at a CPSU Central Committee meeting this summer: "We need the apparatus. But the apparatus we need is new, capable of executing its functions in a qualified manner, of rendering broad-scale assistance to the elected organs." I would add to what was said: to be flexible and competent.

Radical measures to curtail and change the structure of the party apparatus have been implemented first and foremost to achieve this goal. In our republic, 145 people were let go during the course of the reorganization. Along with this, about 60 competent party members with initiative came into the apparatus of the republic Central Committee and obkoms. Suffice it to say that the majority of them have higher party-political education, an academic degree, or practical party work experience.

In beginning the cadre reformation of the party apparatus, we based our approach first and foremost upon

those demands which our times have presented to the party leadership. And in my opinion, today these consist of developing sufficiently precise paths of ideological provision of our society's life.

[Correspondent] Obviously, that is exactly what V.I. Lenin foresaw when he said that the leading party organs will come all the more to resemble scientific centers?

[Ibraimov] I completely agree. This thought of V.I. Lenin is topical and in accord with our day, when the scientific provision of party work is necessary for raising the authority of the party and its leading role in perestroika. That is why we must today reject the technocratic approach to the formation of the apparatus. An apparatus staffer must above all be a person of an intellectual mold, of fine culture, with initiative, and a creative thinker who can organize the masses on the basis of trust, conviction, and his personal example.

Naturally, we are not counting on anyone providing us with such people. Our task is to notice these qualities in a person in time, and to develop them capably. And of course, in doing so, we will not exclude from the equation the manifestation of personal initiative, a constant aspiration toward renewal in work forms and methods.

For this purpose, single-minded work to generalize and disseminate the leading experience is being conducted in the republic's party committees. Thus, a scientific and practical conference dedicated to topical issues of raising the role of the party committee instructor in perestroika was held in Osh in the beginning of this year. Practical seminars for leading party and soviet organs are regularly held on the basis of the republic's best party committees. In Osh and Issyk-Kul oblasts, clubs for business meetings of the primary leaders have been created; they are headed by the party obkom secretaries.

[Correspondent] Today it is completely clear that in party work, relying on achieved experience and intuition is not enough. Knowledge for practical work must constantly be drawn from the very thick of life itself, from contact with people. In light of this, I recall a recent conversation which took place at a shop party meeting at a Frunze enterprise. When the talk came around to the party raykom, one of the communists suddenly said, "I've been in the party for 40 years, but I can't recall the raykom secretary coming to the shop even once; he should be interested in how we live, what our concerns are. And maybe he could ask the soviet, and you'd see what things could be done together in the rayon."

[Ibraimov] Of course, one may only agree partially with whether or not the so fashionable "going to the people" [khozhdenie v narod] is the main condition for increasing the party aktiv's authority. Authority is earned by practical fulfillment of people's interests. It is another matter that there are among the party leaders some who either do not notice or do not want to notice that perestroika has literally stirred up the energy of the masses. The process of politicizing people's thought will grow in proportion to the pace of perestroika. But are

the committees and apparatus prepared to direct this energy to the needed channel? And the sooner we realize that the main sense of our work among people is to indoctrinate conscious political creation in them, the more real and weighty will be our success in perestroika.

[Correspondent] And for the time being we have to ascertain only insignificant movements in the process of perestroika of intraparty work. Our paper's readers cite in their letters a multitude of causes for this. Here is the isolation of the apparatus from the rank-and-file communists, and the decrease in the role of the primary party organizations, and the absence of broad glasnost in the affairs of the party itself. And one reader advised in his letter to the editor: "The fewer monologues there are in the party, the more time would remain for dialogue!"

[Ibraimov] Good advice! Yes, the habits of the years of stagnation are still strong in us, this attraction to monologues filled with appeals, advice, and moral lectures. Yet the times demand of us a transition to a frank dialogue with people. And we have to learn how to speak, to listen, to argue, if you will. Are not certain party workers losing their authority because until now they have not learned to listen to people.

It must be said that the course to the most effective forms of communication within party ranks has become one of our priorities. The republic CP Central Committee, obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms, the primary party organizations have reviewed the current and long-range work plans for the purpose of transferring the activity of the party committees to the primary party organizations and labor collectives. A resolution on minimizing documentation turnover has been adopted. In a number of party committees, curators have been registered in the party in one of the primary party organizations reserved for them. Members of elected organs have been drawn into lively activity.

I especially wish to underscore the fact the today, the interrelationships of the apparatus with the elected party organ are changing radically. So, for example, today it is becoming a rule that when the proposals prepared by the apparatus on the issues brought up for discussion by the buro or plenums, other important political document receive preliminary discussion at the commission meetings; these are required to include members of the party elected organs.

The party apparatus work practice encompasses constant meetings with communists and labor collectives. Holding open letter days, a direct conduit with the party leaders, has become a standard phenomenon, as have "roundtables" and press conferences.

Party Central Committee, obkom, raykom, and gorkom secretaries and members have begun to give lectures to and have discussions with the population more frequently, allowing them to become closer to people, to constantly seek their counsel. During the course of the current election report campaign alone, the Central Committee buro and party obkom members participated

in over 400 party meetings. The work of Kirghiz CP Central Committee brigades in the body of party, soviet, and managerial workers for the broad-range study of the state of affairs in the provinces, and their practical assistance, is in constant practice.

[Correspondent] Moreover, in my opinion, under the conditions of expanding glasnost, the workers of the party apparatus are underestimating one more important channel for dialogue with people, which is the mass information media, and even if the workers do take the step of appealing to the readers or television viewers, then their speeches are usually official and dry.

[Ibraimov] I cannot but agree with you. Indeed, even if the majority of party apparatus workers do utilize the mass information media in their work, then it is most likely because they have to. The aspiration to have constant dialogue with people via the mass information media must be a natural requirement of the party worker, a means of self-expression and of searching for like-minded people. And it is, in the final analysis, a form of activity which increases his personal authority and the authority of the entire party.

[Correspondent] Zhumabek Ibraimovich, a responsible stage of perestroika has unfolded in the country today; the formation of republic and local organs of power has begun. The main thought of the Appeal of Kirghiz CP Central Committee to the republic's party organizations, communists, and voters is to nominate and elect to the soviets energetic, authoritative people devoted to the cause of perestroika. What task has the republic party apparatus set for itself at this responsible moment?

[Ibraimov] The appeal simply states that the party organizations bear complete responsibility for the outcome of this important political campaign. And while many party organizations were going through the nominations and elections of USSR people's deputies in the spring of this year, it must be honestly admitted, they held a non-interference position in the pre-election campaign; now, we must take a firm position and take an active part in the nomination of candidates for deputy, decisively repulsing the demagogues, and steadfastly advocating the party position and its ideological platform.

Perestroika has chosen the current generation of communists, our time. And we must prove our faithfulness to the traditions of the revolution which perestroika carries on...

#### Violation of Nomination Procedures Noted in Kirghiz Rayon

90US0381C *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 5 Dec 89 p 1*

[Report by N. Dubrovin, senior consultant, republic election commission: "Holding Repeat Nomination Recommended"]

[Text] The work of the Kantskiy Rayon soviet of people's deputies on the preparations for and conduct of elections of Kirghiz SSR people's deputies was examined at the meeting of the republic election commission. A report was given by A. Tukbashev, chairman of the rayon soviet of people's deputies ispolkom.

The republic election commission noted that the Kantskiy rayispolkom is conducting definite organizational and political work in the preparation for and conduct of elections for Kirghiz SSR People's Deputies; measures have been developed and implemented which reflect the fundamental issues associated with the electoral campaign.

The reports of the Kantskiy city, and Novopokrovskiy and Birdikskiy village soviets on the preparations for elections were discussed at the rayon territorial commission meeting.

The nomination of representatives to the body of the okrug commission took place in labor collectives; two or more candidacies were discussed.

At the same time, the republic election commission noted the deficiencies and certain derelictions in the work of the ispolkom of the Kantskiy Rayon soviet of people's deputies.

In the rayon newspaper, there is no column "Toward the Elections" or on other subjects associated with the elections.

In accordance with the Kirghiz SSR "Law on the Elections of Kirghiz SSR People's Deputies," the organization of nomination of candidates for Kirghiz SSR people's deputies in labor collectives, voters' meetings, military servicemen's meetings, and collectives of teachers together with students of institutions of secondary and higher educational institutions is entrusted to the okrug election commissions. However, at the Kolkhoz imeni Kirov, they could not determine whom to nominate at a meeting of the kolkhoz's authorized agents. According to the law, it was necessary to conduct election of delegates to the kolkhoz's production subdivisions, to issue the delegates identification concerning their election, and then to hold the meeting on the nomination of the candidate for Kirghiz SSR People's Deputy.

But in the kolkhoz they had taken another route: They gathered the kolkhoz workers and held discussions of several candidacies for the nomination of candidates for Kirghiz SSR people's deputies without informing the okrug election commission (chairman M.L. Manuylenko) or the Novopokrovskiy village soviet of people's deputies ispolkom. And the presiding did not announce that a meeting of authorized agents was being held; no one had registered. Seventy-six people, and unauthorized representatives, villagers residing near the kolkhoz office, attended.

In view of these violations of the Law, the republic election commission recommended to the okrug election commission of Novopokrovskiy election okrug No. 80 that a repeat nomination be held in the Kolkhoz imeni Kirov.

It was proposed to the ispolkom of the rayon soviet of people's deputies that the exactingness of the ispolkoms of the city and village soviets in the preparation for and conduct of the elections of Kirghiz SSR people's deputies be raised, the agitation and propaganda work among the voters be activated, the Law and calendar plan of the fundamental measures for the preparation of and conduct of the elections of Kirghiz SSR people's deputies be strictly observed, and that more practical and methodological assistance be rendered to the okrug election commissions, activating their work, and that measures for timely nomination of deserving workers to the body of the district election commissions be taken.

#### **Ukrainian 'Counterrevolutionary' Group Rehabilitated**

*90UN0704A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 2, 8-14 Jan 90 pp 8-9*

[Article by V. Pristayko, chief, Investigative Department, Ukrainian SSR KGB: "A Myth Which Turned Into a Tragedy"]

[Text] Every day new and tragic pages of history are opening up before us. In my opinion, we must study them not only for the purpose of restoring justice and rehabilitating the victims of illegality and arbitrary rule, but also to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past in the future.

One such page, without any doubt, is the case of the UNTs [Ukrainian National Center], which was recently checked up on by the appropriate organs, and all those persons who had been convicted were rehabilitated. Now let's turn the floor over to V. Pristayko, chief, Investigative Department, Ukrainian SSR KGB.

Perhaps it's best that I begin with some dry, documentary information. During the years 1930-1931 the staff members of the Ukrainian SSR GPU [State Political Administration] in the city of Kharkov conducted a preliminary investigation on the criminal case involving the participants in the so-called "Ukrainian National Center". And on 7 February 1932, by a decree of the USSR OGPU [Unified State Political Administration] Collegium, 50 persons were subjected to various measures of criminal punishment.

According to the indictment, the persons charged with criminal liability were accused of preparing and conducting counterrevolutionary, nationalistic, and wrecking activities, of creating and directing a counterrevolutionary organization known as the "Ukrainian National Center." A component of the latter was the Galician "Ukrainian Military Organization" (UVO), which pursued the goal of overthrowing Soviet rule in the Ukraine by means of an armed uprising.

It must be said that we did not turn our attention to this case merely by chance. Everybody knows full well how acute the problems of inter-ethnic relations have become in recent times. It is also known that, in striving to resolve these problems, the interested parties frequently turn to history. Unfortunately, this approach is not always balanced or objective. Thus, in the Ukraine, to be specific, certain groups are now trying to portray the Banderovtsy, who were notorious for savage actions during the Great Patriotic War and after it, as virtually heroic fighters against Stalinist repression. Understandably, we will never be able to agree with such a distortion of the actual events. There are sufficient documentary materials concerning the essence of the OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists]-UPA [Ukrainian Insurrection Army] and the major crimes which they committed against their own people. These are also included in the investigations which were conducted in the criminal cases regarding their specific heinous crimes. On the eve of the war the OUN leaders entered into the service of Hitler's fascism. Diversionary sub-divisions of Ukrainian nationalists—the "Nachtrigal" and "Roland" legions—were included in the Abwehr formations. By the efforts of the German Fascists and Ukrainian nationalists, the "SS-Galichina" Division was formed in the Ukraine's Western oblasts. In August 1943 this division engaged in battles against the Kovpak partisan units, and then took part in battles at the front against the Soviet Army. In one such battle near the city of Brody, Lvov Oblast, the division was surrounded by Soviet troops and utterly defeated.

The armed forces of the Banderovtsy and OUN formations continued their evil deeds even after Hitler's forces had been driven out of the Western Ukraine. We must not forget about all this....

At the same time, we deem it our duty to restore justice regarding the alleged "Ukrainian nationalists," who innocently suffered under the Stalinist repressions.

There is yet another weighty reason why we have paid close attention to the UNTs case. Because, you know, some widely renowned persons were drawn into it. And to this day their fates disturb Ukrainian public opinion. Among them were: N. Chechel, chief, Ukrainian SSR Gosplan Construction Section; N. Shrag, deputy chief, Industrial-Economic Administration, VSNKh [Supreme National-Economic Council]; V. Golubovich, chief, Capital Construction Division, VSNKh; I. Lizanivskiy, chief, Rukh Publishing House; M. Yavorskiy, academician, VUAN [All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences], and many others. According to the archival documents, the head of this organization was M. Grushevskiy, a very important historian and former head of the bourgeois Ukrainian Central Council.

The scope of this case, as conceived by the OGPU staff members, is likewise attested by the fact that they thought of the UNTs as uniting not only all the revolutionary forces in our republic, but also, with the aid of the Second International, creating the conditions for

open aggression against the USSR by Poland, France, and the United States in order to seize the country and overthrow the Soviet government. Thus, the multi-faceted study of this case was linked not only with the need to restore truth re the activities of specific persons, but also to re-create an objective historical picture in the field of international relations.

In order to give you an idea of how complex it was to re-check the case of the UNTs—it was handled primarily by Major N. Koryagin, a senior investigator—let me say that the documents number tens of thousands of pages, bound in 120 volumes. It is likewise important to note, in my opinion, the fact that the myth of the UNTs was not just a primitive concoction, and it was not at all simple to distinguish it from reality. In reading the minutes of the interrogations, we ourselves would sometimes catch ourselves beginning to believe in the accumulation of the charges tied together into a well-constructed, completely logical scheme. Here, for example, is how one of the men convicted in the UNTs case explained in his testimony the reasons for "preparing the uprising": "...The abrupt change in the Soviet regime's policy in 1929, and specifically the measures for collectivization and liquidating the kulaks, were evaluated by us as a particularly suitable moment for fighting the Soviet regime. It was clear that such abrupt changes in the Soviet regime's policy in the rural areas would bring about great dissatisfaction among a certain part of the peasantry, spontaneous uprisings, etc. It was planned to use the spontaneous insurgent forces for an organized struggle against the Soviet regime, after subordinating these forces to our will. Inasmuch as victory was thought possible only with the help of an intervention, the organization of the uprising would have to be coordinated with the latter..."

At first glance, such testimony hardly seems absurd. Nor do the assertions that the Center's members were involved in directly supplying foreign consulates with information about the situation in the USSR; such members occupied responsible positions in the Soviet apparatus and had secret materials at their disposal by virtue of their service positions. "...Materials of a military nature for the Polish and French general staffs, as I have already testified, were transmitted by the UVU, whereas materials of a general political and economic nature were provided by the Center. The Center collected the necessary materials in Kharkov and Kiev.

"In Kiev this business was concentrated in the Commission for Studying the Ukraine's Production Forces under the VUAN. By using its high Soviet status, this commission collected valuable materials about the development of the national economy in the Ukraine, in particular, the status of industry, as well as abundant information of a general-political nature concerning the moods of the rural population, the progress of grain procurements, collectivization, etc."

The indictment also paid considerable attention to testimony about the terrorist intentions of the UNTs

members: "...This session was held at the beginning of 1929 in winter. It adopted the following plan: terrorist acts were scheduled to be carried out against the most prominent representatives of public and party life in Kharkov, i.e.: against Comrade Kosior, secretary of the Ukrainian KP(b) [Communist Party (bolshevik)] Central Committee; Comrade Balitskiy, chairman of the GPU; Comrade Skrypnik, of the People's Commissariat of Education, and in Moscow—against Comrade Stalin, General Secretary of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)]. When selecting the people and methods for carrying out terrorist acts, there were many disputes, and, at last they agreed on certain participants, according to my information, on such members of the UVU who were supposed to create the necessary cells."

I could go on citing such excerpts from the minutes of the interrogations for a long time. But I think that even these quotations are fully sufficient to draw a conclusion regarding the seeming verisimilitude of the testimony. In any case, we did not once encounter any clumsy, "meat-axe" types of charges, such as the one in the renowned film "Repentance," where a person is convicted of espionage for having supposedly intended to dig a tunnel from Bombay to London.

At the same time, the well-structured quality of the charges brought in connection with the UNTs case led us to believe that they had been specially instigated to fit into a scheme which has been very carefully thought out ahead of time. It was a scheme which, by the way, fit the indictment and into the show-type format suitable for a graphic performance. This version was likewise reinforced by our consultations with Ukrainian historians, who convincingly asserted that by the beginning of the 1930's the Ukraine had none of the objective prerequisites for creating such large-scale, ramified, counterrevolutionary organizations. On the other hand, we took into account the fact that during this period Stalin and his henchmen were preaching the idea of exacerbating the class struggle, calling for the exposure of wreckers in industry and agriculture, heating up an atmosphere of suspicion and fear under the pretext of combatting spies, terrorists, and counterrevolutionaries. Thus, the case of the UNTs, to which, moreover, a clearly expressed nationalistic quality was ascribed, was made a part of the Stalinist theory and, in our opinion, was slated to be conducted as a loudly ballyhooed show trial. But that such a trial did not take place attests to the fact that the organizers of the case decided, after all, not to risk it, and they "convicted" the accused behind closed doors, after handing them over to a "troika" under the Collegium of the Ukrainian SSR GPU.

It must be said that reasons for certain doubts—despite the solid verisimilitude of the constructed myth—obviously did exist among its creators. Because, you know, at the beginning of the 1930's open court trials still did not always end the way that the representatives of the punitive organs would wish. Furthermore, the case against the UNTs had been built solely on the testimony and confessions of the accused, as well as the deductions

of the prosecutors. As we became convinced during our extremely careful checkup, there were no proofs whatsoever, and for us as jurists, this is the most important factor in reaching conclusions. Here, for example, we read in the indictment that "the insurgent detachments of the Chernigov, Kiev, and Poltava groups, totaling 5,000-6,000 men were supposed to begin moving in the direction of Kiev and to capture it." But the following question arises: Why are there absolutely no proofs that these insurgent detachments existed—and they are mentioned several times in the case? And to suppose that discovered counterrevolutionary cells would remain without being disarmed, is, to say the least, silly. No less suspicious appears the testimony of the accused concerning the supposed large-scale financial aid to be received by the UNTs from abroad:

"In all...he turned over 320,000 rubles for the counterrevolutionary organization to last through 1928 and half of 1929. He suggested that I hand this money over to Grushevskiy, the leader of the counterrevolutionary organization in the Ukraine. He explained to me that this money was from American sources and from the Czechoslovak government.

"...Money used to arrive from Paris...from those persons close to and likeminded with Briand..."

"...Money was being sent to the counterrevolutionary organization...from the German Social-Democrats...."

"...The Center used to receive money from Polish anti-Soviet circles...."

One could go on citing similar testimony, but it is all disproved by a single circumstance. This case lacks even a miserly sum of money taken as proof. And so it must be that this financial aid is simply the fruit of the imagination concocted by those persons who created the false myth about the UNTs. And many people nowadays have a good knowledge of how the necessary testimony was obtained at that time from those persons under investigation.

"...Over a period of 8-9 days I was interrogated without interruption and not given a chance to rest.... Several times they used the technique of staging a mock execution of me by shooting. Such psychological techniques continued for about nine months, and I, naturally, could not hold out any more, so I gave them the testimony which the investigator Bordon needed. All my testimony was false, and I now renounce it...."

"...We were kept in one room together with another person accused in the 'UNTs case'. And he was urging all of us to do what was stipulated; he helped to draw up the imagined testimony for the investigators. He explained this by the fact that, in reality, there was no such organization in the Ukraine, but it was being created for the purpose of discrediting the Second International in the eyes of the entire world..., to exhibit to the workers the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the role of enemies of the Soviet regime, undermining the building of socialism.

We, the intelligentsia, were being called upon to take upon ourselves the mission of confessing our participation in this counterrevolutionary organization and to bear a certain, limited punishment. This was required by the course of development of the socialist society in our country...."

It must be said that the members of the OGPU Collegium who came to a decision regarding the UNTs case probably even themselves understood full well the true price of the "confessions" made by the accused. In any case, this was attested to by the "sentences": for a cluster of very serious "crimes" those persons convicted were subjected to punishments which were relatively mild for those times—incarceration for terms ranging from three to six years. And M. Grushevskiy, the leader of the counterrevolutionary nationalist organization, was set completely free after having been brought to Moscow upon the order of Yagoda, then deputy chairman of USSR OGPU. There, at the interrogation by Agranov, chief of the secret political division, he declared that "not being able to bear up under the onslaught of the investigators," he had mentioned the names of a number of persons as belonging to the non-existent anti-Soviet organization. In the report which Agranov addressed to Yagoda he indicated the following: "...No insurgent organization headed up by Grushevskiy or those circles close to him existed, nor were there any insurgent tendencies among his political friends."

Nevertheless, 50 prominent, well-known persons at that time were still subjected to repression.... Subsequently on a few of them succeeded in returning home. During the years 1934-1941, 33 out of these 50 were involved in criminal responsibility for "anti-Soviet activities" and "espionage." Twenty-one of them were shot to death. Twelve had their terms of incarceration extended. Most of them died in the camps. Right up to the last days of Grushevskiy's life, the OGPU continued to keep him "on the hook"; they dropped the criminal case against him only in connection with his death in 1933.

Such was the tragic conclusion of the myth about the UNTs, contradictory rumors about which have persisted into our own times.

We were substantially helped in our work by the checkups which were carried out in the late 1950's, the 1960's, and the 1970's on "parallel cases." In particular, it was established that the criminal case regarding the existence in the territory of the Ukrainian SSR of a ramified organization known as the "UVO"—it was supposedly a component of the UNTs—and the participation therein by the accused had been fabricated by the investigatory organs. The Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court in its determination dated 11 September 1958 with regard to the accused in the case in question indicated the following: "...They were all convicted without grounds, according to falsified materials, and the testimony which they gave at the preliminary investigation about their membership in the 'UVO' was invented. The materials of the checkup have established

that the case of the existence on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR of a ramified counterrevolutionary organization known as the 'UVO', directed by the persons convicted in this case, was falsified by the investigatory organs."

As to the participants in the alleged UNTs, after we had conducted our supplementary checkup, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Court, relying on its results, closed down the criminal case concerning three persons still subject to repression in 1988. The remaining 47 persons have been rehabilitated on the basis of the Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium entitled "On Additional Measures To Restore Justice with Regard to Victims of Repressions Which Took Place During the Period of the 1930's, 1940's, and Early 1950's."

#### In Place of An Afterword

**Excerpt from a speech by N. Golushko, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR KGB, at a meeting with journalists, writers, scholars, and representatives of the public.**

In total, during the period which has elapsed since the 20th Congress more than 400,000 persons have been rehabilitated in this republic; of these, 112,000 have been rehabilitated during the past year and a half. Researches in the archival materials on such "organizations" as the UNTs, the SVU [Association for Liberation of the Ukraine], the POV [Polish Military Organization], the UVO [Ukrainian Military Organization], the wrecking counterrevolutionary organization in the Ukraine, and others have shown that they did not, in fact, exist, and the charges brought against their members were based on data falsified during the course of investigations and court trials.

In studying the archival materials of past years, the Chekists of the present generation have painfully perceived the illegalities with regard to innocent persons. Were not the fates suffered by the following persons indeed tragic: S. Kosior, first secretary of the Ukrainian KP(b) Central Committee; S. Andreyv, first secretary of the Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee; as well as the outstanding party leaders V. Zatonskiy, A. Lobchenko, and M. Khatayevich? No less tragic were the fates of K. Kvyatek, deputy commander of the troops of the Kharkov Military District; as well as the political leader A. Shumskiy, the artist M. Boychuk, and many other honor Soviet people who were devoted to the Communist Party, but who were deemed to be "enemies of the people" and unjustly subjected to repressions.

While sincerely sharing the nationwide pain, we are striving to return the good name to everyone who innocently suffered during the years of the Cult of Personality. Nor can we forget about those Chekists who were also subjected to repression. Because, you know, they were the first to see the advancing danger. Despite the fact that Yezhov, and later Beriya, in carrying out Stalin's wishes, organized the liquidation of devoted Communists, introduced a spirit of distrust into the activity of these organs, deployed personnel according to

the principle of personal loyalty, encouraging illegality and careerism, many Chekists spoke out against these methods and paid for this with their own lives. More than 20,000 honorable staff members of the state security organs, devoted to the people, including 1,199 leading officials in the Ukraine were shot to death. Some Chekists, because they did not want to carry out directives from above concerning the conduct of mass repressions, committed suicide.

To our way of thinking, rehabilitation is not merely the return of a good name or the restoration of justice. No less important is its task of strengthening legality, as well as law and order. There must be no repetition of the times of the "celebrated" cases and trials, the times of the "leader without sin," the times of the "lawyer" Vyshinskiy, the times of Yezhov's "iron-fisted rule."

**This item was prepared for publication by Nikolay Baklanov, SOYUZ's staff correspondent for the Ukrainian SSR.**

Kiev.

#### Uzbek Supreme Soviet Meets on Implementation of Civil Unrest Laws

*90US0397A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
10 Dec 89 p 2*

[Article by UzTAG correspondent A. Baranov: "The Law Demands Action: From the Uzbek SSR Supreme Court Plenum"]

[Text] A plenum of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Court has examined the question of how, in practice, the courts are implementing legislation concerning responsibility for violation of established procedures for the organization and conduct of gatherings, mass meetings, street processions, demonstrations, and violations of the law that are connected with them.

The question is not a routine one, considering the realities of the social and political situation that has developed today both in the country as a whole and in Uzbekistan. This was fully demonstrated by the course of discussions, in which there were twice as many participants as had originally signed up indicating their desire to speak in the debates. The discussion was sharp and pluralistic. Individual points in the report delivered by the chairman of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Court, B. M. Malikov, as well the practice itself of legal proceedings within the republic were subjected to criticism and various, sometimes directly opposing views and conclusions were expressed.

The only point of unanimity in the report and the addresses was a recognition of the prime importance of the problem that had been raised, of the very posing of this question stemming from the resolution "On measures for stabilizing the social and political situation within the republic," passed by the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet on 21 October of this year.

This situation, as was noted at the plenum, remains extremely complex. There has been no decrease in social tensions that have arisen here, as everywhere in the country, criminality is increasing, and public, state, and labor discipline has declined. Incidents have become more frequent of violations of public order, when various kinds of irresponsible and ill-intentioned persons, sometimes out-and-out criminals, are taking upon themselves the right to speak on the name of the people of the republic, are trying to introduce chaos during the holding of mass meetings and demonstrations, are encouraging people to violence and excess, and are making crude attacks against our social system, against the party and the government.

This is why the Supreme Soviet resolution demands that law enforcement organs strictly and consistently observe the law, which excludes tolerance and liberalism with regard to anti-social elements and which requires that the legal measures stipulated by law be applied to them.

Study of the question during preparations for the plenum—and, as the report stated, more than 600 administrative files and 30 criminal cases were examined—fully supports the justice and basis of these demands. Practically all unauthorized meetings, marches and demonstrations that have taken place within the republic have been accompanied by illegal actions and crimes—ones such as hooliganism and infringements on the life, health, honor and virtue of militia workers and voluntary public order squads. And in Fergana Oblast, in general, they have developed into vile and bloody orgies—into arson, pogroms, robberies, premeditated murders,

A detailed analysis was made at the plenum of the situation that has developed in connection with examination by the courts of criminal cases and materials connected with the unhappily recalled Fergana events. The general conclusion: This situation is unsatisfactory and completely intolerable.

More than five months have passed since those days. During this time, the oblast's courts have considered 36 criminal cases, on the basis of which 47 persons have been sentenced. A large number of cases have been transferred to the courts of other oblasts in the republic for consideration. Eight hundred and fifteen persons have been subjected to administrative action.

In the course of discussion, the assessment given these figures was uniformly negative. More than 100 persons were killed during these events. However, up until now, the investigative group that is working within the oblast, in which almost 300 workers are employed, has sent the courts a total of three criminal cases that are connected with intentional killings. There are dozens of cases coming in that involve thefts, stolen automobiles, and the carrying of weapons other than firearms. "And where are the rest of the cases that involve murder, acts of violence, arson?"—this was the question that resounded

at the plenum. Indeed, not a single instigator of such crimes has been brought to court.

We permit ourselves to disagree with those speeches in which it was asserted that, up until now, the overall picture of the Fergana events is unclear, that a precise evaluation has still not been made of them. Such an assessment was made, a completely clear and precise one, way back in June—in the resolution of the 15th Plenum of the Uzbek CP Central Committee "On the work results and conclusions of the Uzbek SSR Central Committee with regard to investigation of the circumstances relating to events in Fergana Oblast and measures for stabilization of the situation and increasing the effectiveness of the work of the party organs of the republic" and later in the above-mentioned document of the republic's Supreme Soviet and in materials from the session of the supreme organ of state power.

It follows from this assessment that any kind of judgment about the Fergana events having a nationalistic and political nature is absolutely without basis. There were no "ideological fighters" there; it was the behind-the-scenes bosses and instigators—dealers in the "shadow" economy, criminal recidivists, corrupt politicians thirsting to seize power and not disdaining any means for achievement of their dirty goals—who tried to give a political coloration to these events. Who are they? Unfortunately, there is still no answer. But figures such as the following were presented at the plenum: Fifteen percent of those tried on criminal charges were not persons of Uzbek nationality and more than 100 such persons were subjected to administrative penalties.

"We have considered and do consider the offenses that were committed during the Fergana events to be crimes" the report states. "All those guilty of them should receive the punishment they deserve, irrespective of nationality."

Incidentally, the resolution of the June Plenum of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, in addition to a general evaluation of the character of events in the Fergana valley, stated with absolute clarity that the Central Committee condemned the inaction and indecisiveness of law enforcement organs in putting a stop to the mass disorders. This thesis also received all-round affirmation in the course of discussions at the Uzbek SSR Supreme Court plenum. The speakers expressed and actively supported the view that the bloody outcome in June might not have resulted if, in May, when conflict arose in Kuvasay, officials had not attempted to conceal its seriousness and to put the matter "on hold," but had used the law decisively and had openly punished, as they deserved, those responsible for the disgraceful fighting that was unleashed there and for the killings committed in it.

Worse than this, the speakers said, the shameful practice of non-participation, of oversimplification, and of laxity in bringing people to account continues to survive within the courts today. In an analysis of matters connected

with the Fergana events, incidents have been uncovered when people who committed obvious crimes—violence, arson, and theft, who incited the aroused crowd to violence, and who unconditionally were liable to criminal penalties, were handed purely symbolic administrative sentences—15-day arrests for minor hooliganism or insignificant monetary fines. These are not isolated incidents. Neither the procuracy nor the Fergana Oblast court put a stop to the lawlessness or changed a single decision on grounds of unjustified leniency and legal “toothlessness.” In essence, they distanced themselves from fulfillment of their judicial duties.

This is not a matter of being bloodthirsty or of seeking revenge for what happened, it was emphasized at the plenum. The law—this tool handed to the organs of justice, to all law enforcement organs—should function to protect society against lawlessness, to ensure a normal life, unclouded by anything, for every Soviet citizen.

Nevertheless, it—this law—still does not work well—and not only in Fergana. Analysis of the practical application by the courts of the laws that relate to responsibility for violations of established procedures for organizing and conducting gatherings, meetings, street processions and demonstrations has shown—many such examples were presented in the report and the addresses—that the courts sometimes do not know the elementary norms of existing legislation, demonstrate a lack of principle and oversimplification, and reach “stereotyped,” formalistic decisions that not only do not help to strengthen legality but, on the contrary, provoke the justified indignation of our citizens. This dissatisfaction only plays into the hands of those who find it advantageous to use it to inflame the situation, to supercharge social tensions.

Organizers of and active participants in unauthorized demonstrations and meetings, malicious violators of public order, are often not being called to administrative and criminal account. There are cases of red tape and of imposition of unjustifiably lenient administrative punishments.

It was noted at the plenum, that prophylactic work has been destroyed by the courts, in the full sense of this word. Frequently, elementary requirements of the law relating to the prevention of crimes and other violations of the law are not being met. Of the seven hundred administrative cases of this sort that were studied in the course of preparations for this discussion, not a one was examined in court sessions, and this includes practically all cases connected with the events in Fergana Oblast as well as those concerning illegal meetings and demonstrations held in Tashkent and in Namangan and Samarkand oblasts.

Emphasis was placed on the necessity of improving the quality of individual [chastniy] judicial determinations, of establishing the strictest control over how they are carried out: When considering cases and materials regarding unauthorized meetings and demonstrations

and violations of the law connected with them, it is specifically such determinations that can play a particularly important prophylactic role. Nevertheless, the courts initiate them very sparingly and a majority of them are formalistic and stereotyped. However, even with such quality, 60 percent of the individual determinations that have been initiated remain without an answer, and the courts either cannot or do not want to call the guilty officials to order. And, indeed, this year a law has already gone into effect regarding disrespect to the court, which contain Article 7 that specifically establishes administrative responsibility for the failure to take measures based upon an individual determination of a court or the decision of a judge. The courts must ensure unconditional application of this article, it was noted at the plenum.

The following participated in the discussion of this question submitted for examination: members of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Court L.M. Khomenker and S. Kadyro; the chairmen of the Fergana and Namangan oblast courts, N.S. Siddikov and K. Kamilov; the chairman of the Tashkent city court, K.N. Nasirov; the deputy Uzbek SSR minister of internal affairs, T.A. Tokhtayev; Uzbek SSR Ministry of Justice collegium member B.M. Mustafayev; MVD Higher School faculty head G.A. Abdumadzhidov, and others who took part in the meeting.

Other questions envisaged by the agenda were discussed at the plenum.

#### Writer Alleges 'Dozens' of Election Law Violations in Uzbekistan

18120108 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 3, 28 Jan-4 Feb 90 p 5

[Article by Timur Pulatov, people's writer of Uzbekistan, Tashkent: “Apparat Games Continue.” Correct date for MOSCOW NEWS No 3 is believed to be 21 Jan 90.]

[Text] I don't know about other Republics, but in my native Uzbekistan the heated emotions that accompany the nomination of candidates for people's deputies have been soured by discontent and protest.

The public has come to know of a “warrant” compiled in the secrecy of bureaucratic offices listing over 50 functionaries recommended to the district election commissions in Tashkent as compulsory candidates to the Uzbek Supreme Soviet. For the most part, they are members of the Party apparat at the district and city levels, as well as secretaries of Party committees at enterprises and offices, chiefs of executive committees, plus a number of people not directly involved with the apparat, but apparently favoured by it. The list also recommends a place and time for each nomination. Curiously enough, some of the “nomenklatura” types listed, uncertain of getting the nomination in the desired

district, have proposed alternative ones. Before finalizing the list, the "apparat" obviously took the trouble to poll its future candidates.

Honestly, I found it difficult to believe in the reality of this new spiral of apparat games. It seemed impossible that just as it did five years ago, the apparat had once again compiled a compulsory list of nominees for deputies' seats in order to create a manageable Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR. But the facts were indisputable. And they aroused public indignation. Uzbek writers demanded that an extraordinary plenum of their creative union be convened in order to nominate our own challengers to the apparat-recommended candidates.

Constituents in the traditional communities (mahallahs) known for their solidarity displayed unprecedented activity. But the apparat forged ahead with its usual games. Late in November, an initiative group from three mahallahs numbering almost 20,000 constituents in Tashkent's Oktyabrsky District asked their respective election commission to allocate them a conference room for an election meeting. The meeting which was expected to nominate the prominent dramatist A. Ibragimov was fixed for December 10. But while the grass-roots activists waited for the reply from the election commission, another meeting was convened in the same constituency, which nominated Chairperson Kh. Usmanova of the District Executive Committee as the only candidate. The audience consisted of the local mahallah residents and members of the apparat. They voted to nominate her for election without any alternative.

Dozens of reports about violations of the Election Law pour into editorial offices of Uzbek newspapers, but all they publish are information bulletins from the Central Election Commission about the nomination campaign proceeding "in strict conformity with the Law."

TASHKENT PRAVDA, at long last, exploded with rage in its December 20 report of a fact that "made even the reporter doubt his eyes", as the correspondent put it. The election commission of Tashkent's Constituency No. 56 refused to register the nomination of I. Buriyev, deputy director of the Sredazneftegazstroy association, on the pretext that he did not live or work in the given constituency. (Such candidates are not to be nominated, "as a rule", as the Law puts it.) However, two of the organizations belonging to the said association are situated on the territory of the constituency, and they voted for his nomination. Having received no answer from the election commission, a group of concerned constituents

turned to the Chilanzarsky District Executive Committee and were informed that the ambiguous "as a rule" was ignored only when the nominee was an official of the Republican calibre.

"But isn't Comrade Buriyev, a member of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, of exactly that calibre?" the concerned constituents asked—and got no clear answer.

I could mention many cases in which officials of lesser calibre living and working in, say, Tashkent, were registered as candidates for the constituencies in the Bukhara Region, the city of Ferghana, or rural areas. Alas, wherever the constituents are passive, the apparat finds it easy to promote its own candidates. TASHKENT PRAVDA did not tell the whole story of the Buriyev case. He was not on the "recommended list" because he openly struggles against the vices the apparat officials are so prone to.

As Secretary of the City Party Committee he challenged Rashidov's corrupt underlings, such as A. Karimov (since then tried and convicted) and A. Adylov (still awaiting trial). Convicted on false charges and sentenced to nine years in jail, he was rehabilitated in May 1985. Released from prison he began fighting against the then First Secretary of the Uzbek CP Central Committee I. Usmankhodzhayev whose corrupt practices were also well known to Buriyev.

A short time ago, speaking at a Republican Party Plenary Meeting, Buriyev accused A. Yefimov, Secretary of the Central Committee, of arrogance and lack of respect for the people he witnessed when Yefimov was First Secretary of the Navoi Regional Party Committee. At that time Buriyev himself worked in Navoi as Chairman of the Regional Executive Committee, so his charges were well documented. Such are the facts that come to mind in view of the apparat's obvious reluctance to have Buriyev as a people's deputy.

Reflecting on the continuing games of the apparat I do not wish to cast a shadow on all the candidates included on the "recommended" list. There are many respectable and worthy people on it. And yet, how can one talk of pluralism and the search for optimal ways of development in Uzbekistan if the Republic's future Supreme Soviet does not represent all existing social movements, strata, and groups? Election commission pettifoggery has virtually put the artistic intelligentsia out of action, with the exception of a few persons the apparat finds trustworthy enough. To be sure, even these have been nominated in constituencies with no alternative candidate. Not a single candidate proposed by unofficial movements has made it through the registration hurdle. But running for the 500 seats in the Uzbek Supreme Soviet will be about 200 Party functionaries of various levels, for the most part unchallenged.

**Estonia's Sillaste on Economy, Ethnic Relations  
Link**

90UN0661A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in  
Russian 6 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview with Estonian SSR Goskomtrud Chairman Yukhan Kheyovich Sillaste, by Yu. Kogtev: "The Poor Economy is the Cause of the People's Quarrel"; date and place not indicated]

[Text] *Investigating the source of the inter-ethnic conflicts, the outward manifestation of which we are all well-acquainted with, means to avoid repeating them. About this—a conversation with Estonian SSR Goskomtrud [State Committee on Labor and Social Problems] Chairman, Candidate of Economic Sciences Yu.Kh. Sillaste.*

[Kogtev] Yukhan Kheyovich, first of all let us point to the ultimate goal of the series of reforms.

[Sillaste] The basic features of the model to which we are directing our attention are found in the concept of republic economic independence, known by the first letters of its Estonian title as IME [Self-Managing Estonia]. Its purpose is to correct the disproportions and contradictions that have sprung up in our economy.

How this system came to pass is a subject for another conversation, but it has a large reserve of built-in endurance.

For decades the country's economy was built on extremely cheap and controlled manpower, shorn of its roots, property and connections with its native land—everything that makes a person a citizen. Just think: in years past, Beria's agency provided up to one-third of the national income!..

Alas, it is only in recent years that we have begun to realize the inhumanity of such a policy, and the illusory nature of attempts to build a flourishing society while reducing a person's role to that of a "labor resource," or "planning unit." The many years of practicing centralized planning and the incredible concentration of resources, without considering the people's social interests and their national peculiarities, are now being repaid with colossal losses and inter-ethnic friction.

[Kogtev] Nevertheless, in your republic they do have their own specific features?

[Sillaste] That is so. But in order to understand what that consists of one has to put oneself in the position of the central departments. Their goal is to increase production, avoiding as much as possible, or minimizing, expenditures. From this point of view it is more advantages to build a new combine right here in the Baltic Littoral, where the social infrastructure is relatively developed; and not in, say, Central Asia, although it is precisely there that they have an abundance of manpower. But then, it's not hard to import "labor resources"...

I'll give you an example of the departmental approach that does not take into consideration the far-reaching demographic consequences. At the middle of the last century, the Krengolmskiy Textile Mill was founded in Estonia. Raw materials for the mill were received via sea route from England. Time passed, and the cotton-suppliers were changed. During the war, the combine suffered severe damage and only the walls were left standing. The question arose, where should it be restored—on the previous site, or in Central Asia where, incidentally, they also raise cotton? The departmental approach won.

[Kogtev] But after all, what you are talking about can be applied to any region with a developed industrial and social infrastructure; for example, in Moscow and Moscow Oblast there is the problem of the "limiters."

[Sillaste] True, but I am trying to explain that the basis of our problem lies in the classic conflict between the command-administrative system and the everyday interests of the populace, although in our republic it comes out at times in the form of inter-ethnic differences. This is reflected in the fact that enterprises which were once bilingual are step-by-step becoming homogeneous in terms of their ethnic make-up.

I began my working life as a lathe operator at an electric motor plant. We knew of no ethnic problems in our bilingual collective. But then the following took place: technological renovation of the enterprise ceased, while at the same time the prestige of unskilled labor fell sharply. Then the cadre make-up was changed. It was replaced by immigrants from Pskov, Kalinin and other neighboring villages. But this caused no embarrassment to anyone in branch management. Why get involved with modernization when you can import a hundred or more men, take them from worse to poor conditions, and pay them off not by means of enterprise funds, but by means of the social infrastructure established in the republic?

Add one more circumstance: the machinery has worn out, but the plans were increased. How can they be fulfilled? Only by means of overtime. Clearly, such a work schedule would be suitable only to immigrants—first of all, people counting on the prospects of an apartment; and secondly, people with no ties with home and their families. There's a mechanism for social stratification for you. Today things have gone so far that enterprises are more and more often forced to make use of forced labor. For example, the Narva building materials combine, instead of somehow alleviating working conditions in production took an easier way out: they constructed a nine-story apartment complex with decorative barred windows, and filled it with "chemists." They have to fulfill the plan somehow! One wonders what their next step will be?..

On the whole it is time to honestly admit that our problems begin with the economy, and not with linguistic or ethnic peculiarities, and only later on take on

the form of inter-ethnic relations. The poor economy is what's causing the people to fall out.

And this is why our attempts to shut off the migration pump has caused such a negative reaction at the enterprises.

[Kogtev] But as you know, it is not only the directors who are opposed to that solution...

[Sillaste] That's a tough question. Limiting migration is no less advantageous to the immigrants than to the local population, since the proposed draft laws stipulate firm guarantees for the rights of the immigrants. But it's hard to bring this fact to the attention of a portion of society: there are psychological barriers to overcome.

It goes without saying that the indigenous population has its own interests in halting immigration. Take for example such cities as Narva, Sillamae, and others, where we see that the proportion of the Estonian population, which until recently comprised an absolute majority, has by virtue of the influx of migrants and other reasons, been reduced to a certain percentage. The threat of loss of one's language and national cultural traditions is raised. All this cannot but disturb the Estonians, as it would no doubt disturb representatives of any other nationality... And nevertheless, the principal purpose of the measures being taken is to establish, on the territory of the republic, living conditions suitable for a human being regardless of his nationality.

[Kogtev] Not so long ago you introduced a fee for labor resources, levied on the enterprises for the purpose of settling the immigrants. But this measure is not entirely solving of the problem.

[Sillaste] No, and for two reasons. First of all, putting money into the accounts of local government organs does not yet mean apartments and stores. Here one has to add rapid inflation. Secondly, the sum of 16,000 rubles established for Tallinn covers only the cost of the infrastructure. But a wholesome life for a man, I am deeply convinced, involves not only the use of the services sphere, but also assimilating the cultural and historical features of the land on which a person has settled, becoming a part of its linguistic milieu, inculcating an attitude of respect for the national traditions of the native populace; and finally, acknowledging the sovereign interests of the republic to live on, as one's own.

And this is why we believe that an entire complex of laws is needed to regulate social policy in Estonia. Distortions caused by poor planning ought to be corrected with the assistance of the planning and economic mechanisms as well. The republic government is obliged, in our view, to assume responsibility for providing a wholesome life for our guests, for language training, and for overcoming other difficulties in adaptation. We take the position that it is inhuman to condemn people to live in dormitories for ten years and more, to keep them on the waiting list for an apartment for years and years, and to isolate them

from the linguistic and cultural environment of the territory on which they work.

And what does the existing resettlement system offer? It covers the costs of shipment of 500 kilograms of baggage, and six-day's pay allocated for getting used to the new situation, and that's it! After this, a person is considered ready to carry out his functions as an ordinary working entity.

We propose a different system: an enterprise interested in a worker places an order with the appropriate service of a local Soviet. And the Soviet decides the question on the basis of available material resources.

The consequences of scorning a social policy are seen today in many spheres of life and in many regions of the country. The necessity of quenching the flames of social tensions springing up left and right in our society requires decisive and well-considered measures in order to regulate job-placement for the populace and the processes connected with it. Yes, we must explain, try to convince, arrive at compromises, avoid social collisions and conflicts, and at the same time persistently strive for changes—in the name of eliminating the disproportions and contradictions that have evolved in our economy.

**POSTSCRIPT: On 27 December 1989, the Estonian Supreme Soviet abolished the Estonian SSR Goskomtrud and organized the Estonian SSR Ministry of Social Problems, headed by Yu.Kh. Sillaste.**

#### **Anti-Georgian Intrigues at People's Congress Alleged**

*90US0424A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian  
29 Dec 89 p 4*

[Article by Lyudmila Esvandzhiya: "What Lies Behind the Close-up Photos?"]

[Text] Today it is quite clear that of the two out of three versions of actions our deputies had previously agreed upon, the following appeal should have been heard:

#### **Appeal to the 2nd Congress of USSR People's Deputies**

*We, the People's Deputies from Georgia, appeal to you, the honorable chairman, and to all the honorable deputies. We appeal to your sense of morality and to your civic conscience.*

*Together with all the nations of the Soviet Union Georgia has more than once experienced the bloody influence of a totalitarian regime. The people remember 1924, and 1937, and 1951; and even after the Stalin epoch, the year 1956, when hundreds of defenseless young men and women were gunned down in the streets of Tbilisi. And here once again demonstrators have been murdered—this time, in April 1989. The nation endured this event as a national catastrophe. True, the situation has changed in comparison with 1956. At that time the government had hushed up the deaths of the people; but now we are discussing the tragedy throughout the country, trying to*

*define what sort of mechanism could permit such a thing. Thereby great responsibility rests upon us, esteemed deputies: responsibilities to our fellow citizens, and responsibility to the future.*

*Before our very eyes once again we see attempts to distort the truth by the sadly well-known methods developed by the totalitarian regime. But that is a waste of time, for the truth is simple: Inspired by perestroyka and glasnost, in Tbilisi as throughout the entire country, thousands of people came out into the streets, striving for democracy, independence and freedom. True, there were extreme slogans, but that is the cost of the process of democratization and does not change the essence of what happened.*

*The fact of the matter is, that the demonstration was a peaceful one, yet it was cut off by military force and the use of toxic agents and engineer shovels. People were killed. It is impossible to refute these facts. For the people know the truth. A mother knows that her daughter was killed, and she could see how and by whom she was killed. She does not need any kind of political analysis, esteemed deputies; the entire country needs one; in order that the Tbilisi April not be repeated anywhere, anytime—as the events of 1956 in Tbilisi and 1962 in Novocherkassk were repeated. They were repeated because of distortion and covering-up the truth.*

*We appeal to you to condemn the use of force against the peaceful demonstration of 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi.*

*We believe that everyone who strives for the triumph of truth and justice will be with us. And we believe that the truth will win out; for, as the Holy Scriptures say: "Nothing is hidden that shall not be made manifest, neither anything secret that shall not be known and come to light." [Luke 8:17]*

[signed] USSR PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES FROM GEORGIA

This appeal was drawn up by the drafting committee selected by our deputies; its membership included T. Buachidze, E. Shengelaya and T. Chkheidze, as well as L. Gogoberidze, Dzh. Khetsuriani and T. Sharikadze.

But why was this appeal not heard, and why did participants in the Congress not find out about it? Because a fourth variant of the events was drawn up, which the deputies did not foresee.

A. Sobchak spoke; then Chief Military Procurator A. Katusev. And here Temur Chkheidze was to have read the text of the appeal from the Georgian deputies. But from the moment that the the applause sounded to the concluding remarks of the military procurator—expressing the attitude of a certain part of the hall to what was said—our deputies had already stated their opinion differently. They, as you know, got up and walked out. Because, as one of the deputies has already stated in an interview, the supplementary report exceeded all expectations—in terms of its cynicism,

prejudice, and the tendentiousness of its analysis and conclusions. To speak from that same rostrum—even to speak words of truth—seemed almost impossible.

That was the moment of choice. A critical moment. At that time the fate of the coming resolutions on the 9 April events in Tbilisi was already decided. Yes, our deputies knew: many who knew what happened support the conclusions of A. Sobchak's commission. And this support was shown not only on a friendly level, in the lobbies of the Congress, but also during its sessions. Thus, G. Gumbaridze, who was sitting on the presidium while the questions of 9 April were being examined, received the following note from members of the Deputy's Club of the Ukraine, Belikov, Gonchar, Korotich, Pavlichko, Ryabchenko, Chernyak, Yavorivskiy and others:

[Handwritten note] "Dear Comrade Gumbaridze! The Deputy's Club of the Ukraine, at this dramatic moment in the work of the Congress, expresses its feelings of solidarity with all the Georgian people. We are with you!" [About 18 signatures, mostly illegible]

Yes, the support was, of course, felt. It was seen in the fact that after the supplementary report, the hall was emptied by at least a third. And yet, the general revelation still hung in the air when the Georgian CP Central Committee first secretary and chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet took the rostrum. And he began to speak, with dignity, about the main thing—as one should have spoken about what took place. And after this speech it was inevitable that petty, undignified intrigues and various kinds of underhanded schemes should appear: anonymous leaflets, the authorship of which could be perceived, but maintaining a sense of anonymous letters. Our newspaper has already printed one example of such "literature" in the 21 December issue. Here is one more:

#### **'Democratization of Georgia or Breakup of the USSR?'**

"The so-called 'Georgian question' What is it? What is behind it?

"After the November session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, and after the speech of Deputy Mgledadze, could there really be any further doubt as to the ultimate purpose of the Tbilisi Action?

"Are the forces which seized power in Georgia after 9 April not spitting on glasnost and democratization?

"Is it really not clear that it is only a matter of months to the separation of Georgia from the USSR, and establishing a black dictatorship in Georgia?

"Can a soberly-thinking person, one who has read the Georgian press himself with his own eyes, really not see what was 'begun' on 9 April at the government house?

"Has the alliance of separatists throughout the country really not become more and more obvious to any unbiased politician, regardless of his tastes and convictions?

"Have not the Georgian CP, the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, and the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers been made the hostages of newly-declared Georgian dictator Gamsakhurdii and his stooges?"

**"Whether we want our own 'Gamsakhurdii' in Moscow, Leningrad, Kazan or Uryupinsk—will be decided here at the Congress."**

Those who were counting on the fact that the old reflexes were operating found that their tricks didn't work, and from this one there was merely the shadow of a so-called threat (to whom?). And the deputies closed ranks in a united upsurge, and in the name of higher ends (which?) they marched in step across the field of the Congress, on which the tender shoots of democracy, freedom and glasnost were only beginning to sprout.

Behind the close-up television scenes and beyond what was published in the central press, there remains a great deal. What was offered to the attention of the readers today was merely a small part of it.

#### **Kharkov Oblast Informal Groups Profiled**

90UN0671A Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by TRUD staff correspondent M. Yurchenko: "A Slap in the Face...on Political Grounds"]

[Text] The people's court of Kharkov's Dzerzhinsky Rayon heard the case. The victim was a district inspector, a militia captain, a broad-shouldered giant with an impressive bass. The defendant was a tiny woman with a quiet voice, a scientific associate of the Kharkov Literary Museum. It was hard to believe that she had meted out to the militia man a full-blown slap in the face. Yet a fact is a fact: In the preliminary accusation, her actions were characterized as malicious hooliganism, which threatened her with punishment right up to incarceration.

The "accused" is an activist in the "Memorial" society, encompassed in the Kharkov organization of the Ukrainian popular movement "Rukh," and along with like-minded people, she escorted to the rayon militia department three compatriots being brought to administrative justice for organizing an unsanctioned rally. The militia man asked the outsiders to clear the duty section, upon which, as the female linguist asserts, he chose a stylistic level and intonation impermissible in communication, for which he paid with "light bodily harm not entailing a short-term health disorder."

It is possible that under different circumstances, a real man, even "doing his duty," would not take revenge on the lady. But having felt his tongue on the threshold of his mucous membranes, he sensed the offensive political taste of the humiliation inflicted, and could not bear it. The court, however, was lenient: A fine was imposed upon the offender for excessive excitability.

"But you understand that the case bore a political overtone?" said F. Altunyan, one of the chairmen of the society of the illegally repressed, co-chairman of Kharkov "Rukh". He is someone who knows the price of spoken and printed words; in his time, he spent several years in camps for keeping "The Gulag Archipelago."

Yes, I understand. I feel that the laying on of hands is far from the best means of self-assertion, and that rudeness and a slap in the face are not the weightiest arguments in a political struggle. Is it not better to seek out real arguments? This is what we will speak about.

Brief information: The republic's multi-millioned East will give no fewer candidates for the upcoming elections than will the Western part. That is why Kharkov has acquired the status of the political center of the Slobozhane movement. The situation here is special. The cities are predominantly Russian-speaking; the rayon centers and the villages gravitate toward the same. But the local activists of the so-called "Ukrainian Helsinki alliance" and the Ukrainian youth league, stubbornly asserting that there is nothing more important than the renaissance of the "Ukrainian spirit," fight for a general transition to the exclusive use of the Ukrainian language.

It must be said that in addition to Russian, the "Slobozhane" communicate in a dialect called "Surzhik"—a colloquial amalgam of the Ukrainian language with Russian. An old man from Kiev will understand "Surzhik" no worse than someone subjected to the influence of the Polish dialect in the Western Ukrainian lands. However, certain fierce zealots of Ukrainian purity call "Surzhik" Moscow language [moskalskaya mova], forgetting that the Russian language came to the Ukrainian Sloboda primarily by non-violent means, by means of migration, mass assimilation of the residents of many corners of the country into a rapidly developing industrial area, and by the evacuation of the war years. Other informals, concerned about the renaissance of the language, are proposing something of their own compulsory measures to replace the Stalinist ones...

No less than their western fellow tribesmen, the "Slobozhane" worship Shevchenko, Franko, and Kotsyubinskiy; they honor the Cossack-ancestors of the Zaporozhye freemen, and recall that Kharkov was once the capital of the Ukraine. To agitate among them for the deepening of national cultural development is the same as breaking down an open door. The informals propose filling in the blank spots in the knowledge of national culture—please; they organized the "Spadshchina" (legacy) society, opened circles of admirers of the Ukrainian language. They advocate transferring school teaching, classes, kindergartens to the Ukrainian language—and this has already been done...

However, what the Slobozhane listened to carefully from the very beginning was the local "Rukh's" thesis on the democratization of society. No less heatedly than in the Western Ukraine, "Rukh" calls for strikes in its name; it

conducts rallies and hunger strikes, advances ultimatums and slogans, not infrequently going beyond all bounds of decency. And the authorities are on guard. Taking into account the elections finally lost last spring, they polemicize at the same rallies where they are drowned out by cries of "get" and "ganba" ("down with..." and "shame"), and do not let any occasion to apply power to slip by, "sobering up" their opponents with 15-day arrests and fines ranging from R100 to R1,000...

Should these events be linked to the elections or should they be viewed in the overall context of a particular type of fight against the official organs and the informals? Even a month before the elections, university Docent Yu. Isichenko, a member of the board of Kharkov "Rukh," announced to the press that the organization's goal is not to take the position "at the wheel." The people, they said, must occupy that position. However, the fine gesture of renouncing power pretty well "faded" after the words of "Rukh" cochairman V. Shcherbina, tossed out in a polemic outburst: "Why be cunning; we are talking about a power struggle. I personally will nominate my own candidacy."

I note: Approximately 100 representatives of informal organizations are on the ballot as claimants of places in various levels of soviets.

The informals' popularity, artificially heated up, began to melt before our eyes; the reserve of rally themes thinned out. They demanded access to the press—all local papers did give them the opportunity to express themselves, but not immediately. They craved a direct dialogue with the "apparatus"—the gorispolkom and the obkomm organized debating clubs; there was a meeting with the obkomm buro. They called for an immediate start to developing a model of oblast economic accountability—it turned out that since autumn, there are already seven versions: please come, discuss them, critique them...

Perhaps only the topic of the sausage shortage and what the anarchists-syndicalists noisily declare, "The soviets without the communists," were the only ones left unexhausted. But whom were they appealing to? With the arrival of the cold weather, the rallies "moved" from the well-populated central park, the local Luzhniki, to under the rooves of the schools' sports halls and the housing utilization offices, and gradually turned into meetings of the same individuals, hardly endearing them to the families. Each meeting has its "hammered-in program," in the form, for example, of endless rhythms of a home-grown poet on the abuses of the "partocracy," hardly comparable with the ageless "Gavriliada."

Everything was proceeding toward the schism of "Rukh." Not sharing the opinions of its right wing, not accepting the idle talk and the obvious bureaucratization, several groupings came out of it. The co-chairman of the board, polytechnical institute professor V. Grinev, the most noted figure of the Kharkov organization, lay down his authority. They were pinned with the label of

"schismatics" and... they continued to hold rallies on the eternal theme, "Who is to blame?"

I will not assert that the criticism of the authorities which resounds at the rallies is without grounds. Yet we are right in comparing the convincingness of the accusatory verbal flood of words, devoid of any constructive basis, with the slap in the face which began our conversation. Both the one and the other are testimony to helplessness. And, it would seem, that many of the informals have begun to understand this.

The Kharkov oblast council of trade unions was the first to attempt to exploit their indefatigable energy "for peaceful purposes." Essentially, they are not bad guys...

Dilettantes with heightened self-esteem? Yes. Do they explain their attitudes with the help of slaps in the face? Alas. Yet the social nihilism and temperamental nature of many of the informals is not just a growth disease of the "political youth," but its counter reaction to the lack of recognition and the accusations of being almost anti-people. Such accusations are not dying down. They also resounded at the last Kharkov party obkom plenum, at which a new first secretary was selected. One of the pretenders to the post received the accusations, oblast council of trade unions chairman V. Chub: He, so they said, had sullied himself with his sympathies for the informals... On this subject, Ukrainian CP Central Committee First Secretary V.A. Ivashko, who spoke here, expressed the thought that labels regarding the informal organizations are inappropriate. They are the same Soviet people as everybody else, not some saboteurs who parachuted in; in their own fashion, they are participating in perestroyka. It is necessary to get into contact with them, and to help in the realization of all that is good and useful in their programs.

Since the beginning of the electoral campaign, the Kharkov council of trade unions has attempted to maintain this position. The "Ekoforum" association was created under the trade union council's aegis and roof. It comprised representatives of practically all informal groups and leagues. Time passed, and the voices began to ring out, isn't it time to move from ecology rallies to subbotniks? The irony had no effect. Only the "Ekoforum" executive director and some of his closest assistants were concerned with practical affairs. The rest continued to hold rallies...

There was still one other trade union council attempt to unify the informals' efforts—the creation of a deputies' club. However, the rally syndrome predominated once more. The elections of one of the cochairmen took 8 hours, and still showed up with nothing. In the final analysis they understood in the trade union council that in the current elections, there is nothing in particular to hope for in an alliance with the informals; for the time being, the partner is somewhat weak and unreliable, with all the steam going to the whistle, as they say. And there was no time left; the electoral campaign had begun.

How do the local trade unions look in the electoral campaign? According to the republic's new law on elections, the public organizations lost a representation quota in the soviets and must wage a fight in the territorial okrugs on an equal basis with others.

"Each deputy," says Kharkov oblast council of trade unions Chairman V. Chub, "represents in the soviets someone's interests, one way or another; the territorial residents, the professional, social, and other groups. The trade unions' pre-electoral platform essentially does not contradict the deep interests of any one of them. All conditions being equal, our candidates have something to rely upon, something to say."

The trade union stands are in the most populated places of Kharkov. The first issues have appeared of the socio-political review *ORIENTIR*, the joint organ of the council of trade unions and the USSR people's deputies. In these issues are data on the results of almost 1,500 workers' control raids, how many swindlers were caught red-handed, who was punished, whom the bosses are in no hurry to punish, and what hidden shortage they returned to the counters. Unlike the informals' leaders, oblast trade union council Chairman V. Chub is concrete in his claims against the party organs. Here are just the facts: Obkom secretary N. Skidan, executing construction matters, "pressures" trade union council associates when the latter do not consent to sign acts on receipt of unfinished housing. Despite appeals to the oblast trade union council, Obkom buro member, oblispolkom chairman A. Maselskiy, along with the services subordinate to him, is in no hurry to change the procedure by which each month 850 metric tons of meat from state reserves goes to sausage processing, which is then sold at cooperative prices... (still the same conversation about sausage, but this time, concretely). The trade unions' appeals remain unanswered, and the oblast council of trade unions proposes to include these matters in the agenda of the oblast council session. Here is that concreteness, without which it is impossible to earn political authority today.

With this, it must be said that criticism of individual staffers occupying high positions does not at all interfere with, nor contradict the union with the party, allowing us to expect even more real results from the trade unions' new policy, and the initiative to actually advocate the toiler's interests. Nor can one fail to see the principle and logic in the position of that same V. Chub, who stated his intention to participate in the fight for a place in the republic's Supreme Soviet: He proposed this in a timely manner, during the period of the discussion of the draft law on trade union rights; he included it in his text of the statute on the trade unions' right to be the opponent of party and managerial organs in the discussion of social problems. Is it not logical that he now aspires to represent the position of the public organization, the interest of the working population in the high parliamentary organ?

I will not take it upon myself to say whether the informals will support his candidacy in such a situation. But whatever happens, one thing is clear: The trade union nominees, and all of those who expect from political leaders real action, rather than verbal barrages, would prefer that slaps in the face not be applied during the pre-electoral discussions. This is not an argument, but more likely an act of impotence.

#### **Uzbek Commission Faults Slow Progress in Language Law Implementation**

90US0430A Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian  
20 Dec 89 p 1

[UzTAG report: "Let's Put the Language Law Into Action"]

[Text] On 18 December a session of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers Commission to Develop a State Program to Implement the Law Entitled "Uzbek SSR State Language" was conducted. The session was conducted by Sh. R. Mirsaidov, deputy chairman of Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers, and chairman of Uzbek SSR Gosplan.

By governmental decision, the Republic's Terminology Committee has been created. Its creation was dictated by the specific tasks of implementing the adopted law.

Those who spoke devoted a large amount of attention to the current state of the vast terminological "management." As was noted, the proper procedure in this matter has not yet been established. With respect to the terms being employed, there are a large number of words that people have invented on their own, obsolete archaisms are being resurrected, and various interpretations are being given to the concepts that are being used most frequently on the pages of the press, in radio and television broadcasts, and in official documents. Geographical features, streets, squares, and public parks are not always being renamed in a well thought-out manner.

It has been recommended within a short period of time to prepare and publish dictionaries, self-teaching guides, and phrase books, and to organize "terminology columns" in newspapers and magazines. It is necessary within the shortest period of time to prepare a long-range terminology research plan that has been coordinated with the scientific-research institutes and departments of higher educational institutions. It is necessary to take immediate steps to set up the instruction of specialists in simultaneous interpretation and to carry out a number of other major measures.

It was mentioned at the session that Uzbek SSR Ministry of Justice has been moving slowly to complete its comments on the Law governing the republic's state language. The lack of these comments is leading to the arbitrary interpretation of the law's statutes locally and to their incorrect practical application. The commission assigned the task of publishing the comments within the shortest period of time.

It was emphasized that, in the work of implementing the statutes in the law, the soviet and economic agencies and all the departments, organizations, and enterprises operating on the republic's territory must take active part.

The implementation of the Law entitled "Uzbek SSR State Language" is still proceeding slowly. A task that was defined as an important one is the creation of conditions for the training, retraining, and refresher training of the instructor staff of schools, vocational-technical schools, institutions of higher learning, and secondary special educational institutions, and the personnel of children's preschool institutions. Attention was devoted to the need to develop teaching plans and curricula for teaching the Uzbek language in Russian schools and by all segments of the population. The attention of the administrators of the republic's Ministry of Public Education was drawn to this need.

The session analyzed the work of the Namangan Oblast Ispolkom and the Ordzhonikidzevskiy Rayon Ispolkom, Tashkent Oblast, in implementing the state language Law. It was noted that this work must take on broad scope and must be distinguished by purposefulness and consistency.

The session participants approved the measures to implement the Law entitled "Uzbek SSR State Language."

U. R. Umarbekov, deputy chairman of Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers, took part in the session.

#### Rapid Economic, Social Action Urged to Attack Roots of Fergana Unrest

90US0430B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
20 Dec 89 p 1

[Article by PRAVDA VOSTOKA correspondent V. Panamarev, Fergana Oblast: "We Must Not Lose a Single Hour"]

[Text] In 1979 the population of Fergana Oblast was 1,695,000 persons. Only a decade has passed, and the number of people in Fergana Oblast has increased by a half million. The increase in the size of the population is considerably outstripping the rates of development in the oblast's social sphere and economy. At the present time more than 60,000 able-bodied people in the oblast cannot find a job, one-third of the rural population drinks water out of irrigation ditches, even the rayon centers do not have indoor plumbing, and only 17 percent of the housing in the villages have been provided with gas. There is a shortage of hospitals, telephone exchanges, schools, and kindergartens. Tens of thousands of families are on waiting lists for housing and plots of land on which to build individual homes. In many families, and especially in rural localities, the income is low and there is no wherewithal to purchase the vital necessities of life, clothing, or nutritious food.

Today it is obvious that social tension is one of causes of the unfortunate events in Fergana. Slightly less than a half-year has passed. But what has been done to improve the situation, to eliminate the shortcomings that accumulated over the decades? I asked that question of many workers in the oblast's party and soviet agencies.

On the whole, the sociopolitical situation has been stabilized and it has a tendency toward improvement. Life has returned to normal and people are becoming confident and calm. We can include among the obvious pluses the completion of the construction of schools for 15,500 children, kindergartens for 3,100 children, and 592,000 square meters of housing.

This autumn, approximately 70,000 families received plots of land. The increase in the shift-operation coefficient and the organizing of new jobs made it possible to find jobs for more than 8000 persons. Production entities that have been polluting the environment—the Novokokandskiy Chemical Plant, the casting shop at the Fergana Gas Apparatus Plant, and the Margilan Cast-Iron Casting Plant—were shut down. The environmental-protection measures have made it possible to reduce the noxious waste discharged into the atmosphere by 6000 tons a year.

"Nevertheless, very little has been done, and the work to resolve the social problems is being carried out extremely slowly," G. Kotovrasov, second secretary of the party's Fergana Obkom, feels.

Immediately after the June events, Fergana was visited by the administrators of a number of union and republic ministries and departments. A plan was prepared for the accelerated development of the national economy in 1989-1990. It was planned to open 17 industrial enterprises specializing in the production of consumer goods. Thus, the intention was to provide interesting, well-paid work to 16,000 persons. Realizing that it would not be possible in not quite two years to build such a large number of new projects, the decision was made, for the most part, to adapt for that purpose the buildings that had been standing empty or that were being used inefficiently.

On 28 October USSR Council of Ministers enacted the decree entitled "Urgent Steps to Create the Conditions for Increasing the Employment Rate of the Population in Andizhan, Namangan, and Fergana Oblasts." On 20 November, the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers also adopted a decree on the same question.

It has been ascertained that the people in Fergana are not ready for the immediate implementation of the governmental decrees. Take, for example, the condensor plant in the Besharyk rayon center. As was reported at the oblast ispolkom, it requires the transferral to it of buildings belonging to the Besharyk Sovkhoz-Technicum, the Agrospetsremont motor-vehicle service-and-repair station, and the repair shops of the Moskva Kolkhoz. The question of transferring these structures has not yet been

completely resolved. There is a lack of planning-and-estimate documentation. The construction site has not been included in the plan for contractual operations, equipment has not been ordered, the financing of the operations has not been initiated, and people are not being recruited to come here. The situation is no better at the construction of the knitted underwear factory in the settlement of Yangikurgan, the branch of the Mikond Production Association in Kuva, or in most of the other projects.

Nor is it clear yet exactly who will build the new factories and plants. The construction organizations that exist in the oblast are overloaded with "start-up operations," and for the most part have not been coping with the planned volumes of operations. Assigning additional projects to them is equivalent to dooming the matter to failure from the start. It would seem that it is necessary to take urgent steps to create in the oblast a minimum of two more construction trusts. This question will be resolved in Tashkent, but it is necessary right now to think a bit locally about recruiting personnel. Some of the skilled specialists and workers, obviously, will have to be transferred from the currently operating construction organizations. We must not lose even a single hour.

And now another acute problem. It was previously stated that approximately 70,000 families received individual plots on which to build their own homestead. People are ready build housing by their own efforts, with the participation of their relatives and neighbors. Unfortunately, the people who want to build their own homes do not have enough bricks, shingles, cement, lumber, glass, or metal. And yet, four months ago, the Uzbek CP Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers decreed that the oblast would receive an increased amount of market allocations for the basic building materials. But the republic's planning and trade organizations have not been fulfilling that decree, but instead have been supplying the oblast according to the old allocations.

The Fergana Oblast Ispolkom has come to an understanding with a Bulgarian-Swiss company and a Spanish company concerning the construction in the oblast of two brick plants with a total capacity of 90 billion bricks a year. When those plants are activated, one of the most widely used building materials will disappear from the list of scarce products. But there has been a "slight hitch": the understanding has not yet been approved at the republic's appropriate administrative levels.

On the oblast territory, in the area of the Shorsu settlement, rich deposits of raw materials for making building materials have been prospected. It is necessary to lay a 17-kilometer railroad spur line to that area. Of course the people of Fergana Oblast cannot resolve this question by their own efforts.

There are no doubts that the oblast has a vital need for additional places for new enterprises. It is only a pity

that the grandiose plans are being hampered by important "details." In Fergana and the rayons, the services sphere, production work performed at home, and the processing of agricultural produce have been developing slowly. And yet it is possible in these ways to provide jobs for many thousands of people, and for them to receive a sizeable income. But currently it is not only in the villages, but also in the cities, that the population is not being provided with the personal services that became customary long ago in other parts of the country. Are we really supposed to believe that the local soviets are incapable of becoming the initiators of the accelerated development and construction of enterprises to provide personal services?

This past summer, a good share of the tomatoes that were grown died on the vine—there was nowhere to process them. In the future, with an increase in the number of private plots, the situation could become more complicated. But is it really such a complicated thing, within the network of consumer cooperatives, to double or triple the number of fruit and vegetable acceptance points, or to create mini-shops to process the produce there?

Personnel training and the use of the existing work sites require thorough analysis. At the Main Economic-Planning Administration of the Fergana Oblast Ispolkom, I received the following information. As of the beginning of December the oblast had slightly fewer than 3500 vacant jobs! This was at a time when tens of thousands of people were listed as needing a job. For example, in Margilan, where approximately 800 jobs are available, the number of unemployed exceeds 4000. Might it not happen that tomorrow, after opening up new enterprises with complicated technological schemes, we will again be unable to staff them with specialists and workers? The problem used to be resolved simply: people would be brought in from the outside, from outside the boundaries of the oblast, if not the republic. Today this method is unacceptable. The personnel must be trained locally. And it would be better if people would worry about that ahead of time.

Truly, time is the best healer. The trust among people of various nationalities that was on the point of wavering is being restored. Nowadays the reasonable statement—after all, people have been living here as good neighbors for dozens of years—no longer sounds like empty rhetoric. Actually we have lived that way, and we are living that way now.

However, the socioeconomic situation in the region is still far from what one would desire. Vitally important problems are awaiting their resolution. They will have to be resolved by the oblast's workers and administrators. But it will have to be in a new way, in an unusual way, by rejecting stereotypes and habitual categories.

### Demographic Aspects of Nationality Conflicts in Uzbekistan

90US0389A Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian  
13 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by O. Ata-Mirzayev, head of the Social Geography and Population Department, TashGU [Tashkent State University] imeni V. I. Lenin: "Demography and Interethnic Relations"]

[Text] The September 1989 Plenum of CPSU Central Committee emphasized that lying at the basis of the interethnic relations that have recently become aggravated are a series of interrelated social, demographic, ecological, and political problems. One of the most important among them is the demographic problem, which has become extremely aggravated, for example, in our republic.

It is no accident that at the most recent plenum of the Uzbek CP Central Committee a constantly recurring theme was the idea that the entire spectrum of economic and social-interethnic questions and the prospects for resolving them in our republic must be viewed primarily through the prism of the demographic problems.

The question here is not only and not so much in the rapid growth in the size of the population, but in the fact that, as a result of the drop in the already critically low standard of living, there has been no decrease in the high child and maternity death rate, the problems of the employment rate are becoming more acute, and the urbanization of the indigenous population and its social and territorial mobility are remaining low. As a result, the complicated demographic situation is shifting to the plane of interethnic relations.

#### *In the Mirror of Statistics*

Today more than 20 million people live in Uzbekistan. In 1988, 694,000 persons were born in the republic, and 134,700 died, including 30,300 children aged less than one year. The urban population constitutes 8.1 million persons, of whom only 20 percent are Uzbeks. Year 213,600 persons left Uzbekistan to go to other parts of the country, and 164,800 persons came into the republic, that is, the republic lost almost 49,000 persons as a result of migration.

The size of the population in Uzbek SSR has been growing exclusively as a result of the high natural growth of population [birth rate minus death rate], which is more than 3 times greater than the average for the country. However, out of a thousand newborn infants, 44-45 die before reaching the age of one year, and this figure is twice as high as for the USSR as a whole. With regard to this indicator, our country occupies one of the unattractive places in the world among the developing states.

The increase of Uzbekistan's population on the level of 600,000-700,000 per year will also be preserved in the foreseeable future.

One of the reasons for the aggravation of the interethnic relations in the country, including in Uzbekistan, is the antiscientific planning and placement of the productive forces, without a consideration of the demographic uniqueness of the regions or the union republics. For example, Uzbek SSR, like, incidentally, the other Central Asian republics, used to be viewed as the principal base for cotton production and a region that was rich in mineral resources. All this led to a onesided structure in the economy, with a clearly expressed single crop—cotton—and to the low level of development of the social infrastructure, a chronic shortage of jobs, and, as a consequence, constant social tension. That situation has been aggravated by the extremely low standard of living among the republic's population, a standard of living that has even been worsening from year to year.

Under conditions of the system of administration by fiat, these negative phenomena have been perceived by the indigenous population as the result of social injustice, and in the sphere of interethnic relations they are becoming the chief reason for the serious conflicts on national grounds. A broad spectrum of socioeconomic, demographic, and ecological problems also lies as the basis of the tragic events in Fergana Valley.

The acute social tension that has a national tinge was especially aggravated by the problem of providing jobs for the able-bodied population, particularly the rural population. A large economic load and a high degree of labor tension lie on the irrigated land, where the ratio is 1.5-2 hectares per rural worker, and slightly more than 0.2 hectares per rural inhabitant. The expected high increase in the population, the shortage of water resources, and the ecological limitations on the further expansion of the sown areas, as well as the increase in industrial and housing construction will continue in the future to narrow even this miserly labor load.

What, then, is the way out of the complicated demographic situation? There exist a very large number of ways to resolve the problem, but what is needed here, more than anywhere else, is a comprehensive approach within the confines of a program for improving the republic's socioeconomic development.

According to various estimates, Uzbekistan currently has from one to two million unemployed, primarily among the rural inhabitants. It must be stated outright that agriculture will not be able to absorb, or ought not to absorb, today's surpluses of labor resources, much less the increasing ones. The indigenous population must be drawn into other branches of the national economy, primarily into industry and the service sphere.

A more complicated problem is drawing the indigenous population into the industrial sphere. Practically speaking, as of today we have not yet created a fully valid national working class. But even the Uzbeks who are employed at the industrial enterprises of heavy industry are working basically in secondary sectors. The percentage of highly trained Uzbek workers is infinitesimal.

The main reason for the situation that has been created is the fact that the question of training national cadres of workers has been neglected in our republic. Essentially speaking, no one engaged seriously in this, although it was asserted from high rostrums that this is not only an economic and social tasks, but also an important political one.

I might recall that during the first years of socialist construction the VKP(b) Central Committee issued a special decree to the effect that, in the national republics at industrial enterprises, the local inhabitants were supposed to constitute the overwhelming majority. And actually that was so. Despite the violence of the armed resistance movement, even Uzbek women were drawn into industry on a massive scale. For example, during the first years of creation and up until the war, it was basically Uzbeks who worked at the Tashkent Textile Combine. Currently they constitute only a small percentage there.

The purposeful training of national cadres of workers, primarily from among the rural youth, and their consistent attraction into the republic's industrial complex is today the basic question in the system of urgent steps to ease the aggravated demographic situation. The entire system of vocational-technical education and the vocational guidance of the national youth requires fundamental improvement. It is also necessary to use effectively the opportunities for training cadres of workers for the republic in RSFSR, Belorussia, and the Ukraine. Every year Uzbekistan sends as many as 7000 young men and women to the PTU [vocational-technical schools] in those republics for training. It is necessary to do everything to assure that those young people actually become part of the republic's working class.

Another aspect of the problem is the reorienting of the managers of the republic's industrial enterprises toward using the local labor resources. It is well known that their use is fraught with definite difficulties, concerns, and extra trouble. Therefore, citing the law governing the socialist enterprise, cost accountability, and self-financing, the enterprise managers attempt in every way to avoid training and using the local inhabitants for the basic production, and continue to orient themselves on an influx of skilled cadres from other parts of the country. It would seem that, in addition to the economic measures, we need effective assistance from the local soviets and party committees.

The training of national cadres of workers and their attraction into the industrial branches will be accompanied by an increase in the urbanization of the indigenous population and its social and territorial mobility. But it will not be mandatory for the rural inhabitant to move to the city. Industrial enterprises and their branches and shops can be located in rayon centers and large-sized villages, that is, the industry must take decisive steps into the rural areas, toward the local labor resources. "If the mountain won't come to Mohammed, then Mohammed must go to the mountain." In this matter

the republic has at its disposal positive experience which must be confidently developed. Another way is the intensification of pendulum migration from the rural areas to the city. Dense rural-urban settlement enables the rural inhabitants to travel back and forth to the city to work. All that is required is to organize the operation of transportation and the social and personal-services sphere.

In the system of interethnic relations, an important role is played by the population's migration between the union republics and the country's regions. In the Central Asian republics, including Uzbekistan, this problem is not as acute as, for example, in the Baltic republics. The fact of the matter is that, with the small size of the population and the very low natural increase in population in that region, migration from other parts of the country has sharply reduced and continues to reduce the percentage of the indigenous population in the Baltic republics, and this is causing natural alarm among the indigenous inhabitants and making the social and political situation more critical.

In Uzbek SSR and the other Central Asian republics, the situation is somewhat different. High migration into our region from other parts of the country was noted during the period of industrialization, the wartime years, the 1960's, and up until the mid-1970's. Whereas, during the first years of socialist construction, the large migration into the Central Asian republics was necessary, during the period of stagnation the intensive migration into the region was completely unjustified.

Famous Soviet demographer V. Perevedentsev has proven that, during those years, there had been a spilling over of the labor resources from parts of Russia with a labor shortage—Siberia and the Far East—into Central Asia with its surplus of labor. The scientist recommended that the jobs in the Central Asian republics be filled by the indigenous population, thus closing off access to migration from outside those republics. As everyone knows, that was not done. On the contrary, a short time later, not deliberately but by a natural process, access to the industrial enterprises was closed to the labor resources that were already local. The chief reasons for this were the lack of skills, the large number of children in the family, the low earnings of industrial workers as compared with other branches of the economy, etc.

In the late 1970's there was a discernible exodus of the European population from the republic, which has continued to the present day. Moreover, during recent years that tendency has been becoming stronger. During the past four years (1985-1988), 554,000 persons left Uzbekistan, that is, during that time there was minus migration into the republic. Moreover, it is basically the European population that participates in the migration among the republics. Their leaving is linked with socio-economic reasons. Nor can one close one's eyes to the aggravation of the interethnic relations.

Whereas previously Uzbekistan attracted people by the possibility of obtaining an apartment relatively quickly, by the abundance of fruit, and by the low living costs, at the present time those advantages have been lost. Life has become considerably more expensive and more difficult than in many other parts of the country. The persons who came here sensed that and they are returning to where they came from. There has also been a slight increase in the foreign migration: last year approximately 6000 persons left the republic to go to foreign countries, and more than 3000 persons arrived from abroad.

Recently there has been an increase in the volumes of the so-called organized, planned migration of the population from the Central Asian republics, including from Uzbekistan, to various regions and cities of RSFSR, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, and Belorussia. This migration is carried out basically along the lines of the organized recruitment of workers and the agricultural resettlement of families. According to data provided by UzSSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor], in 1987 more than 11,000 workers were sent chiefly to various construction sites and industrial entities in Russia; that figure is almost 2.7 times greater than the number in 1981. In 1988, 5613 families were resettled from the republic. Once again, the majority of them are Russians, Tatars...

Uzbeks take more active part in organized recruiting, where their share is almost half. Of course, this form of the temporary use of the republic's surplus labor resources in other parts of the country that have a labor shortage is more acceptable than the resettling of families. However, in this important matter it is necessary to introduce order and to increase the effectiveness of these types of migration. The main thing is that it is necessary to resolve the problem of permanently assigning families to the places of settlement on the basis of the fundamental improvement of the living and working conditions. At the same time it is necessary to emphasize that the planning migration beyond the confines of the republic must be carried out strictly on a voluntary basis, without any methods of administrative fiat or coercion, on the basis of people's economic and other self-interests.

Something that has become a center of social tension in the republic is the unhealthy hullabaloo that has arisen

around the problem of family planning, which is incompetently presented as a way to limit the birth rate. There has been sharp discussion with regard to this problem, and the question of reducing the birth rate has been removed from the agenda. However, family planning as an effective program for preserving the health of mother and child, and for improving the health of the nation, must be carried out with increasing vigor in the republic.

The fact of the matter is that Uzbek women—whether urban or rural—do not want to have a large number of children. That fact was revealed by the latest research carried out by the republic's demographers. In response to the question, "What is the best number of children to have in a family?", the scientists received specific answers. Rural inhabitants want to have 5-6 children, and urban, 4-5 children. But the most important thing is that their husbands and parents support them in this regard. The typical answers given in previous years were—"The more, the better," "As many as God will provide" are practically nonexistent in recent research.

So there is really no need to carry on propaganda in the republic concerning the regulation of the birth rate. The nation itself has come to that conclusion, true, not as a result of the good life, as occurs and should occur in a civilized society.

What is needed is specific, immediate, and varied assistance to the woman who is having a child and to the mother of children. It is necessary immediately and everywhere to create medical-hygiene stations, women's consultation centers, and "Marriage and Family" offices. All of this, in an integrated manner, forms a well-extended network of the "Family Planning Service" that has been called upon to help the woman herself to be healthy and to give birth to physically and genetically healthy offspring.

**The interrelationship between demography and interethnic relations is extremely multifaceted.** I have touched upon only a few aspects of this complicated problem. The problem was in the center of attention of the scientific conference "Vitally Important Problems in the Development of Interethnic Relations in the USSR," which was held of 23-25 November 1989 at Tashkent State University under the aegis of the Institute of Party History, attached to Uzbek CP Central Committee, Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee, Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences, and the Uzbek "Znaniye" [Knowledge] Society.

**RSFSR Justice Minister on Court Reform**

*90UN0697A Moscow CHELOVEK I ZAKON in  
Russian No 12, Dec 89 pp 3-8*

[Interview with V. A. Abolentsev, RSFSR minister of justice, conducted by CHELOVEK I ZAKON correspondent: "Does the Court Need a 'Ministerial Hat'"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] The words set off in the title may seem to some people to be a special device for drawing the attention of the reader, who will probably think: why do the courts need a ministry, anyway?

Indeed, why?

Vladimir Aleksandrovich Abolentsev, RSFSR Minister of Justice, answers our correspondent's questions.

[Correspondent] And so, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, the Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR has been adopted. It mentions justice ministries and agencies several times. To what degree will the Russian courts feel the results of the republic Ministry of Justice's concern? And in what way should it be expressed?

[Abolentsev] Yes, the law mentions justice agencies. But only to the extent that it is necessary for determining the status of judges. In other respects, questions pertaining to the work of the Ministry of Justice and its agencies are regulated by other laws and government decrees. And the range of these questions, I'll say right off, is not getting any narrower. To the contrary, in connection with the increased role of judges in society, their concerns are growing substantially.

[Correspondent] Isn't there a contradiction in the fact that, on the one hand, as an agency of legal justice the court is independent, while, on the other, as an institution it is subordinate to the Ministry of Justice? The procuracy is also an institution, and nonetheless it is not subordinate to any ministry.

[Abolentsev] One must not forget that the court and the procuracy are special state agencies. They belong neither to the agencies of the legislative branch nor to the agencies of state administration. As for the procuracy, a strict administrative hierarchy exists in it—a lower procurator is appointed by the higher procurator and subordinate to the higher procurator. In the judicial system, to the contrary, each level (and in our republic alone there are more than 2,500 courts) is autonomous: if grounds exist a higher court may revoke or alter the decision of a lower court, but in no way does it direct the lower court.

[Correspondent] In other words, "higher standing" here pertains only the consideration of court cases?

[Abolentsev] Of course. And that is right. After all, any other dependency of one judicial office on another along the vertical would interfere with the administration of justice. We have already had distressing experience with

combining the functions of judicial oversight and, simultaneously, the organizational management of the lower courts in one and the same judicial institutions. That led to no good. The judges who were supposed to direct the lower courts simply lacked the time for their principal work. They had to adjust their judicial-oversight work and review cases with a view to the responsibility for the quality of legal justice in courts of the first instance. Incidentally, look how urgent the question of separating procurator's oversight from preliminary investigation has now become. The analogy here is remote, of course, but the very problem of separating oversight from management once confronted the courts no less urgently.

Now all organizational concerns are assigned to the Ministry of Justice—an agency that does not itself actually administer legal justice.

[Correspondent] Just what is the idea here? And why are signs designating a specific judicial agency (the Kievskiy Rayon People's Court, say) invariably adorned with the title of a justice agency, such as a ministry?

[Abolentsev] Primarily we are concerned with questions of the location, structure and staffing of courts. The selection of personnel, the organization of elections and reports of judges and people's assessors, and their professional training and advanced training. The justice agencies assist the courts in organizing their work, direct and oversee work to implement judicial decisions, and organize the keeping of judicial statistics. Also involved here are the supplying of courts with materials and equipment, the working and living conditions of court employees, and a great deal else. These functions exist objectively, and no matter how the judicial system is organized, someone has to perform them.

As for the title side of the question, i.e., signs and court forms, in my opinion there are no fundamental obstacles to removing the "hat" of the justice agencies. The present situation really is attributable to a deeply rooted tradition according to which any state agency should "go" under one department or another. People (including many heads of courts) believe that this adds prestige. Let's hope that with the formation of a law-governed state the judicial branch will occupy its fitting place and will no longer need borrowed prestige.

Let me note, incidentally, that then it is necessary both to exclude court buildings from the category of administrative offices, and to exclude the judges themselves from the category of so-called administrative and managerial personnel. If that were done, we would cease having the financing of court construction cut off (as happened not long ago, for example, with the building of the Moscow City Court that is under construction), and quit being subjected to periodic attempts to reduce the number of judges. That's much more important than signs and forms.

[Correspondent] Am I to understand you to mean that relations between the justice agencies and the courts do not need to be updated?

[Abolentsev] They do need it, and more than ever before. After all, we have to learn how to protect judicial independence. The Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR clearly sets the priority—the question of ensuring that independence is given the very first place.

[Correspondent] Is it only from external influences that judges need to be protected? Doesn't some work also need to be done on correctly regulating relations with other law-enforcement agencies, especially the procuracy?

[Abolentsev] Unquestionably. The law's requirements with regard to judicial independence pertain to procurators just as much as to everyone else. There are global problems here, concerning, say, procurator's oversight over the administration of justice. It is difficult not to agree with the point that the principle of judicial independence is contradicted by the procurator's simultaneous performance in court of the functions of prosecution and of oversight over the trial of the case. Say, it is precisely thanks to this second function that the procurator takes part in the executive session of the court, yet the defendant is not present there. Or, for example, the procurator enjoys the right to present conclusions in the court session. Under such conditions, one can speak of an adversarial situation only in a qualified sense. Moreover, on the purely mundane level a great deal has accumulated in relations between judges and procurators that needs to be gotten rid of as quickly as possible. In a court session no one has the right to demonstrate his special status, yet judges allow such demonstration. Otherwise a highly unusual idea is formed of equality before the court. This is the source of inevitable grievances and demands to call certain judges "to order."

Here is a recent example. The Supreme Court of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR twice returned a bribery case for additional investigation—the investigative agencies stubbornly refused to carry out an order to check on the involvement of other persons in the crime. The autonomous-republic procurator's protest was withdrawn by the RSFSR Procurator, and the RSFSR Supreme Court, which had considered the complaints of those "other persons" themselves, deemed the court's actions to have been correct. However, instead of eliminating the red tape in the case, people at the local level started to conduct an investigation with regard to court personnel: it turns out that several words in the record of the court proceedings had been noted in the wrong color. In order to protect the judges, the Ministry of Justice had to appeal to the RSFSR Procuracy, which took prompt action.

[Correspondent] Well, the outcome was completely in the spirit of restructuring. But let's return to what one hears as a refrain today in any criticism of the Ministry of Justice: the courts are simply not provided for materially. That pertains to wretched buildings, the lack of basic office equipment, and the attention that is given the judges themselves. Do you agree with the notion that cheap legal justice proves costly?

[Abolentsev] Do I agree?! I don't just agree but have cited and am prepared to further cite a great deal of indisputable evidence to that effect. The chief evidence is the colossal rate of turnover among judicial personnel. Today nearly one-third of judges have been in office for less than three years. The main reason is that their earnings are unjustifiably low—less than the country's average. And that is in a situation where the mental and physical stress is such that one judge in four is relieved of his duties early because of a deterioration of health.

Court buildings are a painful issue. Nearly 1,000 of them are utterly unfit for the administration of justice. And our ministry lacks any capability to rectify anything. We cannot create the necessary living and recreation conditions for court employees. We have no housing stock, medical institutions, kindergartens, Young Pioneer camps, sanatoriums, or the like. All these things have to be solicited. Although, it would seem that such a demeaning position is particularly contraindicated for justice.

Of course, the Ministry of Justice itself bears a share of the responsibility. However, it should not be exaggerated. After all, this is a matter of additional budgetary allocations, and not that we have managed to get them but have improperly invested them. The question is more complicated—its roots lie in the public's understanding of the importance of legal values, in the degree of demand for a strong and independent court. And isn't it indicative that a decision to improve the material circumstances of the employees of the courts, the procuracy and justice was made in the very first session of the new USSR Supreme Soviet? Moreover, a USSR Council of Ministers' decree on this matter will be adopted in accordance with proposals previously submitted by the USSR Supreme Court, USSR Ministry of Justice and USSR Procuracy. They provide, in particular, for raising pay.

[Correspondent] Could you cite just a few of the proposals that the government received?

[Abolentsev] First of all, there is a new salary scale for all court employees. The Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR resolves the question of assigning qualification-related rankings to judges. It is proposed that additional pay be given for them. The question has been raised of special compensation for those who carry out court orders for their recovery of sums of money, with this compensation being paid at the expense of the person against whom a judgment has been rendered. The problems of sanatorium and vacation facilities, pensions for judges, and a great deal else have been raised.

The resolution of all these issues will make it possible to carry out the selection of personnel for courts much more effectively—this extremely important function has been assigned to the justice agencies by Article 9 of the Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR. Then the next regular elections of judges can be held on a competitive

basis. I am convinced that the gain from such an "investment" will exceed the costs.

[Correspondent] And so, the Ministry of Justice's chief "headache" is over the courts?

[Abolentsev] If you proceed from the classic theory of the separation of powers, the court is one of the three summits in the law-governed state. However, as far as the functions of the justice agencies as a part of the executive branch are concerned, it hardly makes sense to rush to define priorities here. It would not occur to anyone to claim that the judicial branch takes precedence over the legislative. Yet we "serve" both branches. Moreover, the legal reform is making daily adjustments in the volume of this work.

Take, for example, the drafting of laws and the systematization of legislation. Even before it kept us busy. Suffice it to say that the subdivision concerned with this is the largest in the ministry. But can one compare former legislative practice with that which awaits the union republics in the future? The number of laws is growing through a reduction in the process of departmental regulation-making, and at the same time the resolution of many issues is being transferred to the jurisdiction of the union republics—each of them, like the union as a whole, will become a law-governed state.

Not so long ago the ministries and departments were promulgating hundreds of normative acts affecting citizens' rights every year. A good many of those decisions, especially in the services sphere (everyday and municipal services, trade, communications, etc.), are highly vulnerable from the standpoint of conformity to law, and tend toward an openly bureaucratic interpretation of the lawmaker's will. Hence yet another important task—to help clean out these truly "Augean stables." But not just that. The time has come, in principle, to determine whether departments have the right to establish norms of conduct for people who do not work for them. In the area where they retain that right, it would be a good idea to introduce the so-called state registration of normative acts of the ministries and departments. That function could be assigned to the Ministry of Justice. It would refrain from registration if an act was adopted in violation of the law, and if there was no contradiction, it would register the document, after which it would take effect. I want to stress: I am referring precisely to preliminary registration; it is the prerogative of state administration and in no way intersects with procurator's oversight over the conformity to the law of normative acts that have already taken effect. Such a procedure is successfully employed in a number of European socialist countries and has earned positive marks. Incidentally, we have such experience in our country, too. In December 1920 V.I. Lenin signed a decree according to which all departments were required to send their legislative and most important governmental proposals to the People's Commissariat of Justice. And it, in turn, would present the government with findings on the drafts, or with a redrawn draft. The decree also contained another

interesting rule. According to it, all legislative and governmental acts subject to publication were sent to the People's Commissariat of Justice, and without its notation they could not be published in official publications. The People's Commissariat of Justice was required to provide its notation regarding publication within a three-day period. So there's the time to which the sources of the idea of preliminary oversight by the Ministry of Justice can be traced.

[Correspondent] Now, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, allow me this "heresy": justice and cost accounting. Is it possible to find any points for their contact?

[Abolentsev] You know, that's not such a heresy, if you take into account the fact that experiments to convert a number of institutions to cost accounting are fully under way in our ministry's system. In particular, the notary office. So far in four regions—in Moscow and Moscow, Kalinin and Kemerovo oblasts. A reduction in waiting lines and an improvement in the quality of service are already becoming noticeable there.

Cost-accounting principles are being more and more actively introduced in the work of judicial-expert institutions. The question of having them provide expert opinions on civil cases has been resolved. For example, on the division of household property and other property. Previously this work was done by "outside" specialists, at a much higher price. It turned out that the provision of expert opinions on a cost-accounting basis in a state institution both produces higher quality and takes less time. Moreover, in six regions we are conducting an experiment with regard to the provision of expert opinions on a cost-accounting basis in criminal cases. It involves types of expert opinions that are new for our institutions: technical opinions in the areas of fires and construction, technological expertise, etc. Previously they were provided by specialists drawn from outside.

[Correspondent] And are there any chances for the introduction of cost accounting in other sectors that the Ministry of Justice supervises? We were just talking about putting together draft laws.

[Abolentsev] If you have in mind the draft legislative work of the ministry apparatus, it cannot, of course, be put on a contractual basis. The formation of a system of judicial organizations offering contracting parties (so-called economic subjects) a whole array of legal services, including, of course, the drafting of normative acts, is another matter. Now this is done by collegiums of attorneys and legal cooperatives—their cost accounting is inherent. At the same time, the question could be framed more broadly, since state organizations for providing legal services to enterprises are also being established.

Recently, for example, there was a discussion in our ministry collegium of the first steps taken by the Moscow State Center for Legal Aid to Enterprises. It is an autonomous, cost-accounting-based organization

endowed with the status of juridical person. Its staff contains not only legal specialists but also economists and accountants. The State Legal Center, as it is called for short, has already concluded a number of contracts with enterprises for regular services, and also gladly provides legal services on a one-time basis. It aims to ensure the effective protection of enterprises' legal rights and interests, and to help in the introduction of various models of cost accounting and leasing relations, the conclusion and fulfillment of contracts, the establishment of foreign economic ties, the organization record-keeping on legislation with the use of computers, etc.

Today it is still too early to provide an appraisal of this specific experience. However, the idea itself deserves attention. If state organizations exist that produce products, why not establish state organizations that provide them with legal services? Competition in the market for these services with attorneys and legal cooperatives would only benefit consumers. Of course, all forms of legal service should have identical starting conditions. In the future we might also think about establishing a republic cost-accounting-based association for state organizations of that sort. Then yet another perfectly specific function would be added to the methodological guidance of legal work that the Ministry of Justice presently provides. Of course, with the most active assistance from agencies of the state arbitration service. In time, a number of the ministry's other subdivisions might also be restructured on the basis of these principles. Say, those that presently direct the provision of legal services to the public, judicial-expert institutions, and the dissemination of legal knowledge.

[Correspondent] Let's hope that this is a matter of the not-so-distant future.

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### Railway Freight Losses Cited

904H0120B Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 3, Jan 90 pp 6-7

[Article by Ye. Kolesnikova: "Spend Millions To Guard Freight and Save Billions"]

[Text] A wretched job has been done of guarding freight on the railroad. The yearly losses from theft are tremendous. It is obviously simpler and more reasonable to spend millions on organizing efficient work and on protecting freight and thus to save billions.

If the rails of the country's chief mainlines were combined into a single through roadbed, they could circle the equator three times. The comparison is clear. Railroad workers often cite it, in illustrating the power and far-flung nature of our roads. I suggest something else, no less impressive.

Imagine a department store in which there are no shortages—of spare parts for motor vehicles, imported appliances, fashionable clothing and footwear, laundry detergents, etc.... This store could operate for an entire year with a commodity turnover of several million rubles, by trading in just the goods stolen on the country's railroads.

For the sake of objectivity it must be confessed—in the last decade the situation has noticeably improved. In 1980, when the USSR Council of Ministers and the CPSU Central Committee adopted the decree "On Measures To Ensure the Safekeeping of National Economic Freight and Intensify the Struggle Against Theft on Railroad and Water Transport," the looting situation was five times greater. Let us labor under no delusions, though: the theft curve has now obviously risen again. The Ministry of Railways is worried, and the legal protection authorities, too. It is just that the departments have different opinions on the problem. Let us try to analyze them.

We turn to the facts, and they, alas, point to a distressing thought—it is really a lazy person who steals. It is extremely simple to ship goods by railroad: the car is loaded, the door shackle is wound around with a wire, the seal is applied—and they are on their way. The procedure is based on complete trust between the suppliers and the freight transporters. Not everyone always understands trust, however, as a procedure of the highest level. Here is the proof.

According to information from the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], discrepancies have increasingly been noticed between the weight indicated in the documents and the actual weight—they make up 10-13 percent. This is particularly characteristic of the Central Asian, North Caucasus and Transcaucasus regions, and of the Lower Volga area. For example, in 20 cars checked by Internal Affairs authorities last summer at the Syrdarin station on the Central Asian Road, a shortage of 33 tons of tomatoes was discovered.

The consignors had the opportunity to underload the cars when the railroad workers essentially stopped checking the weight of the freight indicated in the documents. Light-fingered workers, purposely overstating the weight and volume of the goods transported, also had this opportunity. Another example. In March of last year, a tank car arrived at the Chelyabinsk station. Even its external appearance was suspicious: the drain valves were broken off, the sides were covered with rust and mildew, but according to the documents, there were almost 5000 decaliters of wine in the tank. A biological expert examination established that there had been no beverages in the tank for at least three months. For almost the same length of time the transport police workers had tried to prove that there had been no theft.

In a word, there had been opportunities for theft right up until the consist moved from the site. It was not profitable for anyone to check and weigh the cargo. The supplier had reported in the documents for the products

shipped, and the railroad workers—for what was transported—if only, frankly, for the safeguarding of the seal. It is not by chance that an investigation of any conflicts begins with the question: is it intact? If it is, what claims can be made against the railroad?! Is the freight short? Let the controllers trace this. But how? There are only a thousand scales for 7000 freight stations. Probably, the rest of the goods are literally estimated with the eyes. The railroad workers have their own arguments: they say, it is not all that simple to weigh an entire consist, each car has to be driven on to the scales. Here, however, the Odessa enterprise Tochmash has begun to produce electronic attachments for the scales—a car can be weighed in motion by means of them. The Odessa workers have so far not received a single request for them.

Of course, weight manipulations are only one of many methods of removing currency from the State pocket. Various goods go along the steel roadbed, including those accurately packaged, counted by piece and dispatched with a seal on the door. Is there any guarantee here that the goods will arrive at the consignees intact and well-preserved?

According to information from the USSR MVD, 80 percent of the thefts from cars and 95 percent of those from containers are carried out by the simplest method—through the doors. One need not be a skillful burglar here—so far, instead of locks, they use...ordinary wire. The criminals easily fake the simple plastic and lead seals.

V. Logunov, chief of the Main Administration for Container Transport and Commercial Operations of the USSR MPS [Ministry of Railways], opened wide the doors of the office cupboard. On the shelves were locks of various designs.

"As you can see, railroad workers also look after the safekeeping of the freight," Logunov commented on the collection. "Last year we announced a competition for the best locking device. The activity was fantastic! Some 600 suggestions came in, and 6 of them were selected. An experimental batch has already been produced—2500 locks. Of course, this is still not enough, but it is also naive to suppose that a lock can guard against plunderers. In my opinion, the police should put more energy into their preventive work."

I cannot help but agree. In the first place, the locks on the doors of our apartments have still not proven themselves. It is easy to imagine what it would be like if they were not there at all. In the second place, it would not be a bad idea to carry out preventive measures amidst the railroad transport workers themselves. Having data available on the routes of particularly attractive freight, and knowing the storage conditions, they themselves often become plunderers.

According to information from the USSR MVD, last year criminal groups were revealed amidst the railroad workers at the Inskaya (West Siberian Railroad), Armavir and Aldy (North Caucasus Railroad), Sharvan

and Vatagu (Azerbaijan Railroad), Chita (Transbaykal Railroad), and Uzhgorod (Lvov Railroad) stations. Particularly large numbers of thefts, mainly of export and import goods, were put down to their account. For example, in June of last year Galeyan, Arshakyan, Baburyan and other workers of the Transcaucasian Railroad stole 136,000 rubles worth of imported glassware from a car.

The safety of freight going to the West from the Far Eastern region is particularly alarming. According to a strange tradition, it is not as a rule checked at commercial inspection points. If a train runs from West to East, it may be inspected. A group of locomotive engineers at the Irkutsk-Classification station took advantage of the situation—they stole only from cars traveling to the west.

Logunov agrees, "Yes, our personnel is still not irreproachable, but it cannot be stated that railroad workers have pilfered everything. No one thinks that. According to the data of the Administration for Supervision of the Execution of Transport Laws of the USSR Office of the Public Prosecutor, the share of the MPS workers is only one-third of the total number of thefts."

"In analyzing the reasons for the thefts, I would single out two important points," says B. Vankovich, deputy chief of the Administration for Supervision of the Execution of Transport Laws of the USSR Office of the Public Prosecutor. "In the first place, it is actually easy to steal. I followed with interest last year's competition of the MPS for the best lock, and the best seal. After all, though, ten years ago the USSR Council of Ministers and the CPSU Central Committee obliged the railroad workers to develop and introduce improved sealing systems and locking devices. But just as before, a wire kink dangles on the doors, with which even a teenager could cope. The train may happen to stand on an open track section for about 15 minutes—in this time a smart citizen manages to pull several packages of goods out of the car. One need not even mention the "abandoned" trains, which stand on the tracks without moving for several days, or even for a week. In just nine months of last year on the Muromsk route, for example, 600 consists stood idle—only one out of six was guarded. As a result, 12 thefts were committed there, and the loss was 14,000 rubles.

"Sometimes one comes across anecdotal situations in criminal cases. A batch of Japanese jackets was stolen from a train. The investigation led to a small village. Its inhabitants, observing the 'abandoned' train, could not resist the temptation and borrowed the scarce overseas items. They say, they removed them in carts. The trackers found one jacket...in a dog kennel—it had been used to bed down the dog. It is a bad, sad anecdote.

"In the second place, it is time to revise the attitude toward goods that have already been unloaded from the cars or are awaiting dispatch," continues Boris Mikhaylovich. "Recently I was at a little station near Kazan, and I saw how the freight yard was guarded there. There were

only two guards on a territory of six square kilometers. Neither a fence nor a telephone. Is it difficult to steal here? Moreover, they do not as a rule steal alone—they join into criminal groups. They drive the trucks into the station warehouses, and sell large batches of goods through the stores. A well-adjusted mechanism arises, and with each newly arriving consist it draws in new people. Let us discuss the deep social roots feeding organized crime. Elementary slipshodness partially feeds it. After all, every fifth container center has no enclosing fences at all, and every third—fixed check-point conditions. Almost half of the warehouse facilities are not equipped with protective signaling. Have we, then, forgotten the old adage: they steal what lies in temptation's way?"

According to the information of the MVD, a group of criminals stole two containers of knitwear and radio equipment worth 70,000 rubles from a container platform at the Aldy station. At the Tashkent-Freight Yard, members of a criminal group (it included railroad workers and representatives of the organization for whom the freight was destined), removed three boxes of imported jewelry worth 35,000 rubles from the warehouse.

Is it worth adding to the examples to prove the obvious: valuables must be guarded.

"The absence of elementary guarding may become the cause of serious conflicts," says Vankovich. "Not long ago Armenian railroad workers made claims against their Azerbaijani colleagues. The huts for the earthquake victims were received in terrible condition. I went with a group of colleagues to investigate. They explained—even before the consist crossed the border of Azerbaijan, the huts were mutilated: the fittings were pulled out with the sockets, the glass was broken, the furniture was broken. It appeared that teenagers had been 'having a good time'...."

Listening to Boris Mikhaylovich, I remembered a story by V. Grigoryev, the fantasy writer, "Rog izobiliya" [Horn of Plenty]. His hero devised a unit, into the narrow end of which all kinds of scrap was loaded, and from the wide end excellent things came out—television sets, refrigerators, clothing. During the tests, someone asked: but does the machine have a reverse, that is, does it run backwards? The inventor was surprised—why? They said—it has to. He did it, but something jammed. Since then the horn of plenty has meticulously processed things into scrap. I will not take the risk of drawing direct analogies with the railroad, but all the same, something similar is happening in its work.

"Alas, there are not enough guards," Logunov acknowledges. "The amount of freight that must be guarded has increased 5-6-fold, and there are only one-third of the people. Just try to entice anyone to travel around in a sheepskin coat from one city to another for 120 rubles."

True, it must be noted that, in addition to the sheepskin coat, there are other benefits—rations, various additional payments, free travel when on leave. If this is not enough, however, we must think about what else people are interested in. Meanwhile, the VOKhR [Administration of Internal Protection of the Republic] workers are giving themselves an incentive. Two riflemen of the Moscow Railroad guard stole 11 boxes of Romanian shirts, immediately making themselves 10,000 rubles richer. At the homes of other "guards," large quantities of tooth paste, soap and motor vehicle spare parts were discovered. Everything had been taken from railroad cars. A VOKhR worker can, of course, have one-third of his salary exacted for oversight, but everyday "arithmetic" shows that it is more profitable—to steal....

Workers from the transport police and the office of the public prosecutor go off on business trips on an average of 300 days a year. There are scarcely over 2000 of them for the entire country. They travel around all over, determining where, by whom and when a seal was torn off, at what site things were stolen, where the scarce goods disappeared to. The Ministry of Railways has only to decide which of the roads will pay the shipper for the loss.

In the last analysis, however, the negligent management has to be paid for, not out of some abstract purse called the State's, but by each one of us—and not only with money and peace of mind. The interrelation here is obvious. The flow of goods arriving on the "black" market is not drying up, crime is increasing, and that means social tension as well.

According to information from the USSR MVD, in the last two years over 50,000 thefts have been committed on railroad transport, and over 10,000 criminal actions have been instituted. Criminal proceedings have been instituted against about 11,000 persons. Losses from thefts constituted over 11 million rubles.

"We are prepared to propose measures making it possible to cut thefts on the railroad to a minimum," says S. Galakhov, deputy chief of the Main Administration of Internal Affairs in Transport of the USSR MVD. "Our proposals hardly please MPS workers. The point is that on the railroads valuable freight is so far being entrusted to people who bear no material responsibility for it. The secretariat of the VTsSPS [All-Union Central Trade Union Council] and USSR Goskomtrud have tried to put the situation right—they adopted decrees, gave recommendations, and proposed, for example, that contracts be concluded on the brigade form of material responsibility. But the measures did not take root.

"It has long been noticed, that it is difficult to make a person engage in any business that is unprofitable for him," continues Sergey Sergeyevich. "In our opinion, it is easier for the railroad workers to pay damages for thefts than to invest funds in protection and locks. So why not relieve the MPS of the need to keep track of freight safety. Let State insurance companies, which

should have been created long ago, deal with this. Part of the funds due the railroad for high-quality transport can be turned over to the insured. An entire system of economic incentives can be worked out that will arouse everyone to high-quality work—the suppliers and the railroad workers and the insured themselves."

The idea is not a new one. Similar insurance companies are in operation abroad, fully paying for their existence. They may even offer helicopters to accompany particularly valuable freight.

There is also positive experience in our country. As we know, thefts of spare parts, units and assemblies for motor vehicle equipment occupy a leading place on the tremendous list of stolen goods. The party that suffers is the USSR Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building. The USSR Ministry of Railways is sympathetic—in 1986 a special procedure was established for escorting passenger vehicles for export with through details as a militarized escort. A few runs showed that motor vehicle equipment could be delivered to the destination point safe and sound. The guards were well paid, and the escort conditions were acceptable. The MPS assigned an old passenger car in which they could relax and prepare food. Then they suddenly stopped assigning it—they said that there was nothing to carry passengers in. As a result—according to the data of the State Inspectorate on Quality of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, in 9 months of 1989, almost 8500 export Zhiguli were delivered to border points and seaports in damaged condition, and of them over 4000 pieces were the fault of the railroads.

"At commercial inspection points for trains," comments S. Galakhov, "we are now obliged to create efficient police covering forces. This stops the plunderers. But the colleagues of the police then have to work...for the railroad workers—after all, they are the ones who should make the commercial inspection of the trains."

At the All-Union Conference of Railroad Workers, figures were heard which cannot help but be startling: according to the data of experts, the country loses 10-12 billion rubles yearly because it fails to keep freight safe (including that due to its late delivery and removal, and spoilage). Perhaps it is time to realize—it is better to spend millions sensibly for protection and for improving equipment, and to save billions in return.

#### Latvian NFL Accused of Illegal Interference in Military Electoral District

90UM0158B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Dec 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Col V. Myakov: "For Whom the Law Is Not Written"]

[Text] Candidate deputies from among the servicemen represent a little more than 1 percent in the forthcoming elections to the local Latvian soviets. I would say a rather miserly number. But there are corresponding legal

grounds for this. This is that the districts for electing people's deputies from the servicemen can be organized only within troop units. Among the people, these are merely called closed sections.

Recently it has become known that the activists of the People's Front of Latvia [NFL] who, it must be said, are able to put up their own candidate deputies in virtually all the electoral districts, have tried to "interject" their representatives in the closed electoral sections.

"Wait a minute, fellows, what are you trying to do?" said the representatives of the electoral commissions of the troop units with rather infantile directness to a number of the activists from the Riga rayon NFL councils ["duma"], "this is a flagrant violation of the electoral law...."

"Nothing of the sort," replied the contending fighters for democracy. "The law states that the social organizations have the right to put up their own candidates...."

"Yes, it does. But this applies only to the organizations operating on the territory of the corresponding district. Our unit does not have an affiliate of the NFL as yet...."

"You still do not know the situation," say the representatives of the council, smiling slyly.

How the NFL activists intend to put up candidates and hold meetings they, in truth, did not explain. But they did have to name the ranks of their supporters. It turned out that there were six of them or maybe seven employees of the Soviet Army in the military construction collective. These NFL members did not have any organization in the subunits. And on the day of the elections, they will all vote at their place of residence.

Seemingly the situation was now clear and the law had triumphed. But that was not to be the case. The NFL activists are for some reason little interested in the legal fine points. With a rush worthy of a different undertaking, at their meetings they proposed candidates and registered them in the electoral districts of the units as alternates to the representatives from the troop collectives.

The surprising thing was that only one rayon electoral commission voiced any doubts as to the validity of such a procedure. Having studied the essence of the question, it refused to register Inesse Vinkere, an editor of the rayon newspaper, as a candidate deputy. In response, certainly, there was a chorus of indignant voices on the council. The decision of the rayon electoral commission was appealed to the court. I do not know what the judges were following or what paragraphs and articles of the electoral law they used as a basis, but the ruling of the electoral commission was rejected.

A representative from the District Political Directorate, Lt Col S. Aleksandrov, spoke about all these liberties in the interpreting of the law at a regular session of the Latvian Central Electoral Commission. The members of this commission must be given their due as they spotted

the violations immediately and recognized the claims of the troop units unconditionally. The rulings of the rayon electoral commissions for registering candidate deputies from the NFL in the closed districts were repealed. The question of I. Vinkere remains open since the Central Electoral Commission does not have the right to set aside the ruling of the people's court. Here the republic Supreme Court should have its say.

### **Omsk Citizen Awarded Damages For Confiscation of Literature**

*90UN0665A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 11 Jan 89 p 4*

[Article by N. Kutorgin : "Dyaviliada: The Book Was Written By a Talented Author, the Omsk Experts Decided... And Consigned It To The Flames"]

[Text]A rather rare event has occurred: a worker has won a suit against the procurator's office. But he is not especially happy about it.

For 3 years I.I. Shestakov, a radio operator from the plant imeni K. Marx, sought justice. And then it came, a rayon court decision remarkable in our time and as yet unprecedented in the Omsk oblast: the oblast procurator's office (!) was judged guilty and sentenced to pay I.I. Shestakov 1,187 rubles and 78 kopecks. Was this the proverbial happy ending? Iosif Iosifovich (i.e., Shestakov) doesn't agree that this describes the situation and now asserts that money alone cannot put things right...

Showing Shestakov's wife a search order the investigator from the Office of Internal Affairs, senior lieutenant, B.A. Kurakin, was not looking for weapons, contraband, or narcotics, but strode boldly over to the book shelves. Evidently, he knew just what he was looking for among the several thousand volumes collected by this well-known Omsk book lover. Into a suitcase confiscated from the lady of the house he tossed Denikin's memoirs "March On Moscow," Ropshina's (Savinkov), "Pale Horse," carefully bound typed copies of Bulgakov's "The Heart of a Dog," and "Dyavoliada". These were followed by xeroxed copies of the works of Ye. Yevtushenko, N. Gumilev, I. Severyanin, O. Mandelshtam, and A. Akhmatova's "Requiem." A total of 53 books were crammed into the suitcase, along with tape of the songs of B. Okudzhava..

What had disturbed the guardians of law and order? Shestakov, upset by this intrusion into his apartment, attempted, of course, to find out the reasons for such drastic actions on the part of the police. The answer astonished him no less than the search. It turned out that the police claimed they had information that he kept pornographic works in his home.

No matter how the owner of the library swore that there was nothing of the sort in his collection, they did not believe him in the investigative office of the oblast ispolkom Office of Internal Affairs. Nor were the employees affected by his argument that during the 5

hours the search took, their detective, simply by leafing through the books, could have convinced himself of the absurdity of the accusation and the illegality of this violation of personal property rights. Moreover, 2 months later the highly literate claimant was invited to the office of the oblast procurator. The deputy head of the investigation unit, D.V. Petrusenko, claimed at the meeting that the Omsk law enforcement organs could not have been mistaken. The fact that they found no pornographic literature in Iosif Iosifovich's possession altered nothing, he was being brought before the court as a witness in a criminal case concerning its dissemination. Hadn't he reproduced and copied the books? Didn't this mean that he was intending to sell them, which would be an illegal activity.

The inveterate bibliophile tried with all his power to get the confiscated books returned to him, and finally on 19 June (remember this date, it explains a great deal in this story) there was a ruling that there would be no criminal prosecution. This ruling went on to say: "The objects being sought (i.e., pornography, N.K.) were not found; however, various works of literature came to light, including some which in their subject matter were ideologically damaging and harmful to the spirit of our Soviet society. These include "The Heart of a Dog" and "Notes On Cuffs" by Bulgakov, "The French in Odessa," and "March On Moscow" (memoirs of the Whites), and the poems of Mandelshtam..."

The ruling further spoke about the fact that, according to the "Regulation concerning citizen engaging in home businesses and handicrafts," Shestakov was administratively guilty of reproducing and disseminating printed works (and this was argued in a proposal in the ruling). This document culminated in the phrase "...the works that were removed will not be returned until after examination by the court."

At the end of 1986, the Central Rayon Court of Omsk handed down the decision that these books be confiscated for the benefit of the state. And in the summer of 1987, as it says in the official documents, in accordance with a decision by the officials of the oblast procurator's office, they, along with other literature, were taken to the dump and burned.

Here is the denouement of the detective story. It has, I would like to make clear, a more or less happy ending. After all worse things have happened.

Not long ago, the journal ZNAMYA described how one reader of Bulgakov was sent to prison for the fact that he had "The Heart of a Dog" in his home. And yet here Shestakov is fretting, even though now he can replenish his library with the thousand rubles he was awarded from the Omsk law enforcement agency. But Iosif Iosifovich has not calmed down at all and began to write letters to the editors. "We hear all the time about some sort of mythical bureaucrats who impede perestroyka. And yet it is clearer than clear that only by exercising total glasnost, which does not back down before pressure

from those in power, only by naming names, can we, as in my case, destroy the invincible triad of Internal Affairs Agency - Court - Procurator, when it with its iron obstinacy defends the false honor of its uniforms and 'outlook on life' that reigns in the offices of the heads of the oblast. No matter how much is said about the perniciousness of the system itself, those who perpetrate its evil are always specific. In the words of the poet Voznesenskiy, 'these people who have no qualms and ask no questions resemble the characters in Bulgakov's "The Heart Of a Dog" who have had transplants of the heart and psychology of a dog."

Lack of qualms and unwillingness to ask questions. Are these not the qualities that engendered the stupid and sometimes simply base actions of the officials who participated in one way or another in this long saga of the books? Indeed, the behavior of the investigators from Office of Internal Affairs in carrying out the command to remove the "subversive" books was continued by the actions of an oblast procurator's office worker. Sensing the nostalgia for the old times and the "iron" rule of law that permeates certain high offices, he decided not to return the books. Against the law? Well, what of it? The honor of the uniform is more important than anything else—and so the books were sent off to the oblast court.

Perhaps, the people there might have questioned why the books had been sent and who they were supposed to be judging since the case was closed? But this didn't happen. During the court session, the case documentation indicates, that Ye. Vorobyeva, head clerk of the oblast court chancellery, testified that, at the request of the former chairman of the oblast court, Yu.I. Anosov, she selected some of Shestakov's books and brought them to his office. She could not remember whether they were ever returned, since she never checked them against the list—unshakable trust in the integrity of the chairman was security enough. Anosov, in his own testimony, stated that Petrusenko came to him and proposed that they divide the books. He threw him out of his office.

Now let anyone try to prove or refute these assertions! After all these are nothing but words. But wait, there is one more document—the protocol of the questioning of the chairman of the Central Rayon Court, Z. Zemlyanskaya. She confirmed this when we spoke to her.

"Anosov phoned and said that there would soon be an action against the oblast procurator's office, that the decision concerning confiscating Shestakov's books must be made in favor of the state. The books were not delivered to the court."

Evidently it is still too soon to be complacent concerning the telephone law. In this story it had been operating for 3 years and yet nothing happened. The chairman of the rayon people's court flourishes and now judges cases, while the chairman of the oblast court recently retired on an individual pension. Is it any wonder that under the obedient hand of the obedient judge, the following

decision was born, "the books have been detrimental to the interests of society, and are examples of bourgeois culture. Reading of such literature has a ruinous effect on the readers' emotions and motivation, especially young readers, and destroys healthy moral and ethical principles.. all the literature should be confiscated."

The "unshakable triad" with which Shestakov was so indignant in his letter, is looking for a way out here as well. The senior investigator of the oblast procurator's office, S. Sosunkevich, in 1989 is proposing a resolution that the criminal action concerning the loss of the books be terminated (oh, but these highly literate book readers are insistent!) on the basis of the fact that "in the final analysis, all literature was destroyed in accordance with the decision of the court." This is news! By whom and when was such a decision made? For the oblast procurator's office, judging by everything we know, confiscation was considered to be identical to annihilation.

It is true that there was a moment in this story when the obscuring of the law in the oblast was pierced by a ray of light?

The deputy chairman of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, N.Yu. Sergeyeva, explained in protest, that in Omsk they arbitrarily interpret the "Regulation on citizens engaging in home business and handicrafts." It turns out that unpunished confiscation of these crafts is simply not mentioned in this decree. But as the folk saying goes: "It's a long way up to heaven, and a long way over to Moscow," and for this reason in Omsk they decided that there was no need to worry their heads about legal terms, and one of the directors of the oblast procurator's office decreed that the case would be consigned to oblivion, that is the books would be burned. And this, you understand, was simpler than simple. Officials of the oblast court, headed by A.A. Petelin who at that time was the procurator of the investigative office, were called in.

It is easy to understand that, because of the special importance of the assignment of destroying books, it couldn't be entrusted to mere bailiffs. And so these officials raked together either the remainder or all of the long-suffering books. Ye. Vorobyeva (the former head clerk oblast court chancellery) now asserts that they had a list and left a receipt attesting that they had received the books. But the trouble is that that receipt got irretrievably lost in the piles of court papers. How and in what vehicle the perpetrators transported the "harmful literature," they were unable to remember in court with any accuracy. Evidently, their lack of confidence in their answers, and the absence of a receipt allowed the oblast procurator, Yu. Yakunin, to officially assert that the books were never returned to the oblast procurator's office. That is, that they had had nothing to do with them, and all questions should be addressed to the oblast court.

What in the end did the worker Shestakov get from the servants of Themis (goddess of justice) and the director

of the Omsk oblast? His books? But all that remained of them was ashes. Money? This is also a complex issue. The oblast procurator's office does not agree with the courageous decision of the judge of the Oktyabr rayon people's court, K. Serebryakova. One more court examination is possible. The motives are easy to understand. The honor of the uniform is worth a great deal, and here we are talking about a thousand rubles. More than anything else Iosif Iosifovich is upset about how his "case" could have happened and whether there are any guarantees that it won't happen again.

I share his anxiety. Because I agree that this was not so much a matter of the misuse of power or the impunity of one or another representative of authority, as of the ideological support of these things. It is absolutely clear that the vain attempts of certain representatives of the law to blow up this case involving what they considered was suspicious literature up out of proportion, would long ago have turned to dust had it not been supported by a reptilian ideology, and by those who express so-called public opinion, for which time has always been found for speeches at the party Plenum, conferences and space in newspapers, in which they skillfully brand and condemn anything which the local leaders did not like. And such things can be rather strange.

I will long remember the buro of an oblast committee where, in accordance with a proposal of the oblast ideologist aided by the the newly printed ill-fated "note" to clause 11, they had organized a unanimous dressing-down of the director of the local television station, who had permitted this clause to be called a "noose around the neck of democracy" during a broadcast. It was a good thing that this clause was soon buried by our nation's Congress of Deputies.

But let us return to the writer of the letters. As you remember, all the menacing papers concerning confiscation and annihilation of the books made reference to the ideological harmfulness of literature. The jurists themselves, thank God, had not acted in the role of literary critics. The books from Shestakov's library were condemned by specialists, headed by a member of the ideological commission of the CPSU obkom and secretary of the Omsk writers' organization V. Murzakov.

I will permit myself to cite the text of this expert conclusion, dated 2 June 1986: "... with regard to the works of Akhmatova and Bulgakov, the experts have concluded that the copies of the story 'The Heart of a Dog' and the poem 'Requiem' were written by talented writers, unquestionably at a high professional level, but that they do not reflect objective reality and are a consequence of spiritual crises their authors' were undergoing as a result of the complexity and ambiguity of the social and political transformations that occurred in our country. The contradictory opinions of Bulgakov and Akhmatova during the period in which these works were written, and the fact that they had not completely overcome their erroneous outlook on the world have evoked intense interest in these works on the part of our

ideological opponents. These works did not get disseminated or reproduced on a variety of different types of machine without the active participation of our opponents. The collection of stories 'Dyavoliada' contains no ideological or artistic errors. This, naturally, does not give individual citizens the right to bypass the state editions, and reproduce such works.."

There it is, the justification for throwing dozens of other books—Severyanin, Gumilev, Mandelstham—into the fire, or perhaps doing something else with them. To prop up this authoritative conclusion, there then appeared in the city and oblast newspapers devastating articles about the "book black marketeers," where it was said of Shestakov that he caused moral damage to our society, but for the time being had had the good fortune to escape the bench of the accused.

Of course, God save our hero and others from such "good fortune," from the lack of qualms and questions of free or unfree executors of the social imperative. There has always been a demand for them, and this demand, as we all know, gives rise to the drafting of bills..

One would like to believe that now this demand is diminishing. But when will it be reduced to zero?

### Rise in Youth Crime Rates in Armenia Examined

90US0408A Yerevan *KOMSOMOLETS* in Russian  
23 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by Marina Akopyan and Albert Muradyan: "As Ye Sow..."]

[Text] "He who did not warm himself at sunrise will not do so at sunset, either." (Eastern wisdom)

The happy time of early youth. Who among us has not at least once regretted its carefree years. We felt like immersing ourselves in adolescence, trying to cast off the burden of the years we have lived. Did this experiment work for us? Judge for yourself.

For a start, we decided to go to the club under ZhEU [Housing Utilization Station] No. 26 in Rayon imeni 26 Commissars. A semi-basement space without any sign, with broken glass and a rusty balcony fence, dirty rooms, a so-called sanitary hub, parquet flooring warped in the places where it remained, an upright piano, and, it seems, an accordion, as well as refugees who have moved in here seemingly of their own accord, for lack of any other housing. That is what we saw here. But still believing, as before, in the slogan, "The best of everything to the children," we decided not to become prematurely disillusioned, and went to the "storm" movie theater "Razdan," where we were greeted by charming "Little Vera," who does not allow "children under 16" to see her... Unlike the other teenagers, who had gotten into the hall, we remained faithful to our "own" age and obeyed the prohibition.

The cafe-club "Azat zhamants" greeted us with an interesting theatrical presentation and pricey tickets—from 6 to 9 rubles. Not something we could afford! True, later, after we "grew up," we learned that this cafe had been transferred to the balance of the KanAZ, an organization capable of covering the cafe's many thousands of rubles of debt to and loans from the state. We hope that teenagers can also now visit "Azat zhamants."

So where should we go? We asked ourselves this rhetorical question standing at the entrance to one of the many video-game attractions. Having finally gotten to the games through the crowd of children, we lost a full day's pay for a journalist...

Having finally become disillusioned with childhood, and understanding that it is wonderful only in reminiscences, we wondered, does not the lack of a sufficient number of places in which they can relax, enjoy themselves, and find something to do which interests them push teenagers on the path to committing transgressions for this same purpose—to occupy their leisure time, or to obtain resources for spending time in an "adult" fashion?

The data on the state of crime among minors and youth in the republic for the first half of 1989 confirmed our fears: a 55 percent increase (112 cases, as compared with 72 for the same period last year). In addition, while in all of 1988, 129 students committed crimes, in 6 months of this year, that number has reached 92, of whom 44 are school pupils, and 45 are students at an SPTU [rural professional-technical college]. Over 9 months of 1989, 131 transgressions of a criminal nature were committed by 166 minors.

**Armenian Komsomol Central Committee Ideological Department Head A. Tumanyan** comments upon these data, the causes for the increase in crime:

"I feel that in the first place, the child should receive his upbringing in the family; it, however, is undergoing serious changes, and not for the better, unfortunately. The authority of the head of the household is crumbling; the number of divorces and single mothers is increasing, which also has negative effects upon the children. Thus, while in 1988, of 99 convicted minors, 20 (or 20.2 percent) had been raised with only one parent, then for the first half of this year, of the 62 convicted, 16 (25.8 percent) had one parent. The process of upbringing has been neglected in the school as well. The school imparts a certain level of knowledge, but you could not say that in the area of upbringing. We have forgotten such an important aspect of the upbringing process as preceptorship, under which a master was for a SPTU student, in effect, a father, older brother, and comrade with indisputable authority. And not only in the production sphere.

"In the USSR Supreme Soviet a temporary committee for the fight against crime is in operation, and an analogous committee was recently created in our

Supreme Soviet. Perhaps it will become the coordinating center for the prevention of law violations, including those among minors?"

**In 1988, 8,891 spouses (351 per 100,000 population) dissolved their marriage in the Armenian SSR; in the RSFSR, 626,523 (584); in the Georgian SSR, 9,142 (246), and in the Estonian SSR, 5,953 (512).**

**Satenik Karakhanyan, department head of cultural-educational work of the Armenian republic council of trade unions:**

"In my view, one of the main causes of the increase in crime among minors is poorly organized leisure activity for youth. Just look at the clubs under the majority of the ZhEUs. Unmodified space, a lack of the appropriate equipment and experienced educators. But even the best club is not capable of encompassing all those children living within the territory of the given ZhEU. It would be ideal to create such clubs in each residential building, with a good material base. But alas, we do not have this. Nor should we forget the children who live in private houses; they have no ZhEU, and, in principle, they have nowhere at all to go. You will agree that the pioneer palaces offer very little."

What can Yerevan give its young citizens today? Practically nothing. After all, they do not accept everyone into the sports schools serving entire rayons, whether on the grounds of age or the notorious prospects.

It is also necessary to come up against indifference on the part of the people upon whom the organization of teenage leisure activity depends to a great extent. Let us say that we can help the enterprises organize children's clubs, and allocate money to maintain workers, but the absolute majority of directors of plants, factories, and other institutions and enterprises simply brush off the suggestions, citing the difficulties arising with the transition to economic accountability and self-financing. But did it used to be better? I recall for how long a time I tried to persuade a director to build a pioneer camp for the children of his associates. In reply, I heard: "Only certain children of our associates are in need of pioneer camperships. We have sent them off to the country's best pioneer camps." The leaders do not have a long-term view. Is this not the source of our economy's misfortune? It is, after all, a fact that enterprises today are refusing to give patronage assistance to the schools where the children of their own workers and employees are studying. And as a result, in effect, the only possessor of the monetary resources remains at a distance from an important task of our society—the upbringing of the growing generation.

It seems that it is necessary to create an organ which would begin to be responsible for work with the growing generation, which would have the opportunity to place this work at the required level. Now, the Komsomol, local authorities, the MVD, and others are concerned with the children, but it works out that too many cooks spoil the broth. And after all, we are talking about our

country's future, our people's future. The fate of our homeland depends upon what the future will be like tomorrow. Let us not forget this, and let us move from endless conversations to concrete matters.

**Building 20, Lenin Prospect. There was here at one time a chess club belonging to ZhEU No. 9, Spandaryanskij Rayon. Now there is a wholesale-trading cooperative...**

**Sergey Martirosyan, chief of the Abovyan'skaya educational-labor colony:**

"Juvenile crime is a problem not only for our country, but for all states. Society's civilization, scientific progress have generated an immense flow of information, in which children have gotten lost. In his natural aspiration to master it, the teenager manifests haste; bursts of childish romanticism and the fury of fantasy are woven together, and the result of such a surrogate is impossible to predict. And, as a rule, a leader, an organizer will be found toward whom children will be drawn without knowing what they are doing. Only a wise, tactful, and authoritative parent, teacher, or friend may help the child assimilate information correctly, give him a push where needed, and pause where needed, helping him find his calling in life.

"The abstract appeals 'Everything for the children,' and 'Children are our future' have led to the devaluation of the idea itself. After all, children are today, and only later are they tomorrow. For some 70 years, practically, Soviet power has shortchanged our children on, among other things, human kindness, attention, and affection. They lead a life of grown-up people, and we should return them to childhood, organize and create it for them.

"I am convinced that criminality is not an inherited disease. Good hearing, eyesight may be passed along genetically... But criminality is superficial, acquired from the surrounding people and society: We should all change our attitude toward children, learn to understand them, and most importantly, to forgive them. To forgive them without humiliating them. And the child will respond to you with sincerity and devotion."

**At 8:30 pm on 1 July 1989, Vaagn Kroyan, born 1968, and minor Samvel Tatevosyan, stopped a "Zhiguli" automobile on a Yerevan street and asked driver Onik Tatevosyan to take them to Kharberd. On the way, threatening O. Tatevosyan with a knife, they bound him, threw him into the trunk of the car, and drove toward Sochi. Before getting to the rayon center of Kalinino, they threw him onto the road at night, promising to return the car shortly. Thanks to the investigative measures taken, the thieves were detained by the militia organs in Sochi, and returned to Yerevan. The people's court of Ordzhonikidzevskiy Rayon sentenced V. Kroyan to 6 years imprisonment, sentence to be served in an intense-regime corrective labor colony, and S. Tatevosyan to serve a term of 5 years in an educational-labor colony for minors.**

**Sergey Arzumanyan, doctor of psychology, acting professor of the department of preschool pedagogy of the Armenian Pedagogical Institute imeni Kh. Abovyan:**

"No one in our republic (or in our country) wants to be concerned with children. If someone shows some initiative, begins to take up the problem seriously, he is simply not given the opportunity. In 1979, the department for the study of the sociopsychological causes of criminality and conditions for the re-education and correction of juvenile law violators, in which I worked, was created by a decision of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers. The work had just begun to pick up speed when it was closed at the department dean's decision in 1982. The reason? You will not believe it. The inappropriateness of the subject of the work to the profile of the institute. What more can be said..."

"I am one of a few doctors of social and criminal psychology in the country. For many years I have studied and continue to study the causes leading to violation of laws among minors; I have published many articles, but none of this interests anybody. Under the previous MVD leadership, I was still invited to give reports at meetings of ministry staffers. I understand that this was done mostly in order to check something off in a report, but today, even this is not done. And after all, it is now, when literally before our eyes, for the growing generation the stereotypes formed over the years are crumbling, and in effect, nothing is being offered to replace them; it is necessary to take up children's upbringing in the most serious manner. It is naive to dump all the problems in this serious matter on the family and school, as has been done previously. The causes are of a deeper nature, and in order to disclose and eradicate them, for a start it is necessary to study the genesis of the causes of juvenile crime, which is influenced by both the social environment and the political system. And it is going to be easier to do this today, because we can speak with children openly, without being afraid to tell the truth about the processes which have taken place and which are taking place in our society.

"In each educational institution (corresponding to our school) in the United States there are at least three psychological services. One detects the early pre-conditions of children's delinquent behavior, that is, it studies the causes leading to changes in the behavior of a child who has manifested a tendency toward violations of even the most insignificant nature. Another service studies the "problem," or as we more frequently say, the "difficult" children. And a third—children with delinquent behavior. There is not a single psychologist in our schools. What kind of serious upbringing can we talk about in this case.

"For a long time, I tried to create within the republic MVD Administration of Corrective Labor Institutions a social-psychological service, but I found no support. But after all, a person who has gotten into a corrective institution for the first time may still be saved..."

"The need for the creation in the republic of a special organ with the broadest rights, which would study the entire range of problems associated with bringing up the young has long since ripened. It seems to me that the main thrust of the new organ's work must be in the national customs, the traditions of the Armenian people. In general, I feel that any people can achieve success in this matter only if it relies upon its traditions and culture.

"The creation of such an organ having the right to demand and to punish those who do not fulfill its orders is the only way out of the situation which has come about. Either the state takes up the cause seriously, or it runs into enormous difficulties. Political "viewing" of the upbringing of the growing generation through closed fingers will lead to no good. It is already time to understand that, if it is still not understood."

For every 10,000 14-17 year-olds in the Armenian SSR population in 1988, 4 are convicted (the proportion of convicted minors in the total number of the republic's convicts is 2.6 percent); in the RSFSR, 68 (12.6); in the Georgian SSR, 11 (3.9), and in the Estonian SSR, 72 (11.7).

**Artavazd Gevorkyan, chairman of the Armenian SSR Supreme Court:**

"There are many reasons. One of them has social roots. For example, in the thirties to the fifties, when everyone relied more upon himself, on his own powers, than on his parents, children had a goal—achieving a certain position in society by their labor, study. Many now prefer that their parents do this for them. Hence the flourishing of protectionism, nepotism, and seniority.

"Another reason is the destruction of the family, which also leads to an increase in crime. Parents already do not care about the children, but certainly the divorce in these families was preceded by conflicts, fights, and even beatings, from which the child took to the streets... In addition to all of this, in incomplete families, where, as a rule, the children are raised by the mother, there occurs a certain type of "feminization" of boys. The school could help, but alas, male teachers are also a great rarity. And girls are in no less need of fatherly strictness."

**In 1982, 24-year-old S.A. was sentenced to the highest measure of punishment for a group murder with aggravated circumstances. But even before this, at the age of 19, the son of a highly-placed bureaucrat was sentenced by a court to 2 years incarceration, with mandatory labor. He was tried for theft. The most recent sentence was to death, and the heart of the criminal's father did not survive it.**

**Gagik Gevokyan, first secretary of the Spandaryanskiy Rayon Komsomol Committee, city of Yerevan:**

It seems to me that before speaking about the reasons for the growth of crime among minors, for a start, another question should be answered: Could such growth not take place under the conditions of our reality? After all,

to this day we cannot decide who concretely must take care of the children. Many feel that this is the exclusive occupation of the Komsomol. The Komsomol takes care of them, but let us think a bit; can the Komsomol today, without enough resources, take care of the children? For example, we want to organize a club, we go to the city soviet, which allocates us space in the basement floor of a residential building. Financial expenses are necessary just to get the water pipes and sewer system out of there. And where is the Komsomol getting the funds from?

"Nor, for example, can I understand why the MVD must be concerned with minors. Somehow I decided to visit a boy registered for the inspection on affairs of juveniles. The teenager's parents, upon learning the purpose of my visit, tearfully asked me not to come anymore. They come from the militia, the rayon soviet, the rayon committee... The child had become nervous and tense. Neighbors were already pointing at him, scaring their children with him... We can talk endlessly on this subject, but has there not been enough, have we not been talking too much of late? It is already time to get down to the matter. Children's upbringing is an all-state problem, let us approach its solution in a state-like manner, not reduce everything to the usual campaign, giving off much noise, but little sense."

**At 19:40 on 17 April 1989, on the road to Tsiternakaberd, near the SKK [union control commission], 10-year-old David Kirakosyan, sitting at the wheel of a "Zaporozhets" automobile ran into Y. Firsova and M. Oganesyan, who as a result received light bodily harm. In the car's passenger compartment, next to the "little one" were its owner, S. Aloyan, and the boy's mother, A. Kirakosyan. By a decision of the people's court, S. Aloyan was sentenced to one year's probation.**

**Aykaz Grigoryan, chief of the UVD [Internal Affairs Administration] of the city of Yerevan:**

"In many ways, the growth in crime among minors can be explained by the lack of conditions for passing time in an interesting manner. By that I do not mean all sorts of interest circles. You take a look at how many teenagers flock to the entrance to the "Avtodrom" attraction; the pleasure with which they ride in these cars. Well, why not form in the city and the republic auto fan clubs, where kids could learn to drive an automobile and study automotive work. I know that there are classes studying automotives in certain schools, but only theoretically, for even the chance to tinker with an engine does not always present itself. Of course, this is only an example, but in any case, the clubs we have and the ones being formed must take the teenagers' desire into consideration, their striving to master a concrete profession. That is when we will not have them walking around with nothing to do, not knowing how to "kill" time, and crime among minors will lessen (and perhaps disappear—I am an optimist)."

**At about 8 pm on 29 September 1989, on Marx Street, 16-year-old Armen Pogosyan drove onto the sidewalk in a "Volga" automobile belonging to his father, and ran into sisters Svetlana and Ruzanna Amiryan, and the latter's 2-year-old child. All three were taken to the hospital with injuries of varying severity. An investigation is being conducted.**

**Rayon soviet Deputy Chairman Mikael Oganyan, Rayon imeni 26 Commissars:**

"There are many reasons, perhaps the most important one is that many have perceived perestroika incorrectly, taking it to be a free-for-all. With proper upbringing of children, this should not have happened. However, school today does not give children the upbringing required by the situation of the country and society today. The school is perhaps our weakest link. Obviously, there are serious claims against us. But we will be realists; the local authorities today do not yet have the rights about which much has been said lately, including at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The slogan, 'All power to the soviets' as previously, has not been removed from the agenda.

"In addition to everything else, I am certain that a serious problem in children's upbringing is the country's lack of a comprehensive program for raising the growing generation in which psychologists, sociologists, and pedagogues have had a hand, that is, all those who can make a contribution to this serious cause. There is no concrete executor. It would seem that everyone is responsible, and on the paper-pushing level that is the case; but when things get down to concrete work, then no one is responsible for anything. There is no one to ask. If we are really thinking about our children, it must not continue like that."

We could still cite a multitude of opinions and proposals of people the nature of whose work involves them in children's upbringing. But we think that the ones we have are enough. It seems to us that everything they talked about and proposed must not be left hanging. After all, solving this problem must become the most important task for our society today. Only we do not need to cite the difficulties—social, political, and economic. Foodstuffs, that self-same laundry detergent, and soap will appear on the grocery shelves. But the broken fates of children, what is to become of them? Perhaps tomorrow no one will even need such abundance, and will it even come about? Who is going to create material wealth? Those who today see an indifference toward them? They will scarcely be concerned with this. More likely, they will imitate us and think exclusively of themselves, of their personal welfare.

There is no need to guess what will come of this. The entire path the country has covered over the 70 years of its existence has already answered this question: joyless prospects for economic development, the breakdown of agriculture, the growth of crime, particularly among

juveniles, the exacerbation of interethnic relations, conflicts on religious grounds... this is what society's "concern" for the growing generation has led to. Let us not forget this.

**Baku Official Questioned on Increase in Crime**

*90US0391A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian  
15 Dec 89 p 2*

[Interview with G.I. Odzhadov, deputy chief of the Baku Gorispolkom Internal Affairs Administration for criminal investigation, by Azerinform correspondent A. Guseynov: "Topical Interviews: Resolute Measures are Being Taken"]

[Text] Lately Azerinform has been receiving complaints from Baku residents about the growing number of violations of the law in the city. Tensions have developed. G. I. Odzhadov, deputy chief of the Internal Affairs Administration for criminal investigation of the Baku Gorispolkom, was interviewed by an Azerinform correspondent, who asked him to answer several questions.

[Correspondent] Guseyn Ibragimovich, you are an old Baku resident and no novice in our city's criminal investigation department. What can you say about the situation in Baku?

[Odzhadov] Unfortunately, the situation in Baku is indeed tense, and it has been aggravated especially since the renewed bandit attacks against areas bordering on Armenia. The flow of people who had sought shelter there last year has increased as they now flee again from conflicts in the region to seek security in Baku. They are joining those who had fled here last year but have still been unable to resolve their housing and employment problems. All this is aggravating the already complex, crime-prone situation in the city. It should also be noted that some ethnic Armenians who had formerly lived in our republic and have now left to settle in Armenia have, under a decision of Yerevan authorities, been moving into the apartments of Azeris who had fled from Armenia. At the same time, these people retain their housing, which is protected by law, here. Meanwhile our compatriots who lost their housing and property in Armenia as a result of the actions of Armenian extremists, have, in the absence of an appropriate decision by the Baku Gorispolkom, been trying to occupy empty apartments abandoned by people who have gone away and to take over in those apartment things which they had left behind in Armenia: blankets, tables, crockery, etc. It is hard, you know, to explain to them in such cases that they are committing a crime... The plight of these, frankly speaking, unfortunate people is exploited by criminal elements, who occasionally manage to induce some of them to commit criminal acts, including serious crimes. Hence the growing proportion of group crimes and the appearance of criminal professionalism. And, naturally, public dissatisfaction.

[Correspondent] It is rumored among residents of our city that some of the people leaving Baku were allowed to sell their apartments. What could you say on this score?

[Odzhadov] No such permission was given. But, unfortunately, here, too, people were able to find "legal" loopholes: fake marriages in order to get registered in an apartment of people planning to leave Baku, and then paying a certain sum of money for it. It should be noted that there are people willing to commit crimes to pay those sometimes very large sums. That is why we have taken this process under special scrutiny.

[Correspondent] I must say that your description does not offer many encouraging prospects...

[Odzhadov] In response to your question I defined the situation as it is today, stating that the situation in the city is tense. But it is manageable. The party and local government agencies and public organizations are doing everything possible to provide the refugees from Armenia with housing and work. And at the same time to ensure the security of all refugees, including Meskhetian Turks.

The processes of perestroyka have introduced many important changes in the activities of the militia. Rallies by thousands of people, marches and demonstrations have become facts of our daily life. In these conditions we rely on representatives of public formations, including the NFA [Azerbaijan National Front], to help ensure public order. We have many difficulties due to the militia's poor equipment and supplies. But lately positive changes have been taking place in this field. Thus, the republican Council of Ministers has provided funding for the computerization of internal affairs agencies and for providing them with improved transport facilities.

Our ranks are strengthening. The local party and government agencies are helping a lot. This year alone 650 young factory workers and office employees have been taking part in maintaining public order on a full-time basis while retaining their basic pay. It has been decided that next year the ranks of our local precinct inspectors will be considerably strengthened in the same way.

[Correspondent] Baku residents frequently call Azerinform to complain that police officials frequently fail to respond, or they respond with delays, to calls to the telephone numbers announced several months ago by the MVD. What can you say about this?

[Odzhadov] I cannot agree with claims that police officials fail to respond, although there have been quite a few hoax calls, too. We constantly monitor response to calls. That sometimes our officials arrive late is due to our current technical deficiencies.

In conclusion I would like to assure the people of Baku that the city Internal Affairs Administration is doing all it can to protect people and to leave no crime unpunished. Democracy does not mean permissiveness, and in

addition to rights it also presumes obligations. And we shall act resolutely: there should be no doubt about this in anyone's mind. Of course, we have numerous problems of our own, but the main one is to win the confidence and help of the population. that is why I call upon my compatriots: Let us join efforts to combat crime!

#### Jurists' Union Created in Azerbaijan

90US0391B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian  
19 Dec 89 p 2

[Azerinform report: "Republican Jurists' Union Created"]

[Text] The constituent congress of the Azerbaijan SSR Jurists' Union was held. It was opened by I. A. Aliyev, chairman of the organizational committee, deputy chairman of the USSR Jurists Union.

The congress was addressed by A. S. Orudzhev, Minister of Justice of the Azerbaijan SSR; I. A. Ismaylov, prosecutor of the republic; G. G. Talybov, chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Court, and other delegates, who stated that formation of a republican Jurists' Union was necessary to facilitate the process of further democratization of society and the formation of a law-governed state, eliminate departmental separation of jurists, and meet their professional interests.

The congress adopted the rules of the Azerbaijan Jurists' Union and elected its governing bodies. I. A. Aliyev was elected chairman of the Union.

The congress delegates adopted an appeal to the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR demanding that the People's Deputies give a political evaluation of the anti-constitutional actions of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet in connection with its adoption of a decree "On the Reunification of the Armenian SSR and Nagorniy Karabakh."

The congress was attended by A. F. Dashdamirov, head of the State and Law Department of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee, and A. A. Trepkov, chairman of the USSR Jurists' Union.

#### Roundtable in Turkmen SSR on Stricter Law Enforcement

90UN0758A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 29 Dec 89 p 1

[Editors' roundtable discussion conducted by S. Demkin and V. Zaremba: "To the Full Extent of the Law"]

[Text] "One wonders involuntarily whether perestroyka is taking place within the work of the republic's law enforcement organs!" party veteran K.V. Pavlinov from Chardzhou writes to the editors. "One gets the impression that, here with us, the battle against crime is not becoming stronger, but is growing weaker. I judge on the basis of published reports from the Turkmen SSR Ministry of

*Internal Affairs. The question then arises what kind of people are working within the organs that enforce and apply the law in the Turkmen SSR! How honest are they? How professional? I do not understand why you so seldom see people in militia uniforms in the streets of the city. If the militia personnel (the officers and the rank-and-file) are not wearing their uniforms for operational reasons but nevertheless remember their duties while also dressed in civilian clothes, then why do we have such a sharp increase in street crime? I am starting to think that militia workers are afraid that citizens will ask them for protection against the hooligans."*

A strong letter. But a just one, as all of us, unfortunately, can testify. And statistics that are now publicly available concerning felony crimes do not give cause for optimism. People are losing their sense of being protected. Of course, it is possible to answer the author of this letter to the editors that restructuring of the work of the internal affairs organs did not begin yesterday and that it continues today. That the structure of subunits is being changed and that the responsibility of their workers is being increased by various measures. However, a snowball of problems, first of all legal ones, continues to grow. We are still talking about creating a state based on law, while "realists" from the criminal world are everywhere taking advantage of our slowness. The distance is constantly increasing between old instructions and legal clauses and rapidly changing reality. True, the powerful weapon of legislative guarantees of our security has now been placed in the hands of the organs that enforce and apply the law. We are talking about the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution "On a Decisive Strengthening of the Struggle Against Crime." But, if we have already reached the point of establishing the temporary committees for the struggle against crime that are envisaged by the resolution, then the question unavoidably arises in this connection of how, in general, we have ended up with this kind of life, of why such extraordinary measures are necessary. This and many other questions were discussed in this editorial roundtable. Participating in it were the chief of the juridical department of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, A.M. Vasilyev; the republic's first deputy procurator, Sh. Khodzhamberdyev; the Turkmen SSR first deputy minister of internal affairs, K. Tachmamedov, the republic's deputy minister of justice, V.N. Musatov, and the chief of the Proletarskiy Rayon department of internal affairs in Ashkhabad, D. Annamuradov.

#### Statistics and Reality

[K. Tachmamedov] Answering the question of how we have come to this kind of life, I will say that we have already for a long time now we have felt that we were slipping toward a kind of abyss. The USSR Supreme Soviet resolution "On Decisively Strengthening the Struggle Against Crime" came at what was simply a critical moment. It aims at a unified policy by law enforcement organs in the battle against crime. There has to be a very real war on crime; I am in agreement

with this formulation which has appeared in the newspapers. But we have become accustomed to shy away in an extreme situation and, from the start, have been talking about humanization of the laws. This, of course, is just. But in all cases?

[Sh. Khodzhamberdyev] The resolution emphasizes that investigative organs and courts shall be bound to examine, with maximum severity and within the time periods stipulated by law, cases of robbery, theft, embezzlement, burglary, assault, narcotics dealing, etc. And the resolution in no way contradicts the principles of humanization. Indeed, we are talking about going easier in the case of those who have committed insignificant crimes that are not too dangerous for society, who have committed crimes based on carelessness. But in my view, the is no way we can agree to apply the principles of humanization to those who commit intentional, serious crimes. Nevertheless, some courts and procurators have a wrong understanding of the policy of humanization. The matter has reached the point that sentences which are almost lower than the lowest limit are being imposed for causing serious bodily harm that has almost resulted in a person's death. Of course, it is necessary to consider all the "pro's" and "cons," the circumstances mitigating and extenuating guilt. A differentiated approach to each person who commits a crime is needed, but... Only up to forty percent of convicted persons are sentenced to loss of freedom. Understand, I am not advocating cruelty, but humanization cannot be understood so narrowly.

[K. Tachmamedov] And at the same time, we have to consider the interests of the victim, especially if a very serious crime has been committed against him.

[V.N. Musatov] Our court statistics do not reflect the true state of affairs. The fact is that only 35 percent of the persons who have committed crimes end up in court. Thus, a kind of reduction in convictions is occurring. But this is based on the statistics. The situation is bad with regard to solving crimes; many cases are being halted in the process of investigation and are not being sent to court.

#### Whom Does Humanity Help?

[K. Tachmamedov] During the past seven months, there have been 9000 crimes within the republic—this means 9000 victims. But, indeed, for practical purposes, their interests are not being taken into consideration either in the course of investigations or during the process of court examination. It has been said that there are exaggerations in humanization, that the courts are setting sentences that are too mild. But the court only places, so to say, the final period, whereas cases begin for us in the militia and the procuracy. And it must be frankly said that, as formerly, there is a great deal of covering one's own flanks within the activity of the militia. This relates particularly to militia investigations. Some procuracy workers do not issue warrants for the arrest of person who have committed an obvious crime. And workers in the criminal investigation department play it safe: It is

better not to solve a crime than to take any kind of professional risk. And, inasmuch as the courts sentence only a third of the people who have committed crimes to confinement, a great army of criminals remains at large. And this "army" is in daily operation, supercharging the situation.

But you can't explain the increase in crime by this reason alone. Not to mention the fact that earlier it was rather high earlier as well, although the bureaucratic machine forced us to show an almost one-hundred percent solution rate, which resulted in embellishment of indicators. What happened has happened. We tried to avoid placing emphasis on the most important thing—on the fact that crime as a social phenomenon depends upon tendencies in social life and economics, on economic activity, and many other conditions. We associate the increased complexity of today's crime situation, the increase in criminality, with a sharp problem in finding jobs. This relates especially to previously convicted persons. At the present time, there is no system to help them adapt socially. Difficulties in their work and everyday rehabilitation and other complications are leading to repeated criminality. And recidivism—here we have the most serious and dangerous crime, this is organized criminality.

[D. Annamuradov] For example, people coming from places of confinement are constantly arriving in our rayon. Such an individual has been freed and comes to us: What is there for me to do, where shall I work? In fact, where? I sit and think. Indeed, we now have khozraschet everywhere, and labor collective councils, under various pretexts, try not to accept such people. Some, I am somehow able to set up. The rest—are without work. And here you have potential recidivists.

It is the same thing with adolescents who have committed violations of the law. We register them but, because they do not have specialties, nobody will take them on for work.

[K. Tachmamedov] Confusion in economic and management activity also is having an effect on the crime situation. Irregularities with regard to goods, shortages of many items of prime necessity, and a muddle with the cooperatives all contribute to an increase in speculation and official crime.

[V.N. Musatov] Last year, 61 persons were sentenced for repeated, particularly large-scale speculation. Of these, only seven received sentences entailing confinement. And during the first seven months of this year—there has not been a single one. What kind of battle can we talk about? It is necessary, in a serious way, to correct judicial practices. Indeed, an excess of mild sentences only contributes to a situation of impunity.

[A.M. Vasilyev] A draft has been prepared of an ukase on increased penalties for violations in trade, in particular for sales from warehouses and bases and for concealment of goods. As punishments, it stipulates fines of up to 300

rubles and, for previously convicted persons, a sentence of up to seven years confinement.

[Sh. Khodzhamberdyev] It is precisely at warehouses and bases that controls need to be strengthened so that the products reach the stores. Let there be lines; to make up for this, however, people will be able to obtain them. Here, a complaint can be made against the militia, which has begun to uncover fewer speculators. They prefer to call to account, let us say, a woman who sells a single shirt, but indeed, the speculators have their own leaders and these are the ones whom it is necessary to identify.

[D. Annamuradov] As a practical worker, let me say that such an ukase is absolutely necessary—the fact is that fear of punishment has vanished because legislation itself is imperfect. This particularly concerns punishments for such types of crime as theft of personal and state property, speculation, false-charging, false-weighing and, in general, cheating the customer. While only a third of those convicted are going to places of confinement and half of all crimes are going undetected, what is there to fear? In my view, we should increase the level of material responsibility with the goal of reimbursing losses. And also, we should envisage conditional measures of punishment for those who have compensated for losses. Incidentally, this practice was used in our republic with regard to the "cotton" cases. Naturally, this rule should not be extended to professional crime.

In addition to this, in our everyday lives we come upon incidents when a law-breaker has not even thought about the fact that he was breaking the law. For example, a salesperson or a taxi driver doesn't give any change, and we do not even demand it. The idea has taken hold in our consciousness that it is necessary to give a "tip," covering the difference. By so doing, we are giving unscrupulous people an opportunity not to fear the law.

[Sh. Khodzhamberdyev] Yes, the process of modernizing legislation is falling far behind the process of popular recognition of the necessity for democratization and humanization within our society. And this has led to a situation where the actions of the organs of the procuracy, whose basic function is to oversee precise and uniform observance of the law, frequently are not finding support in public opinion. And one can understand this. To be sure, what we are talking about is a requirement to observe clearly obsolete laws. Obsolete, but, indeed, still not repealed or changed! Incidentally, making use of the right of legislative initiative, the Turkmen SSR procuracy has submitted to the republic's Supreme Soviet a series of specific proposals connected with improving existing legislation.

At the same time, I am convinced that democratization of society is senseless without humanization of the law. World experience testifies that increasing the severity of punishment practices does not influence the level of crime. In the draft "Principles of Criminal Legislation",

humanization is proposed essentially with regard to crimes that do not present a great social danger, and also for crimes by minors.

At the same time, so that the criminal element of the population does not come to believe that punishment will be purely symbolic, it is necessary to ensure (including by measures of procuracy supervision) not only imposition of punishment commensurate with what has been done, but also unswerving observance of procedures for the custody of persons who have been sentenced.

The draft also envisages a reduction in periods of punishment for certain types of crimes. In my view, this is justified. Sociological studies have shown that isolation for a prolonged period of time, as a rule, does not produce a noticeable result in reeducation of prisoners.

#### Who protects the militia?

[K. Tachmamedov] And, indeed, we can talk about protection. Not about attempts on the lives of our coworkers—although our work is risky enough—but about legal protection, in the first place. In the second place, about protection of our right to normal material and technical support and also about the possibility, without obstruction, to improve qualitatively the professionalism of our workers. In the third place, about the protection of our right to action (within the framework of the law, of course)—otherwise, then why do we exist? In the final analysis, everything I have been talking about is directed toward the protection of public tranquility. Everything is interconnected and we are a part of that society which we are called upon to defend.

We are not, of course, divesting ourselves of responsibility for our too slow reaction to a worsening operational situation and for mistakes and omissions in our official activities. And nevertheless it is not accidental that there has recently been much talk about, for example, the technical capabilities of the militia. The republic's militia has nothing to boast about. There is a shortage of people and of modern technology. It is sufficient to say that, for every thousand persons in the population we have in the republic, excuse the figure, 1.7 militiamen, and in the precincts there are even fewer—0.2. Motor vehicles are either old or are obsolete models, and there are very few of these. There is not enough gasoline. This is reflected particularly in the work of duty units and the patrol and point-duty service. We are also experiencing an acute need for new crime investigation equipment. It is impossible to fight crime today using methods and equipment from the 1970's.

And it is also necessary to mention means of personal protection: vests, helmets, shields, etc.

[D. Annamuradov] I have in my rayon department 35 shields of a 1918 model and 25 truncheons. Of 22 old radio transceivers, half do not work. The rayon department has 334 certified workers and a total of ten motor vehicles. Four of these have no batteries and we hand

start them. How is it possible here to respond in a timely way to a call? And since the beginning of the year, the rayon department has registered more crimes than in Tashauz and Marysk oblasts taken together. Our investigation department does not have ordinary video equipment at its disposal and has a total of one tape recorder. They gave us three civilian experts, and it was necessary to house them in small vans outside. We have 33 offices and 5 vans, and everywhere there are 5-6 people in each. How is it possible to talk about normal work?

[V.N. Musatov] By the way, both court organs and the organs of justice, civil registrars' offices, and notary offices are located anywhere at all. The rayon peoples court in Proletarskiy Rayon is housed in wooden barracks—these are emergency quarters. This isn't even to say anything about the fact that to conduct trials under such conditions is belittling—what kind of authority does the court have?

[D. Annamuradov] And, speaking honestly, many of our coworkers also have no great desire to work. The pay is low and sometimes it is necessary to work for days without rest. There are no apartments. We have 80 people waiting in line to obtain them. This year, we gave an apartment to a militia driver who has six children and has been in line for eleven years. In recent times, there have been more frequent cases of resistance to militia workers, involving physical injury to them. But, although the organs of internal affairs have means of defense available to them, nowhere are there regulations with regard to how we are supposed to use weapons.

[Sh. Khodzhamberdyyev] In fact, situations are rare when there is a real threat to the life of a militia worker and then he wonders: what will happen to me if I use my weapon? An order issued by the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs contains four points in which conditions for the use of weapons are stipulated. Basically, they boil down to the protection of citizens during an attack by criminals on particularly important objects. But even here there is first a warning shout, then warning shots fired into the air, and only then direct fire. Therefore, I consider very important that part of the resolution where it is proposed to work out procedures for the utilization of extraordinary measures in the battle against criminal elements, including the use of weapons, and to increase criminal penalties for attacks on the lives and dignity of militia workers and other persons who are participating in the fight against crime.

[A.M. Vasilyev] We are talking about the fight against crime, but success will not be achieved in this cause if we do not introduce order into the law enforcement organs themselves. Indeed, it is no secret that many former militia workers have been sentenced for legal violations and crimes. So that, to the question of who protects the militia, one can answer that, to a large degree, this is the militia itself. And something else. Almost half the apartment crimes in Ashkhabad remain unsolved, and this is a consequence of the militia's lack of professionalism.

[D. Annamuradov] Unfortunately, this is so. The professional level of the personnel being graduated, for example, from the Ashkhabad Secondary Special Militia School (AssShM) is rather low. And where are they going to get their knowledge if, while still school students, many of the graduates are spending half a year in the cotton fields? During two years of study at the AssShM you can't make this up. And so it turns out that graduates don't know how either to draw up documents or to make independent decisions. We have to work with them for about two more years more in order to get a literate operative. And a militiaman sometimes has to concern himself with everything—to solve arguments between neighbors, to smooth out family conflicts, and to catch criminals. Therefore it is certainly worth thinking about dividing the militia up into civil, criminal, morals, and other components.

[A.M. Vasilyev] We need to concern ourselves seriously with the question of improving the professional training of procuracy and court workers. This still is not at the necessary level and partly this is a "service" of the Juridical faculty at the Turkmen State University imeni A.M. Gorkiy—of the smithy of cadres. There are not enough literate secretaries, office chiefs, and court executives in the courts. In 1986, the CPSU Central Committee passed a resolution on improving the training of juridical cadres. It states directly: Open a juridical technical school in the Turkmen SSR. Three years have gone by, and there is no technical school. But, indeed, a great deal depends upon how high the professionalism of procuracy workers is: The procuracy has a coordination role in the battle against crime.

#### A Battle or Campaign Fever?

[Sh. Khodzhamberdyev] A weakening of procuracy supervision of the investigative and inquiry organs and an lack of precise coordination in the activities of the procuracy and the militia have had an influence on the detection of crimes. But to shift the battle against crime solely on to the shoulders of law-enforcement organs is fundamentally wrong. This is a nationwide problem in the solution of which party and soviet organs and labor collectives must take a part. For the present, we have no general plan for such a battle. The republic's enterprises have various production plans but, there too, they do not see that the war against crime is a common matter. And, indeed, we could help the ministries and departments work out a program for strengthening socialist legality. This would be beneficial, I think.

[V.N. Musatov] This is a sensible alternative. It occurs to me that the temporary committee should come out with a proposal to introduce at large industrial enterprises, as well as in the ministries and departments, the position of deputy director for legal work, who would be responsible for the work of the comrades' courts and volunteer public order squads and for the observance of socialist legality. Then, it will be possible to hold him, specifically, answerable for a worsening in the crime situation

at the plant, factory, or institution, rather than the director who is answerable for the plan and other things.

[K. Tachmamedov] It also has to be said that certain ministries and departments are not taking concrete measures to remove the reasons and conditions which contribute to the commission of crimes. A large part of the state installations are not certified [pasportizovan] and are not equipped with protective and firm alarm systems. Lax economic discipline, while engendering shortages, contributes to increased thefts of automobile windshields, tires, and automobile spare parts, and leads to flourishing speculation in industrial and food products. At every meeting, we report about the weak reaction of trade organizations, executive committees, and motor vehicle service facilities to reprimands. The republic has been overwhelmed by apartment crimes. How many times have we turned, both in writing and orally, to the organizations which handle questions of planning and construction, but they continue to build apartment houses where it is possible to get in through the balcony grating on any floor and apartment doors can be opened without effort. Why not equip buildings with cipher locks in entryways? Why should we only allocate rooms for the desks of centralized guard forces, and not all other organizations which also should be interested in the protection of property—both their own and of all citizens?

[Sh. Khodzhamberdyev] Returning to the question of coordination, I want to say that we do not always support the good beginnings of labor collectives. For example, the workers at the kolkhoz imeni V.I. Lenin in Chardzhouskiy Rayon decided themselves at one of their meetings to fight against crime and set to work with groups which took turns in guarding their homes during the nighttime. And there have already been instances of criminals being detained red-handed. But, as the kolkhoz workers have told it, the militia does not always support them and is not giving them practical help, and their legal protection is not clear. We have no background in how to use such groups. I think that the experience of certain plants and factories in Gorkiy Oblast, where workers detachments have been established for providing assistance to the militia, is worthy of attention.

[D. Annamuradov] Speaking honestly, there is no point in volunteer public order squads in the present day. Many members of these squads are only listed on paper, they do not come out for duty. In the first place, because there are no great incentives—three additional days of vacation, and in the second, territorial confusion. A person lives in Proletarskiy Rayon, but works in Sovetskiy. After work he has go home, and then to set out for duty. It is natural that he has no desire to guard an unknown and "foreign" rayon. In June, by a decision of the executive committee, we established such squads in Proletarskiy Rayon—50 persons who served for a month, and by a decision of the labor collective councils, their enterprises continued to pay their average monthly wage. The effectiveness of such a squad is very low. Perhaps it is worth doing, as in other cities in the

country—to create volunteer public order squads at places of residence, under the house-maintenance office (ZhEU).

[V.N. Musatov] Self-defense detachments are a new form, and not an indisputable one, in my view. As a rule, enterprises assign to the squads those who are less needed in production. These people have neither special training nor desire. They operate as squad members and no other rights have been given to them. Therefore, the question of such detachments requires careful work. I think it would be more effective if industrial enterprises would allocate funds for the acquisition of transportation and equipment and for the training of qualified workers for the militia. The directors of enterprises themselves, as well, advocate such a solution. And something more. The creation of temporary committees for the battle against crime—this is a concrete step by the USSR Supreme Soviet aimed at putting a timely halt to negative processes. One would like to believe that their work will not be reduced merely to a temporary activation of the battle against crime. We have seen a lot of campaigns during our lives, and therefore we cannot allow everything, this time too, to follow the path of short-lived campaign fever.

[A.M. Vasilyev] It is necessary that the temporary committees not be eaten up by the paper bureaucracy. The war against crime must be a really decisive one; it should not be conducted according to the unconditionally cruel laws of war, however, but to the full extent of the law.

**From the Editors.** This roundtable discussion took place on the eve of the second Congress of People's Deputies. The problems raised by its participants were on the agenda of the Congress. The growth of crime has taken on such dimensions that it is no longer possible to occupy a position of equanimity. This in itself has already become a crime. Of course, the main responsibility for protecting the normal life of Soviet people lies on the organs of law and order. But, as was noted at the Congress, the battle against crime must become a task of statewide importance. Only by united efforts of state organs and the public, by the efforts of all society, can a decisive rebuff be given to the criminal world.

#### Abuses in Kiev Co-op Activity Detailed

90UN0735A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
21 Dec 89 p 3

[Report by S. Ryabov: "Abuse in the Cooperatives"]

[Text] In early November, the entire law-abiding population of Kiev, including the law enforcement organs and the Temporary Committee for Combatting Crime was given a public slap in the face.

At the "Dinamo" restaurant, group of strong, well-dressed young guys kept ordering the same music, forbidding anyone to dance to it. Then, having chased away the band members, they ordered everyone to stand and drink to the rest of their comrade and friend P., who had

departed for the next world the previous evening. Half of the hall stood, and after unambiguous threats, so did the other—they raised several men who had remained seated by force, wounding one of them in the neck with a knife...

On anonymous phone calls, the militia drove up the restaurant three times, and came away with nothing three times. The doorman, senior administrator, and waiters assured them in unison that nothing had happened. Nor did the hall, humiliated from fear, spill the beans. And where there is no claimant, there is no violation of public order. If you haven't got it, you haven't got it.

On the ill-fated evening in the restaurant they recalled one of the kings of the criminal world, who is officially considered to have passed away from pneumonia. The funeral had taken place on the previous day; his former "colleagues" gathered there not only from across the entire Ukraine, but from other republics as well. The late-model passenger cars alone numbered about one hundred, and there were four buses as well. The total number was up to 1,000 people. "P. was good," sighs his former pal. "He would hand out R100 each to the poor old women."

Restaurants, funerals, some old women. Perhaps it would be more customary to write about whom they killed, tortured, and caught? However strange, that first rank of fact more fully characterizes specifically the concept of organized crime. Hundred-ruble offerings impress not so much by their size as by the steadiness of income. Which means that this cause is carefully and widely established. This is one of the most important signs. Pompous funerals, rather resembling a demonstration of force or an all-union rally of racketeers, convinces and warns us for the umpteenth time how coordinated the criminal world can be in its work, if we speak of its blood interests. This is a type of delayed-action mine, placed under perestroika. And finally, the "knowing no bounds" (it was exactly thus expressed to me in conversation by one of the racketeers) in the restaurant. It is time to realize that from now on no one can feel himself secure against criminal encroachment. No one.

G. Mokrov, doctor of economic sciences and professor at the Moscow Higher Party School assesses the capital of the "shadow" economy at about R500 billion, meaning that there also exists such a force as "shadow" politics. A. Buzgalin, doctor of economic sciences and MGU [Moscow State University] docent adds that the mafia's annual capital turnover alone is from R80 to R150 billion, almost one-quarter of the state budget of our entire country! These data are taken from the central press.

Until recently, the members of the Kiev organized crime group had an income from games of chance alone of up to R100,000 per day. For example, a con man "earned" a "clear" R700-800, after taxes to the racketeers and other "interested parties." And those involving in "throwing the mark-up" (deception while buying and selling cars) have a

**fabulous profit, averaging R10,000 per day. All these racketeers, arm-breakers, prostitutes, con men, and foreign currency mongers constitute the circulatory system feeding the brain and the entire organism of organized crime. It is they who express its morality. The daily income of the Kiev mafia numbers in the millions, a portion of it in hard currency.**

"Over 150 organized groups are operating in Kiev," reckons V.S. Kur, deputy chief of the department to combat organized crime. "Of these, 55 of the strongest and best armed stand out (we already have more detailed information on them). In turn, from these 55 is the control over 80-90 percent of the income of the entire criminal business. But among these latter are two leaders. The ringleaders pay 10-20 assistants, forming the 'first five'; it is they who exercise leadership over the rest. Each of the fists keeps 2-3 groups, which control these or those branches of the crime business. Racketeering is now one of the flourishing sources of income for organized crime."

I saw one of the racketeers immediately after his detention. It seemed as if he did not yet understand what had happened to him. He had just been holding a large amount of money in his hand, and suddenly... It is as if he could have foreseen it: He had long watched from afar for the victim, winding throughout the microrayon, watched the stairs from the next entry-way, but as soon as he took the money, he was on the spot in the iron embrace of the boys from the special subdivision (they are frequently assisted by OMON—the detachment of special purpose militia, and the KGB is now more frequently involved, improving the situation noticeably).

**YET THIS IS ONLY ONE** form of racketeer, somewhat similar to Ostap Bender or, at worst, reminiscent of fox Alisa and cat Bazilio from the "Golden Key." Another form is the representatives of the major organized groups, who impose a tribute from all those smaller and weaker than themselves. The department's specialists are working in this direction. But if we compare them to a deep-sea diver observing sharks in immediate proximity and worrying at the same time about whether he has enough oxygen at the decisive moment, the argument proves to disfavor the latter: the "sharks" of the underground business are capable not only of devouring, but of "miscalculating" their attack. They do not fear prison, all the more so because the net of existing laws is poorly calculated for them, and clumsily set up. So one must try very hard to catch the big fish. Well then, what if one has been caught?

That is worth describing in particular. Late last November, the staffers of one of the Kiev ROVD [rayon department of internal affairs] accidentally (on the anonymous telephone tip of a passerby) detained a ringleader of one of the capital's largest criminal clans. It was a good thing that two cars were ready at once, an UAZik and a broken-down "Zhiguli" Model 1; they blocked the new [model] "niner," otherwise it would not have been worth the work of getting away (and to catch them later

would have been useless, just a fine for exceeding the speed limit). In the car they found two pistols and three Finnish daggers, one of which was about the size of machete for cutting cane. The two militia men saw how one of the detainees (the ringleader) threw his "Valter" [WW II era pistol] with the cartridge and chamber to the ground.

Well, hooray for the Soviet militia? The investigation—the procuracy—the trial? I should say not. No fingerprints were detected on the weapon (they are in general, incidentally, difficult to identify on these objects); the driver, scared to death (hardly by the militia), is silent; the "niner's" passengers distract themselves with conversation. A nice young guy agreed to answer my questions; he is a former boxer, a correspondence-school student, working until recently in the sports committee. It was his pleasure to tell the journalist how in recent years, while belonging to the party obkom commission, he verified the execution by the local organs of the ukase on combatting drunkenness and alcoholism. So, he says, he is a thoroughly vetted man, and got into the car by accident: He was looking for the fender of his car, and these "hooded" acquaintances took him to this rayon. Why did they take him? He had done nothing wrong. Raketeering? Well, he did not play such games. He "caught" foreign trade checks, and had had something to do with con men, but as soon as the militia squeezed him a bit, he gave it all up and is now as clean as glass.

They will let him go; they will let them all go. The rayon deputy procurator did not sanction their arrest. And according to the law, a militia man may not appear as a witness in court, yet no one recalls when this became the practice. In the United States, the evidence of a single police officer is equal to the evidence of several witnesses...

**A week later, the staffers of this same ROVD detain "the man with the 'Valter'" for a second time (and got after the ringleader again by accident, searching drug addicts' apartment with the procurator's warrant), and under the sofa on which he was resting they detect a pistol made by a Spanish firm, and again, a cartridge was in the chamber. The shot resounded through the room, only it had not been fired by either the racketeers, or the militia man, but a member of a Komsomol operations detachment: the proprietress of the hangout said, supposedly, that it was a child's toy. It was a good thing that the bullet lodged in the ceiling and no one was killed. Yet it is a very bad thing that we still confuse children's toys with organized crime.**

Incidentally, dear reader, if you still think that a "ring-leader" is some sort of old man sitting and talking about "how many I killed, how many," then you are deeply mistaken. He is a tall 22-year-old brunette with eyes black as coal and long, curling lashes like a girl's. He is dressed in the latest fashion, hair cut short. True, the prisoner's ring stuck on his finger, the half-contemptuous, half-cautious look, and the nails bitten down to the nub are somewhat in dissonance with the

overall pleasant impression. But as you recall, there are under his command dozens, if not hundreds of young men ready for anything...

**AND WHO OPPOSES THEM?** I will begin from the end. The speculators and other filth at the "Troyeshchina" cooperative market get hot even in December at the mention of the word "Avgust" (the city operative Komsomol detachment of the voluntary people's druzhina). There are 18 people in the detachment, 14 of whom are former assault troops, all Kievans. But for the time being, unfortunately, neither "Avgust" nor the militia has managed to recapture from the mafiosi control over the market.

As was already mentioned, the next force is OMON. I saw the OMON workers in action. It seems to me that the racketeers would prefer (if they could chose) to fall into the hands of the guys from some other subdivision. In any case, the two smothered in the snow who did not even have time to discard the money received wrapped in a newspaper can confirm my assertion.

Of course, not all the OMON workers, but only a small, concrete subdivision collaborates with the department for combatting organized crime. The larger portion is called upon to execute other tasks, in particular, it ensures the maintenance of public order during rallies, street marches, etc. It seems to me that not a few dozen, but a few hundred strong, trained fellows should be put up against the criminal world first and foremost. After all, I remind you, today there are already 150 major (!) organizational groupings in operation.

And now about the main strike and simultaneously intellectual force in the fight against organized crime in Kiev—the special department created within the UVD about a year ago. Incidentally, why it is only a department is not quite clear: As I learned at a ROVD, at almost the same time of the birth of this special subdivision, the personnel department and the organizational inspection department were turned into entire administrations, with a staff increase, naturally. Of course, anyone may be convinced of anything with pieces of paper, but not crime, all the more so, organized crime. At the same time, the staff of the investigation administration, UBKhSS, and the Criminal Investigation Administration are literally drowning in a flood of cases. Moreover, the majority of the associates of the special subdivisions are under the command of the ROVD, that is, they are not included in the UVD personnel. In general, it is as if they are here temporarily. Perhaps I am reflecting like a dilettante, but wouldn't it be better to act the same way with the newly-made administrations? Why is it that during the raging crime the rear, rather than the first line of defense, the front, is being reinforced? Perhaps, that is what is necessary according to some strategic thinking, but I personally, and the majority would prefer that the people who are at any moment prepared to face a pistol or knife for our sake not be refused anything. But for the time being, they have not managed to get any privileges other than

mattresses, pillows, and towels (after all, they often get to sleep for only 3-4 hours per night).

Instead of an answer to the question on how departments were turned into administrations, UUR [Ukrainian Criminal Investigation] UVD Chief I.V. Viktorov made a helpless gesture: That is not in his competence; I had to ask those who were "on top." Well, we readdressed the question to the USSR MVD. In my view, the existing organizational structure needs improvement, specifically: The department should be turned into an administration, and be subordinate to only one individual—the UVD chief; also, OMON should be redirected primarily toward the fight against organized armed groupings.

It is absolutely necessary to introduce investigators into the special subdivision's staff (this also concerns analogous groups recently created in the rayon militia departments).

"Several cases fell through because they did not have along with them a judicial consultant such as an investigator," says N.M. Padalka, deputy chief of the investigation division of the Minskiy ROVD.

**Frequently the detectives accuse the investigator of all the mortal sins because the latter is sometimes forced to release a racketeer detained after great effort, since he does not have any irrefutable against the racketeer. But is the investigator always the guilty party here?**

Nikolay Mikhailovich cited impressive figures: In October, for example, each investigator in the rayon department had to do 46 cases, and in November, 47. But scientists have calculated that the optimal number is 4-5, 10 times fewer! Naturally, people cannot tolerate such mental and physical tension. Recently there remain in the division only three experienced investigators; the rest have left for more peaceful and high-paying jobs (including cooperatives), and their places are being taken by raw youth who cannot even file cases correctly.

**And one more problem whose resolution will allow us to advance even in the current situation.** There exist in many countries laws which allow the application of videotaping and listening to and recording telephone conversations, etc. in the course of an investigation. In the United States, for example, a judge gives such permission if there are serious grounds for this. The facts obtained by such means are accepted by the court as evidence. During the trial (after verification), the surname of the witness cannot be made public, and he himself may not even appear in court. In France, for example, they do plastic surgery for a witness who fears revenge, change his residence, get him a new job, and not at his own expense, of course. An individual who gives the American police important, reliable information, at his instruction, is given X amount of money in a bank account. Telephone confidences have begun to work in Leningrad, true, without compensation, but quite effectively all the same.

CRIME KNOWS NO BOUNDARIES, neither moral, nor territorial, nor political, therefore it is very important to examine closely other countries' experience in ensuring and defending human and society rights as a whole against the ever more active encroachment of the mafia clans. This will finally give us the opportunity to get to the ringleaders of the criminal world.

If we do not take cardinal measures, crime will shake loose the foundations of the state worse than any economic diversion. An example of this is Colombia, says V.S. Kur.

What must these measures be? In the first place, the adoption of harsh laws in the fight against the mafia, the creation of a special permanent parliamentary commission possessing the right to legislative initiative. Even now, as trial by jury is being created, it is desirable that it be involved in cases linked to organized crime...

A similar practice exists in any developed democratic country. Yet why then have they not finished with organized crime there? Because crime had fully formed and fortified itself before society recognized the danger threatening it. But we have organized crime in the process of establishment.

Well, if nothing is cardinally changed, I join in with the prognosis of V.S. Kur, whom his subordinates both jokingly and seriously characterized to me as the "Kievan Commissar of Catania" [Sicilian city]. True, Valeriy Stepanovich is categorically opposed to such a comparison—it is incorrect. But in any event, the militia lieutenant colonel has enough concerns. The man works round the clock; deathly fatigue may slip through in his appearance, but I never saw him in a state of calm. Only the Italian colleague did not even dream of the problems which would require no less effort than does the fight against organized crime itself: Housing for associates, gasoline for the cars, no home phone for himself (this is already simply "boundless" on the part of the communications people)—in general, the entire assortment of typical misfortunes. He even has to take care of transferring the wife of one subordinate from one construction administration to another closer to home. After the usual series of calls to construction administration chiefs and the communications center, he had a temper tantrum:

"The mafia will not beat us; this bureaucratic mechanism will beat us."

And on the spot, all his thoughts switch over to the impending operation:

"Guys, there is going to be a war today; the band has two rifles."

I do not put the word war in quotation marks, because for you and me, this is still a fight, but for them, it has been a war for a long time now, and an unceasing one at that. "We work from morning until the rest, and then we postpone the rest," the associates cheerlessly joke.

Well, we are fortifying the rear, all moving ourselves...

### Fight Against Organized Crime in Kiev Viewed

90UN0735B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
3 Jan 90 p 4

[Article by S. Ryabov: "The Militia's Workdays: There Will be a War Today"]

[Text] A regular briefing took place at the Kiev gor-ispokom UVD [Internal Affairs Administration].

At the beginning of the meeting, UVD Chief A.V. Vasilishin familiarized the journalists with the operational situation in the city. The crime rate has finally managed to come down a bit. A trend toward reduction in murders and manifestations of hooliganism has been noted. The number of fires has fallen 8.3 percent, and the losses from them have been cut in half. Over 11 months, the Kiev militia has disclosed 160 dangerous groups which have committed 460 crimes. Some 52 of the bands disclosed, on whose record are about 200 criminal acts, were of an organized nature.

Yet at the same time, the situation in the city remains tense. Overall, 16,029 crimes were committed. All types of thefts, comprising 60 percent of the violations, are especially troubling. Over 20 units of firearms were confiscated (11 pistols). Incidents of resisting and failing to obey staffers of the internal affairs organs increased a great deal. Seventeen militia men were wounded in the line of duty. They have now been forced to send militia men out in pairs, rather than singly, to patrol about the city.

The second half of the briefing was devoted to the negative manifestations in the activity of the Kiev cooperatives. There have been 3,566 cooperatives formed in the city, and 2,692 of them are functioning. They employ 87,200 people, half of whom work under labor contracts. Self-seeking trends of speculation, embezzlement, and bribery have been more strongly manifested in the cooperative movement today. As UBKhSS [Ukrainian Administration to Combat the Embezzlement of Socialist Property] Chief V.F. Sukalenko reported, after the financial-management reviews of 868 cooperatives, 171 were closed for concealing income, irregular activity, and other violations; more than 20 crimes were disclosed, including 8 misappropriations, 5 incidents of speculation, 2 of bribery, and others.

The proportion of services and production output for the population in the overall volume of work decreased by a factor of 5 by comparison to last year, comprising only 16.2 percent, despite the fact that there are 1.5 times more cooperatives functioning. The number of wholesale trading and middle-man trading cooperatives which bought foodstuffs and industrial goods in high demand and transported them beyond the city has increased significantly. Thus, for example, the "Zarya" cooperative purchased fabric for a quarter of a million rubles. And the opposite; by buying products in other regions,

the cooperative members sell it in Kiev at three times the price. (The "Chayka" cooperative, for example, sold 77 kopek cans of sprats for 2 rubles).

The ispolkoms of the soviets of people's deputies are at times showing excess hastiness to give the "go-ahead" to create cooperatives. One may judge this by the efficiency of use of the credits issued: Of R225 million, the cooperative members have returned to the banks only 1 out of every 15 rubles (in 1988—1 out of every 5).

A total of 287 statements and reports of crimes came in from cooperatives along criminal investigation lines; the overwhelming majority of these concerned property owned by the cooperatives. Quite frequently, the cooperative members themselves become the transgressors, and not infrequently, criminals conceal themselves behind this mask. Therefore racketeering flourishes in the cooperative atmosphere. Thus, a group of racketeers, including Ye.P. Radziyevskiy, of the "Dizayner" cooperative, and a previously convicted boxing master, was detained by associates of the department for combatting organized crime on charges of monthly extortions of sums from R10,000 to R12,000 from the chairman of the "Bizon" cooperative.

#### **Uzbekistan: Statistics Reveal Rising Youth Crime Rates**

*90US0408B Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS  
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 29 Dec 89 p 4*

[Article by Sergey Svetlov: "The Juvenile and Crime: The Grim Statistics"]

[Text] The summary of crime among minors for 11 months of 1989 arrived just in time for the eve of the new year. The Uzbek SSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] press center regularly issues such statistical data.

Alas, within the short time since crime figures have become open, we have managed to become accustomed to steady growth. In the summary, the pluses predominate over the minuses, and these marks of misfortune give no peace.

The USSR people's deputies have devoted no small part of their time to discussing the problem of organized

crime. But in this context, pitifully little has been said about the crime overwhelming juveniles.

Two figures from the report of USSR Minister of Internal Affairs V. Bakatin: This year, a 21 percent increase in crimes committed by minors was registered; among 17-year-old juveniles, the crime rate was four (!) times higher than among 30-year-olds...

The percent of growth was lower in Uzbekistan than for the union—17.1 percent. Yet it is understandable that these abstract data are unsatisfactory. In Uzbekistan, 3,577 crimes were committed by juveniles over 11 months.

If we look at the oblasts, then the greatest growth was in Khorezm Oblast, up 82.2 percent (113 crimes). Matters are more favorable in Surkhan-Darya Oblast, down 32 percent (65 crimes by minors).

A reduction in juvenile crime (by 9.3 percent) was also registered in Syr-Darya Oblast.

In Tashkent over 11 months the number of crimes by minors comprised 1,287 (up 7 percent). By comparison to 1988, juveniles committed crimes more frequently in Tashkent (up 64.7 percent), Samarkand (up 77.7 percent), Bukhara (up 32.2 percent), and Fergana oblasts (up 22.2 percent), and in the Karakalpak ASSR (up 29.2 percent).

However, if we take concrete indices, then we see that "record-setting" Khorezm Oblast had 113 juvenile crimes, but Kashka-Darya Oblast, where the increase was "only" 6 percent, had 123. Where are things better?

In a word, the figures are incapable of giving the complete picture. Only one conclusion may be drawn from them: The criminal is growing younger. All the more often he contrives to be fit to be behind bars even before his draft call.

...It is our practice to exchange wishes in the days before the new year. Yet what can be said here... It is to be wished that in the new decade, the corrective labor institutions will cease to be exclusively labor institutions, and will become more corrective ones. Those who obtain their freedom in the coming year should be wished that they are able to stand on their own feet, and overcome the pull of recidivism.

**Vremya Seen as Obsolete, Seven Days Praised**

90US0501A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA  
in Russian No 5, 3 Feb 90 p 11

[Article by E. Chekalova: "Seven Days That Shook 'Vremya'"]

[Text] "Vremya" was once called the business-card of Central Television. Today the country's main news program is often cited to show the distance by which Central Television has fallen behind the press. And it is not that "Vremya" changed, on the contrary, it has been changing too slowly.

Definitely, it is not just "news of tractors" any more. People of unorthodox ideas, businesslike reporting, and sensible interviews—all of these appear in the program. "Vremya" made our life more recognizable on the screen and it also made life in other countries look more authentic. But we, the audience, still feel unhappy about it as we sense that the strict regulations once applied to the program still linger on. Most controversial ideological debates of today, the opposing points of view, and simple last-minute information on some unflattering facts—all of this remains rather "untimely" for the "Vremya" program.

It has happened before that "Vremya" presented one kind of information about the events in Nagorno-Karabakh, or Transcaucasia, or the Baltic republics at the same time as the "Vzglyad" and "Before and After Midnight" programs and the Leningrad "Fifth Wheel" program provided quite the opposite point of view which later was supported at the highest levels. Failures of this nature did not enhance the prestige of the country's main news program at all. Here is a typical viewer comment: "Vremya" serves to relay the officially approved information that is never completely honest.

It seems that the television viewers were not the only ones to feel dissatisfaction. The "Seven Days" program was launched at 2100 Moscow time, on 12 November of last year and ever since then we watch it every Sunday as our main television news program. This was our impression of the first broadcast: It is not just a new program, but a different concept for the All-Union information channel. From the later programs only the New Year one could be compared to the first broadcast in its intensity, but in general the first impression seems to hold true.

At last the Central Television news has become a writer/anchorman program as it is in every civilized country; that means it became more personalized and less regulated. Here are the results: According to opinion polls, in two months "Seven Days" has become as popular as the night time programs.

Here is another curious note: The head of the information department, Eduard Sagalaev, was the writer/anchorman of the first program. It is no secret that the viewers often think of television journalists and television administrators as of two opposing parties: One side

comes up with some crucial information and the other side edits this information before it gets to the screen to make it unrecognizable and unemotional. In this case the editor-in-chief, a member of the Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] board, started the program with the following message: "We understand how many rumors, falsehoods, incorrect and even dishonest data there are around. We think that our viewers have the right to know the real state of things and to make a conscious choice. You can count on our objectivity and honesty. We will not impose our opinion on you, nor will we hide our point of view."

One would think: What is new here? Everybody knows from both the theory and practice of television that "personalized" information is one of its main principles. And so it is. However, the application of this popular notion in Soviet television was rather rare and at first meant using the announcers who used to read lines written by someone else whose name nobody knew. Now we understand that such announcements are as far removed from real communication as can be. But earlier we thought we knew all these Anechkas and Valechkas very well and we endowed them with imaginary personal traits and interests, and detailed life stories. For that reason any interval in their schedules immediately caused rumors to spread all over the country: What else happened to them? They were the people famous by their fame, i.e. frequency of their appearance on the screen. They personally had no responsibility for any of the broadcasts and we never had any claims to them. We knew just too well: the screen speaks on behalf of the people.

Evening programs were the first to offer their own points of view and information that had not been smoothed over and approved "from above". They started it and right away they found themselves in the position of being "Vremya's" opponents. It became important to create a new, official, All-Union news program in order to overcome the viewers' distrust of television information programming in general. Such a program would be aired in the middle of the evening broadcasts and in such a way it would emphasize the position of the Gosteleradio.

For Eduard Sagalaev and the other permanent anchor of the "Seven Days", Aleksandr Tikhomirov, to be the writers of the program meant to be personally responsible for the selection and presentation of the most important events of the week. And one thing can be stated quite definitely now: The "Seven Days" program has not had any of the serious gaps yet for which "Vremya" is notorious—something has happened but the information about it is aired only on the short waves.

The counter demonstration in Moscow on 7 November, the storming of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] building by the participants of a spontaneous meeting in Kishinev, expressive pictures from the two well-known meetings in Leningrad, last-minute reporting on the breathtaking political changes in Czechoslovakia, the

GDR, and Romania, stern results of the VTsIOM [All-Union Center for Analyzing Public Opinion] sociological research, uninhibited interviews with very diverse people: those who fill locker rooms at factories and the "dramatis personae" who interest everyone, from A. Kashpirovskiy to B. Gidaspov—all these and much other material of "Seven Days" were noticeably different from the routine everyday television information both in subject matter and the angle of their presentation. The main difference lies not so much in the stories themselves (though it is hard to imagine some of them done by "Vremya") as in the general direction of the better broadcasts as a whole.

As early as in 1985 A. Tikhomirov tried to explain in his interview by SOVETSKAYA KULTURA: "The main news program of the country should build its coverage so that, first, the viewer can see an important societal problem behind a concrete fact and, second, he can understand the essence of our current approach to the solution of this problem. Only then can we talk about the social and political orientation of our audience." I think, the weekly news program presented an attractive format and allowed, at last, putting long-standing ideas into practice. One week is exactly such a period of time that a news story can still remain news, but at the same time has to survive as most important in the news natural selection process. One thing strikes me as remarkable: Sagalaev and Tikhomirov have quite different presentation styles and personal likings but they both aim at objectivity. When they covered the most controversial stories like the miners' strike, the two Leningrad meetings, the dissent in the Lithuanian Communist Party, they provided equal time for each of the opposing parties involved. Not always but rather often they presented their own position. For instance, I remember the passionate and erudite polemics between A. Tikhomirov and a Politburo member which, of course, was not a routine matter. However, I tend to explain Tikhomirov's daring not solely by his personal qualities, but also by that same responsibility that the program's writer should feel when trying to maintain standards. For that reason, by the way, I would not recommend expanding the number of writers/anchormen of the program. We have already learned from the experience of "Vzglyad" that passing a program over from hand to hand brings the day when the program no longer goes on the air. The viewers then just sit and try to guess: Did the level of the program drop down that drastically or was there no one left to defend the principles of the program.

"Seven Days" is often compared to "Vzglyad" anyway. They call it the "Vzglyad" for adults, "Vzglyad" without music. To me these comparisons simply show how very few programs there still are at central television that are honest and not boring as far as their format. These very general principles make up practically the only difference between the evening shows, with their inherent attempt at sensationalism and exclusiveness, and the quiet news review which aims to orient the viewer in the stream of events. I say "practically" because in "Seven

Days" one can also see the hand of young journalists. The news programs were always known for the paucity of their graphics; therefore, the visually expressive stories of Vladislav Flyarkovskiy or dramatic and challenging stories of Dmitry Kiselev and Petr Orlov and the poetic etudes by Aleksandra Livanskaya seem very unusual compared to the old format. In my opinion, we should preserve and enhance this quality of something unusual and unacknowledged; all the more so because it is still too often that we can notice in "Seven Days" the imprints of the past "Vremya". In those days a commentator was no different than an announcer, they understood presentation as a kind of bridge between the video clips and not as an interpretation of them; the only reasons we heard were of the type: the collective farms are better than individual ones because they are better.

Before the New Year, a famous French astrologer predicted for "Seven Days" the road through obstacles to the stars. I do not believe in fortune telling, so I want to say just what I see: There are new trends in our television news today. Let us hope that they will turn into new directions.

#### NASH SOVREMENNICK Staff Defends Conservative Views

90UN0677A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS  
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 7 Dec 89 p 4

[Summary by Larisa Razuvayeva of meetings of NASH SOVREMENNICK editors with Tashkent public, in "Cultural News" section: "Get to the Bottom"]

[Text] The literary public of Tashkent Oblast had been looking forward to this meeting for a whole year. That is the time that passed since the invitation to visit Uzbekistan was made to NASH SOVREMENNICK, popular journal of the RSFSR Writers Union.

The debates launched by a number of "thin" and "thick" Moscow journals on the most vital issues of our life have sparked numerous inquisitive discussions and even more rumors and questions all over the country. The attention of readers is quickly captured by statements of writers and journalists representing different factions in the literary community and different trends of social thought. Reports on our literati's conferences and meetings now rank among the hottest news. This is understandable, because they reflect as in a mirror the contradictions of our society, the pain and tragedies of the people.

It is probably no accident that in the clash of opinions the Russian magazine NASH SOVREMENNICK and statements by its editors and regular authors, who include some leading literary lights of our country, arouse lively interest among not only Russian readers. Nor is it accidental that this year alone its subscription circulation has increased to 165 percent. And what publication can boast four editors who are also People's Deputies of the USSR?

The team of **NASH SOVREMENNICK** authors who arrived in Uzbekistan towards the end of November included: V.M. Svininnikov, first deputy editor-in-chief; G.G. Kasmynin, chief of the poetry department; A.I. Baygushev, author, journalist and critic; S.I. Zhuravlev, critic and chief editor of Sovetskaya Rossiya Publishing House; and A.I. Anisimov, vice-chairman of the USSR Writers Union's Council for Belles Lettres Propaganda.

The program of the delegation's four-day stay in the republic was pretty hectic. Straight from the plane the guests, who, fortunately, did not have much luggage, headed for a meeting with chemical workers at Almalyk. This was followed by three meetings in Chirchik, a long, frank public discussion in Bekabad, and visits to several enterprises of those cities. The protracted "round table" at the Uzbekistan Writers Union made it, regrettfully, impossible for the Moscow visitors to meet with a larger Tashkent audience, to include students, workers and intellectuals.

It should be noted that the group of literati who travelled to meet with the oblast's working people also included Uzbekistan poets and writers: Ibragim Rakhib, People's Writer of Uzbekistan; N.K. Gatsunayev, secretary of the board of the Uzbek SSR Writers Union; poets A. Suyun, Ye. Obidov, G. Reznikovskiy, V. Sumin, and V. Pyadukhov. The international team had to respond to many probing questions about interethnic policy, economics, ethical education, language problems, international events, and literary disputes.

Today we offer our readers an interview of sorts with the **NASH SOVREMENNICK** delegation culled from what we thought to be the most interesting questions that arose during the meetings with readers.

**Absent among the contributors to NASH SOVREMENNICK** are Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, Andrey Voznesenskiy, Robert Rozhdestvenskiy, Bulat Okudzhava, Mustay Karim, Olzhas Suleymanov, Rasul Gamzatov, Fazu Aliyeva, Yegor Isayev, Fazil Iskander, Chingiz Aytmatov—in other words, people who basically represent our contemporary literature. At least, not a single publication appeared in 1989. Has this got anything to do with the journal's literary, creative or political stand?

The question contains some inaccuracies. Fazu Aliyeva for example, is one of our regular contributors. Besides, many of the listed authors usually appear in central publications. We are a Russian [rossiyskiy] journal and tend to give priority to our own Russian [rossiyskiye] authors. True, we also print poets from other republics. Those who read us attentively know this. Besides, we feel that many of those named in your list do not "represent our contemporary literature." Don't Yu. Bondarev, V. Rasputin, V. Astafyev or V. Belov represent it? And they are our regular contributors.

Of course, the journal has certain standards for selecting contributors. We prefer not to collaborate with people who at different times, depending on the situation, on the way the wind blew, on the influence of the powers

that be, ably guided their muse, distracting people from essentials, singing hosanna when they should have had the courage of their convictions. You will find no double-dealers among our regular contributors. No one can accuse them of doing something because "everyone did it." That is our civic stance.

What, perhaps, makes our journal interesting in all parts of the country is its orientation towards a deeper, radical approach to the problems of our time, the absence of cheap sensationalism, its attempt to get to the bottom of the "blank spots" of history and social knowledge, to speak out for, and in defense of, the interests of ordinary folk, those who comprise the majority, not a thin stratum of "saviors" of mankind.

**What is your attitude towards the Pamyat society and other informal organizations?**

Our journal has nothing to do with Pamyat. Though it may have gotten its name thanks to Vladimir Chivilikhin's essay novel "Memory" [Pamyat], which we printed. As far as is known, this society has been around for more than one year, and complex phenomena are taking place within it. One should, perhaps, not confuse a vast, mass movement of patriotically minded people with some extremist elements or agent-provocateurs who penetrate and will continue to penetrate any organization, especially an informal one!

It is hard to understand why no one reported or wrote about Pamyat until a certain moment, then all at once it became "very bad" to everyone and people began to vilify it? Why didn't a single newspaper write at the time about a three-day conference of informals in Moscow, in which Pamyat, incidentally, did not take part?

Those "other" informals were given a hall on Oktyabrskaya Square, where they drew up two documents, a minimum program and maximum program. From what we know, the maximum program was so replete with anti-Soviet statements that they didn't venture to circulate it. Soon after that conference, and on its basis, organizations like the Democratic Alliance and Conference of Anarcho-Syndicalists appeared, which supported Stankevich and Ilya Zaslavskiy during the election campaign for People's Deputies of the USSR. This has now been made public (notably in the newspaper KARENYY RYAD in Moscow's Sverdlov Rayon), and besides, they themselves sooner or later blab it out. It was then that, the coordination of certain informal forces gradually occurred.

Moreover they immediately had some state-of-the-art hardware at their disposal. Not bulky tape recorders like ours, but miniature Sony's, which can't be bought even at hard-currency stores. This, naturally, makes one wonder: For some reason someone is supplying you guys very well...

We are often accused of allegedly constantly seeking some kind of plots or secret societies. But we don't look, we simply try to calmly analyze what is happening.

**NASH SOVREMENNICK** is in a sharp confrontation with OGONYOK and several other popular publications. This is leading to a split among the intelligentsia of Russia. But as is well-known, fighting AGAINST something is futile. The important thing is to fight FOR something. For example, not AGAINST rock 'n' roll but FOR the revival of Russian and other national music, culture, etc. It is time to stop the feuding among writers and keep from splitting the Writers Union, and with it the people, at a time when Russia and the entire country is humiliated and ravaged. On the contrary, one should rally representatives of different viewpoints under the same banners.

The author of the question seems to take a balanced approach. Indeed, fighting against something, using only exposes, will not take you far. We realize this and seek to carry on a debate only when it is no longer possible to remain silent. This is the same as failing to answer an attack on one's character.

We repeat that it is not our main purpose to expose this or that person one more time. But one must respond when questions of principle are involved. Lenin wrote in his time: before uniting and in order to unite it is, after all, first necessary to separate. There can be no compromises in ideological struggle. And it is impossible to gather everyone under one's banners for one simple reason. In the final analysis, the entire debate in the press on property issues, on how to continue with perestroika, and so on, boils down to one issue: Do we want to build capitalism, or perhaps we still want socialism?

Whether the representatives of different viewpoints like it or not, that is where life requires a more or less definitive answer. So when we are told that the country needs only a "market" society, that it must fit into and integrate with the world community, completely change the mechanisms of management, revise the foundations, one wonders: why are you so shy, why don't you simply say you're for capitalism? Let us then openly recognize that the country has lost its way, return to the forkroad where we took the "wrong" turn and start developing in the right direction.

But in that case how will you justify striking out 70 years and explain how hard it will be for the country to join the ranks of world powers? Incidentally, many forecasters reckon that had the Russian Empire developed along the capitalist road it could have equalled America in the quality of life by the 1930s. Who will give us those years back now? That is one point.

Second. They say the market will immediately set everything right. You have probably already seen for yourself that it's not that simple. They let the cooperatives "have a go" at the market. And what did it lead to? Even despite the fact that the main levers have remained in the hands of the state. Did it set things right? Shortages in our country are created artificially, because huge profits are concentrated in the hands of some and huge losses in the hands of others.

Frankly speaking, we have misapplied the theory of cooperatives. The cooperator in our country is most often not a producer, because the first to rush into the cooperatives were the shadow businessmen eager to launder their dirty money, their so-called initial accumulations. It was a move that favored them, not the country, not the ordinary man. Another step is permission to withdraw capital abroad. Incidentally, this was discussed in detail at the national Supreme Soviet by Vasiliy Ivanovich Belov, a member of our editorial board. Have you read his speech? You can read it only in **NASH SOVREMENNICK** and the newspapers LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA and MOSKOVSKIY LITERATOR. Why didn't OGONYOK, IZVESTIYA and other national publications print it? Even though it was a speech by a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and a writer of world renown...

As you see, even in our conditions glasnost so far is still fairly frequently a one-way street. In such circumstances it's impossible to accept the slogan, "Let's just make peace, then we'll gather everyone together."

But it should be said that the main content of our journal is not polemics. That comes under our "Mailbag" rubric or in one or two critical articles. All the rest is positive. It is hard to name another journal today that would have striven over the last few years to present so many, and so comprehensive, positive things, like, to name him again, V. Belov's "Harmony" [Lad] and others.

#### What areas do your debates mainly cover?

There are several basic areas. First, the economy. **NASH SOVREMENNICK** strives to speak for the views of the majority of the country's population, people who are forced to borrow a five or tenner from a neighbor until payday, not for those who have dachas on the Black Sea coast. Incidentally, there are many more dacha owners among the "foremen of perestroika" than you think. They are not the ones whom the coming price hikes will affect directly and daily...

Recall the multipage debate raised in the press to the effect that it's time for the state to stop subsidizing collective and state farms. It serves, they said, no useful purpose, and food prices should be raised instead. Then the consumer himself will regulate everything and the subsidies will go straight to the consumer, to every family. Very attractive! But how will those subsidies be distributed, according to what guidelines? If according to pay (as is usually done) then it will benefit those who are already quite well off.

Other variants were proposed. For example, let's raise interest rates for saving accounts. After all, we have more than 300 billion in saving accounts for a population of less than 300 million. That is on average more than 1,000 rubles per person. But we know what stands behind "average" figures. So whom would the state be helping by raising interest rates?

In short, we consider it wrong to raise prices for the most essential foodstuffs. It is wrong to facilitate the erosion of inexpensive prime consumer goods (which is an overt way of raising prices). It is wrong to sell land or enterprises.

Could you buy many shares of your factory? But you can be sure the shadow businessmen can. So that the time could soon come when we would be getting jobs not from the state but from yesterday's shysters owning blocks of shares. And the sooner the law on property is passed—with some very important provisions: private ownership and the right to freely hire labor—the sooner it will happen.

What kind of state will we be then? What kind of restructuring [perestroyka] of socialism would that be? It would be bona fide capitalism. Would history permit this, even if we thoughtlessly fell for it?..

Of course, we have cited only some of the contradictions.

Another aspect is history. Here we differ greatly with our opponents. What does OGONYOK, for example, do? First they make Khrushchev look so bad: he pounds his shoe, goes at the artists, etc. Then Khrushchev's son writes and presents an entirely different picture. Is that how the "blank spots" of history are revealed? Do they all have to be black, dirty or bloody? And where are the documents? Moreover, taken not out of context but in full?

For example, we are now preparing a publication of our own in response to the materials about the shooting of the tsar's family that appeared in the magazines RODINA and OGONYOK. What sensational pieces they produced! However, there was one thing they didn't say, or perhaps not one, but the main thing: How could some obscure Bolshevik in Yekaterinburg by the name of Yurovskiy make a decision of such national, worldwide (according to its consequences) importance as the murder of the Emperor and his family? How could it happen that one of the members of the tsar's family was canonized, moreover one who, incidentally, died in another place, though also in the Urals, but not where Yurovskiy was in command? It is quite obvious that the decision was made at the center. So why not say so openly, name the "big" names and tell the real, not distorted story?

That is where our watershed passes. We are for getting to the bottom of the entire thing. Nowadays mysticism is cultivated by the mass media, with new-fangled collective Grisha Rasputins suddenly appearing: ESP's, extra-terrestrials, UFO's... For all that it makes exciting reading, it also distracts people (like all one-day sensations) from the serious problems of our life.

A couple of years ago our opponents raised a fuss about a memorial to the victims of the repressions of 1937. But why only them? What about the millions of peasants, the so-called expropriated kulaks, what about those who perished in the famine of 1933? And how many people perished without any due process or trial, not even sentences by the notorious "troikas"? So if we are to

recall all repressions, then in the words of our editor-in-chief Stanislav Kunyayev:

"It all began with Nikolay's children... What did they mutter as they died in the dank cellar? The very same words as...The unfortunate children of Arbat..."

Now about art. We support fundamental art, realistic art, which reflects the interests of the national grass roots. Our opponents are primarily concerned with other things, with avant-gardism. It is a fine phenomenon and it should exist, because it stimulates creative thinking and evokes new forms. But are new forms the only main thing in art? What brilliant innovators there once were in art! Where are they now? In the final analysis, it is the grim realists who remain, those who were able to depict their time.

**Is capitalism that bad? Sweden, Finland, Canada... Those countries have more socialism than the USSR. What about a personal Mercedes?**

A good question. In some ways its author may be right. It is necessary to put it in historical perspective. We think that Finland has been very fortunate. It has almost continuously (with the exception of one period) been able to fully tap the market of such a huge neighbor as the USSR. And Finland also has fruitful relations with the West. Since the country has become a kind of bridge between capitalism and socialism the Finns come out winners in any case.

As for capitalism... It's not that bad and has far from exhausted its possibilities. Let us not forget that when Marx wrote his theoretical work he had in mind such a high level of capitalism, with such a super concentration of production forces, that the new production relations would be inevitable. In that sense history did not follow Marx: the revolution did not occur in the most highly developed countries. But does that mean that socialism is hopelessly bad?

*Theoretical* socialism is a system of social justice, mankind's great dream. Simply speaking, capitalism is when someone is better off *at the expense* of others, but socialism is when one is comfortable *together* with others. Indeed, we still can't have everyone "affluent together." But does that mean that it can't and won't be so?

Speaking of a personal Mercedes. Probably it wouldn't be bad to have one. But everyone knows the jams that occur on the roads of, say, France or Canada, when it is easier to get somewhere during rush hours on foot or bicycle. But on the other hand, we still have a long way to go for that. Our roads, especially farther away from the center, are so bad that one may well have to haul one's vehicle on one's back part of the way. When we solve those problems it will be easier to answer such questions.

**Thank you very much for the meeting. You have not convinced me of everything, but I may, perhaps, subscribe to your journal next year, though along with OGONYOK.**

**Journal VYBOR Seen Transformed From  
Unofficial to Official Status**

90US0443A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* in  
Russian No 4, 24 Jan 90 p 3

[Unattributed article: "A New Rubric: 'We Present'"]

[Text] The boundary between the official press, the informal press, and what used to be called "tamizdat" [Soviet material, often dissident, published abroad and sent back to the Soviet Union], has become extremely unsteady during our time. An example of this is provided by the fate of VYBOR, the literary-philosophical magazine of Russian Christian culture (publishers Viktor Aksyuchits and Gleb Anishchenko). The magazine began to be published in the summer of 1987 in Moscow as an independent quarterly. Soon it began to be reprinted in Paris as part of the RUSSKAYA MYSL newspaper. And now it is supposed to appear in a large printing run as an official publication in Riga (with the participation of the Latvian Cultural Foundation).

In VYBOR's program, which was announced in its first issue, the publishers defined their position: "Russia's tragic experience, the exploit of millions of martyrs demands that we rise above the ideals of material program that prevail in modern life. Our duty is to give rebirth to Russia's spiritual culture, to restore the link with its organic roots—Russian Orthodoxy, to communicate more closely with traditional universalism and openness, the 'universally human nature' (to use Dostoyevskiy's term) of the Russian religious soul... In the impulse of spiritual nationwide reconciliation that proceeds from Christianity and that is based on love, charity, and forgiveness, we see the only path for the salvation of Russia and everyone living in it. It seems to us... that the time has come to admit that the present-day global problems require the unification of the creative forces of the entire nation and a joint search by various groups of society."

Each of the nine issues that have been published so far opens with sections containing articles pertaining to religious philosophy and religious commentary. Here one can hear the word of Orthodox pastors—Metropolitan Antoniy of Surozh, priests I. Meyendorf, D. Dudko, A. Menya, A. Averyanov, and B. Polosin; chapters from V. Aksyuchits's book "Pod senyu Kresta" [Under the Protection of the Cross]; and works by B. Bakulin, T. Goricheva, V. Zelinskiy, V. Trostnikov, and others.

The second part of each issue contains works of fiction and articles on historical philosophy, literary criticism, and criticism. The poetry section has printed verse by V. Krivulin, A. Zorin, O. Sedakova, and Mikushevich. After participating in METROPOL, Yu. Kublenovskiy was forced to leave Russia, and VYBOR became the first magazine to return his poetry to his homeland. The magazine also published verses written by those whom we are not accustomed to perceiving as poets, for example, priest G. Yakunin and prose writer L. Borodin.

VYBOR acquainted its readers with the prose of Christian authors F. Svetov and Z. Krakhmalnikova. A. Nezhnyy, a well-known writer on social issues, appeared on its pages with chapters from his novel "Smertnyy chas" [Hour of Death]. The magazine also prints the works of many previously unknown authors. For example, the readers treated as a true revelation the prose of S. I. Chetverukhin, a writer who, during his lifetime, could not publish even a single line. Our literary heritage was represented in VYBOR by a selection of unpublished verse by V. Khodasevich, and by B. Pasternak's correspondence with N. Stefanovich. B. Zaytsev's letters from Athos will be printed in the next few issues.

VYBOR is currently the only magazine in Russia that regularly prints modern Christian poetry and prose, thus attempting to make a contribution, to the best of its ability, to the cause of reviving Russian literature, a literature that is based on a Christian view of the world. The same goal is assigned in the literary-criticism and other critical works. Articles written by G. Anishchenko, S. Belov, A. Belitskaya, O. Zapalskaya, V. Nikitin, and others have analyzed from Christian positions the works of Lermontov, Dostoyevskiy, Ostrovskiy, Bryusov, Klyuyev, Bulgakov, and Platonov, and current prose appearing in NOVYY MIR. A special rubric in the magazine is devoted to the creative works of A. I. Solzhenitsyn. His letter to the publishers of VYBOR was published there.

The articles in the criticism section analyze not only literary works, but also the tendencies in modern cinematography and the theater.

"The magazine has declared from the very beginning that it is the organ of the patriotic Orthodox public. And we stand on that," V. Aksyuchits and G. Anishchenko told LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent I. Rishina. "VYBOR strives to sound the appeal to its Orthodox readers to be circumspect and thoughtful in resolving today's acute problems, including the national one. By developing the ideas of Russian patriotism, we speak out against the extreme actions that hinder the unification of all the healthy Christian Orthodox forces. We are convinced that we have made the correct "vybor" [choice].

**RODINA Chief Editor on Reasons for Journal's  
Rapid Growth**

90US0443B Moscow *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA* in  
Russian 14 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview with RODINA editor Yu. Sovtsov by A. Afanasyev: "The Truth About RODINA"]

[Text] A readership of 450,000—that impressive result, under conditions of fierce competition, has been achieved by RODINA magazine after only one year of operation. Our commentator A. Afanasyev discusses the complicated fate of this publication with RODINA's editor in chief Yu. Sovtsov.

[A. Afanasyev] A year is a short period of time, Yuriy Aleksandrovich. But to the best of my knowledge RODINA has already had a rather brilliant history. And all this began...

[Yu. Soltsov] With an idea. The idea belongs to the Komsomol Central Committee: imbue patriotism in our young people by the broad use of historical material. But do so without any didactics. Instead, use discussions and arguments, because, since time immemorial, the forcing of one's own "only true opinion" has never evoked anything but heartburn in young people.

[A. Afanasyev] But then, on the basis of a decision made by the Politburo of CPSU Central Committee, RODINA became a publication of PRAVDA. So does that mean that this is a magazine "for adults"?

[Yu. Soltsov] Yes. And it was that decision that largely helped us to get on our feet. Also, the comradely support provided by the PRAVDA collective contributed to our growth. But we stipulated with the Komsomol that we would be putting out a magazine for people in the most active age group, because it was they who would be moving perestroika ahead. But we did not make an open declaration of this, because "basic principles" of every kind just have not been getting through in our time—not even under Kashpirovskiy... Our two main lines are the social world in society, and national reconciliation. Our magazine was aimed at the thinking, intelligent person. A person who will understand us and who is capable of making his own analysis of public (different, sometimes poles-apart) points of view.

[A. Afanasyev] And does that reader understand you?

[Yu. Soltsov] Judging by the mail and the subscription results, completely.

[A. Afanasyev] However, we sometimes hear that RODINA tries to become popular by publishing sensationalistic items.

[Yu. Soltsov] What do you have in mind?

[A. Afanasyev] You were the first, for example, to discuss the tragic demise of the tsarist family...

[Yu. Soltsov] Should we not have discussed it? Was it something that we invented? You might recall that that fact belongs to our history. Not English or French history, but our own. And doesn't it seem to be insulting to you that those same Frenchmen and Englishmen know the truth about our Motherland better than we do? And they have at their disposal the facts about our history in a much more skillful way than we do. It is for that reason that we make it a habit to give two opinions. Taking into consideration the extremities of one view, we have granted the reader the opportunity to compare and, in a carefully weighed, calm manner, to think about that tragic episode in the revolution.

[A. Afanasyev] But with regard to similar comments accompanying V. Soloukhin's article "Reading Lenin," people say that they are rather weak and do not stand up to criticism...

[Yu. Soltsov] Well, those comments were written by specialists who are the best ones in that field today. They are members of a group of authors which, under the leadership of M. S. Gorbachev, is preparing essays on CPSU history.

[A. Afanasyev] Nevertheless, what is, in your opinion, the logic for discussions such as this?

[Yu. Soltsov] You have failed to notice that the press has scarcely had time to print any pointed material that pertains to previously "restricted areas" when a tiny rumor immediately starts to spread, to the effect that it is anti-Sovietism. But I feel that the anti-Sovietism consists in the fact that the nation was deprived of its memory and then the country was led to this condition. Also in the fact that today certain people sometimes get the desire to cut off glasnost's oxygen. Although, naturally, no one has any insurance against mistakes or shortcomings—because we do have such things. But you must realize that we journalists (at least the ones whom I know personally) are Soviet citizens no less than the people who issue "dosages" of the truth about the USSR. And you can believe me when I say that we are patriots no less than those who "know" absolutely all the recipes for cooking up patriotism... Didn't you hear, incidentally, how the situation with regard to Soloukhin's article changed after we published our item?

[A. Afanasyev] No, I haven't heard.

[Yu. Soltsov] Previously (in Xerox copies) people were snatching it up. But now no one wants it, even though there are plenty of Xerox copies in the market.

[A. Afanasyev] Has its status fallen?

[Yu. Soltsov] Actually it would seem so. Our item, with comments, brought it out of the underground. The forbidden fruit lost its sweetness.

[A. Afanasyev] It seems to me that a complete analysis has not yet been made of the glasnost mechanism: the very attempt here to "keep back" some of the information, as it were, puts the reader's interest on a children's swing, pushing that interest in the "forbidden" to this great height. But frequently things turn out just the reverse. Was "GULAG Archipelago" really read five years ago—in copies—the way it is being read today? Sergey Pavlovich Zalygin justifiably writes in the foreword, "...having learned, understood, and experienced a lot, we shall read him (A. I. Solzhenitsyn) in a different way, and quite possibly it may even be in a way that he would not want." But the very fact that our native literature is returning not by way of the back door of samizdat [the underground press], but by way of the

front door at NOVYY MIR moderates the hullabaloo and eliminates the morbid fever. The reader does not participate in reading what is "forbidden," but instead he assimilates the content calmly and thoroughly...

[Yu. Sovtsov] We are sometimes asked, "Why did you give the floor to so-and-so?" But isn't it understandable that there would be more harm if he were not given the floor? Because otherwise he will find where and how to express his opinion. And we will lose the opportunity to use our comments to illuminate his position, with all its strong and weak points (we advise the party leaders: go out to the city squares, mingle with people, and we ourselves take a cautious attitude when the magazine does that). By giving the floor even to people with extreme convictions, we know: the more truth there is, the weaker the ground under the feet of those who are sowing enmity.

[A. Afanasyev] But isn't this lack of understanding currently changing the magazine's fate, Yuriy Aleksandrovich?

[Yu. Sovtsov] I would like to believe that this is not so. For the time being, I would prefer to classify our current complexities in a simpler manner: for example, organizational disorder.

[A. Afanasyev] But isn't it true that RODINA might be shut down?

[Yu. Sotsov] No, I think that that is not true. By decision of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, RODINA is being reoriented. Now it will be a publication for RSFSR. Of course, we regret very much "parting" with our union readers—we currently have almost 500,000 of them (and more than 300,000 in RSFSR). We tried to make RODINA a magazine for everyone—for Russians and Kazakhs, Ukrainians and Armenians. Although we are very well aware that this kind of separate publication is necessary for Russia, as long as the decision has been made, we would want it to be implemented.

[A. Afanasyev] Does that mean that there are problems?

[Yu. Sotsov] Yes. On 28 December we received this letter from the publishing house: "As a result of the fact that the editorial office of RODINA magazine is no longer part of the PRAVDA publishing house of the CPSU Central Committee, please free by 10.1.90 the areas being occupied by the editorial office." By that date we probably will have to hand over our passes and material assets... Incidentally, I would like to emphasize: we completely understand the economic background of that letter. We do not hold any grudges either against the publishing house or against the newspaper itself. Moreover, I repeat, we owe a lot to PRAVDA for getting us started. There is something else that is offensive: inasmuch as the print shop has temporarily stopped working on issues 1 and 2 of 1990, those issues will not reach the reader soon and the situation objectively is beginning to look as though RODINA is being shown the door.

[A. Afanasyev] Yes, one cannot fail to be alarmed at the fact that some people are thinking specifically that way. Especially, say, in context with the reorganizing of the SMENA illustrated magazine into the MOLODAYA GVARDIYA format (the illustrations in that instance will scarcely be more attractive)... And what about the government of Russia? Incidentally, at the second Congress of USSR People's Deputies I had the opportunity to have a talk in the lobby with A. V. Vlasov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and chairman of RSFSR Council of Ministers. Aleksandr Vladimirovich warmly recalled one of the "Direct Lines" that he had maintained with the readers of KOMSOMOLKA. In our conversation Aleksandr Vladimirovich also mentioned RODINA magazine. So far as I could determine, the chairman of RSFSR Council of Ministers likes the magazine, and the fate of RODINA will be resolved very shortly.

[Yu. Sovtsov] Yes, actually the RSFSR government has taken a completely understanding attitude toward our problems. The new title—magazine of RSFSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Council of Ministers—was coordinated with V. G. Zakharov, deputy chairman of RSFSR Council of Ministers. We also received support at the Ideology Department of CPSU Central Committee... There is only one thing that must be taken into consideration: it is difficult for RSFSR Council of Ministers within a short period of time to locate for RODINA a publishing house, accommodations, apparatus, and equipment. And so, as a result, there arises, objectively speaking, an organizational hole, a pause. How long it will last, and how the fate of the magazine and the collective will be resolved (and we have, more or less, 40 professionals who have come from magazines and central newspapers), we do not know.

[A. Afanasyev] But we shall hope that it will not be so long that it will confuse almost a half million of your readers who will prove to be without RODINA unexpectedly and at no fault of their own.

[Yu. Sovtsov] As a minimum the readers will not see the magazine for several months... If the Law Governing the Press (in the form, of course, in which it remains in the draft) were in effect, there would be at least some kind of support: psychological, as well as material. Recently I had a conversation with a certain Canadian journalist and I really puzzled him with the question of wasn't he afraid that he would be fired. He is an independent person both in his views and in his means, and he arrives at a newspaper or magazine according to his convictions. He goes there to talk to people who share his views. But if their opinions diverge from his (and that also happens) or if, for example, some kind of organizational difficulty arises, the problem is resolved painlessly, once again for the same reason: independence. And that does not terrorize anyone. No one is seized by panic that this independent person will break loose "from his chain" and throw himself upon the Canadian government with antipatriotic criticism. And it is as though we—such is the sensation—are hired by the state. If tomorrow a

journalist "doesn't look right" to the state, he simply has nowhere to go—can that fact alone reinforce his perestroika convictions, deepen his sincerity, sharpen his pen, or develop his talent? Although, on the other hand, the fact is generally recognized: our journalists were the first to support perestroika, and among my friends and colleagues I do not know a single one who openly or "to himself" would speak out against perestroika, against M. S. Gorbachev's line.

### OUR FEELING OF GORBACHEVISM NEWSPAPER, Editor Reviewed

18120109 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 3, 28 Jan-4 Feb 90 p 7

[Article by Andrei Romanov: "'ANTI-SOVIET PRAVDA' of Sasha Bogdanov"; first paragraph is MOSCOW NEWS introduction. Correct date for MOSCOW NEWS No 3 is believed to be 21 Jan 90.]

[Text] "Perestroika is doing fine." (From the newspaper entitled OUR FEELING OF GORBACHEVISM, No 8.)

That's instead of an epigraph. Now, about the essence of the matter. In the last issue of MN, in an interview with Anatoly Yezhelev, people's deputy of the USSR, the appearance of independent newspapers in the USSR published by individuals was discussed. And now, if you please, you can get acquainted with Sasha Bogdanov, born in 1960, having unfinished philological education at a university—editor-in-chief, chief artist, main reporter censor, typesetter and retailer of the newspaper OUR FEELING OF GORBACHEVISM and the supplement to it ANTI-SOVIET PRAVDA.

We met Sasha in Moscow, on Pushkin Sq., next to the MN office. This location is famous now as the "fair grounds" of samizdat press. Bogdanov is from Leningrad. He's in Moscow on a temporary and forced stay—waiting for the end of his latest case with militia.

Let's thumb through the xeroxed copies. Typed texts—notes, poems and cartoons. A lot of humour, gibes and irony. Nearly always the subjects are very serious for the official press. At the end of each issue: "Publisher—Sasha Bogdanov." Address.

Let's look it through. "The perestroika meat grinder is grinding everybody up, bones and all... The new power thought up a whole system for brainwashing the population. But nothing concrete is being done... Let's sell the Mausoleum and Lenin's mummy for currency!.. 70 years of bloody terror... Forward! To the victory of anti-communism!"

Not long ago the author would have been terribly punished... And now... Now, to be fair, we must say that Sasha Bogdanov, apparently, isn't appealing for the violent overthrow of the existing system—he obeys the Criminal Code.

Also, to be fair, I'll say that his paper has some ideas hard to refute. For example, the following extract: "Comrade Bush!.. Let's give Mikhail Gorbachev both credits and the most favoured nation status, because in case of a lethal end, neither I, nor you, nor our friend Rockefeller will have enough money for the burial of perestroika!" Or take a magnified but not an idle thought. "A too sharp left turn will result in an upturn." Sasha Bogdanov has also a positive programme of his own—something like a Russian national rebirth on the basis of an open-door policy. The programme has a lot of reasonable things.

Bogdanov doesn't like "separatists"—people in Union Republics—who want to part from Russia. However, it would be an exaggeration to regard him as a Russian nationalist. He doesn't like the Pamyat Society at all. He says this cost him two 15-day detentions. The "brave" Leningrad militia arrested Bogdanov for his attempts to put up posters criticizing Pamyat. This, by the way, is a reason of his pessimistic view of the future. "In a few years' time Pamyat will hang all of us. Both us and you," he prophesied to me. That's why he tries to make his paper funnier—our people lead a difficult life anyway, let them laugh a bit.

According to Yuri Timofeyev, Bogdanov's co-author in several issues, their approach to journalism was critically assessed by the so-called republican party which Bogdanov named as its paper. The leadership of the party declared that such an "unserious" edition compromises a "serious" organization (several dozen members). True, later on, the party leadership got used to it and reconciled with it.

With great reluctance, Sasha Bogdanov agreed to speak with me. He thinks that the interference of the official mass media always costs him too much. A couple of years ago, a small interview on the TV show "Public Opinion" led to Bogdanov's dismissal from a dairy plant the very next day. Quite recently a PRAVDA correspondent positively mentioned another of Bogdanov's public speech, and as a result, he had to stand the jeers of his colleagues in the "democratic movement".

Our esteemed people's deputies probably hardly saw Sasha Bogdanov in their mind's eye when they elaborated the draft Law on the Press, including the article on the right of individuals to set up their own mass media. It is much more pleasing for all of us to see the future Freedom of the Press as a lady agreeable in all respects, polite, politically educated and ideologically staunch. But that is our dream. In real life, however, the first to appear is exactly Sasha Bogdanov—a member of the intelligentsia, gifted in his way, but a true enfant terrible (an incorrigible child) in politics. You won't even get from him a good word about perestroika, due to which he's started to publish his paper and, by the way, to live quite well, materially, quitting his job as a loader.

His paper sells quite well. The appearance of such publications is inevitable—sooner or later—whether or

not everyone likes them. Therefore, it is high time we treat Sasha Bogdanov and his colleagues seriously, and this doesn't exclude criticism. It won't all remain samizdat.

### Soviet Firm Plans To Publish Western Siberia Topographic Maps

90US0348A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian  
11 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 6

[Interview with A. Chepkasov, director of the All-Union Engineering Geodesy Production Association, by Correspondent A. Illarionov: "Details for *IZVESTIYA*: Declassified Maps"]

[Text] Novosibirsk—The All-Union "Inzhenernaya Geodezia" [Engineering Geodesy] Production Association has obtained sample copies of highly detailed topographic maps of Novosibirsk Oblast and some of its rayons.

Until recently, such items were classified top secret. This is but the first step in an extensive program to produce topographic maps of the oblasts and rayons of Western Siberia for unrestricted sale. The All-Union Inzhenernaya Geodezia Production Association has been at the forefront of efforts to prepare such maps for printing and to put them into widespread production in our country. An *IZVESTIYA* correspondent spoke with association director A. Chepkasov.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Fomich, to all indications, practical work has now gotten under way to declassify your interesting and very important product.

[Chepkasov] Indeed, the situation had reached the point of absurdity in the recent past. In Japan, for example, a book about Siberia's Akademgorodok included a detailed layout of the world-famous research center that was most likely obtained via space satellites. Nevertheless, for a long time after the book was published, one could publish only a distorted layout of Akademgorodok in the USSR...

But now many Siberians and people in the Urals and the Far East will learn how to use topographic maps to reliably get their bearings in their mountain and taiga rayons, which are bigger than some oblasts in the European part of the country.

First and foremost, detailed modern maps provide invaluable information about our chief resource—land. They provide a documentary basis for the pursuit of economic activities in these regions and for their study and evaluation. The maps that are being readied for publication have a variety of uses.

The scale of 1:1,000,000 (10 kilometers to one centimeter) is best suited for a regional map that encompasses several oblasts. Such maps can be used to study interoblast transport, energy, and other economic links. The scale of 1:500,000 (five kilometers to one centimeter) is suited for a wide-angle [obzornyy] map of an oblast or kray. The scale of 1:200,000 is better suited for a rayon map and is valuable to kolkhozes, sovkhozes, leskhozes,

and other enterprises that operate in rural areas. Such a map is also handy for any resident of a city or village.

The standard plates of topographic publications, A. Chepkasov continued, are bounded by parallels and meridians. They do not coincide with the boundaries of administrative units. On this same topographical basis, we are going to compose maps of rayons, oblasts, and entire regions that are better suited for everyday use.

[Correspondent] It is common knowledge that the capacity of map-making factories, including the Novosibirsk factory, is very strained. Where are you going to print your new products?

[Chepkasov] We are going to replace obsolete equipment at the Novosibirsk Map-Making Factory. In addition, we have purchased the necessary equipment and are setting up map-making at another production facility as well. In order to better study demand, we have decided to market our output ourselves.

### Turkmenistan CP Announces Periodical Changes For 1990

90US0348B Ashkhabad *TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA* in Russian 10 Oct 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Turkmenistan Communist Party Central Committee: On Certain Changes In The Periodical Press"]

[Text] The Turkmenistan CP Central Committee Buro has reviewed questions concerning certain changes in the structure of the republic's periodical press, as well as regarding the publication of a number of new periodicals.

It has been deemed expedient to publish, beginning in 1990, a city newspaper entitled *ASHGABAT AKSHAMY* as a Turkmen-language newspaper of the Ashkhabad City Committee of the Turkmenistan Communist Party and City Soviet of People's Deputies. The newspaper will have four pages the size of a page in *PRAVDA*; it will be published five times a week.

Publication of the newspapers *ZAKHMET BAYDAGY* in Turkmen and *ZNAMYA TRUDA* in Russian will begin in Nebit-Dag as an organ of the Nebit-Dag City Committee of the Turkmenistan Communist Party and City Soviet of People's Deputies; the newspapers will have four pages half the size of a *PRAVDA* page.

A decision has been taken to publish, beginning in 1990, a rayon newspaper entitled *OBA SEKHERI (SEL-SKOYE UTRO)* as a Turkmen-language organ of the Krasnovodskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies. The newspaper will have four pages half the size of a *PRAVDA* page and will be published three times a week; the newspaper *ZAKHMETKESH* will be abolished.

In connection with the formation of Kara-Kalinskiy, Sakarskiy, and Telmanskiy rayons, the following rayon newspapers will be published: GYZYL YYLDYZ, KOLKHOZ YOLY, and ZAKHMET SHOKHRATY. The newspapers will be organs of the Kara-Kalinskiy, Sakarskiy, and Telmanskiy Rayon Committees of the Turkmenistan Communist Party and Rayon Soviets of People's Deputies.

The Turkmenistan CP Central Committee Buro has approved a proposal of the Turkmenistan Lenin Communist Youth League Central Committee on converting the newspaper KOMSOMOLETS TURKMENISTAN into a weekly publication beginning in 1990, with 16 pages half the size of a PRAVDA page. The Buro also approved a proposal of the Ministry of Health and the republic State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports on the publication, beginning next year, of a popular-science magazine entitled SAGLYK in Turkmen. The magazine will have four standard quires and be published once every two months (six issues per year).

The magazine ZAKHMETKESH AYAL will be renamed OVADAN and given the status of sociopolitical and literature-artistic journal of the Turkmenistan CP Central Committee, and the journal TURKMENISTAN AGITATORY (AGITATOR TURKMENISTANA) will be renamed SYYASY SOKHBETDESH (POLITICHESKIY SOBESEDNIK) and given the status of sociopolitical journal of the Turkmenistan CP Central Committee.

The Ideological Department and Publishing House of the Turkmenistan CP Central Committee, the Turkmen SSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade, the Turkmenian Lenin Communist Youth League Central Committee, and all concerned ministries, departments, and public organizations have been instructed to submit in the first six months of 1990 proposals for further improving the structure of periodicals.

#### **Soviet Printing Industry Abilities Scored**

90US0459A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 31 Jan 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by V. Abramov: "A Stepchild of Industry"]

[Text] The disappearance of yet another daily necessity from the stores tomorrow may not cause a major commotion. We have gotten used to this.... What if central newspapers are not published one day? Commotion does not begin to describe it! Until recently, this was inconceivable. However, even now, when disruptions in the supply of paper make this possible we want to believe that there will not be a failure due to technical deficiencies.

We want to believe.... However, the overall condition of printing facilities in our country is unenviable: Even money is printed in our country by machines created approximately 40 years ago. They have long become

morally and physically obsolete. As far as the central newspapers are concerned, there are printing plants at which the printing machinery is on its last leg among those oblast and republic plants involved in printing the largest share of their press runs. This is easy to see. It is enough to put side by side copies of the same newspaper published in Moscow and, say, Khabarovsk. There is a perceptible difference in their quality. The copy which is printed worse indicates old ills of the printing plants.

We are now talking about equipment or, more precisely, the newspaper printing machinery. For about five years now, the newspaper lines for relief printing, the traditional kind for our country, have not been produced. This appears to be good: The course has been set for equipping the printing plants with more up-to-date offset printing machines. They will bring quality, convenience, technological progress. The problem is that offset machines are manufactured only at the Rybinsk Printing Equipment Plant in an amount substantially smaller than that needed. It turns out that the renewal of the pool of newspaper-printing machinery proceeds slowly, and there is a danger of it ultimately wearing out in at least some cities. This may happen in the future though the current picture is not good either.

A printer from Astrakhan, N. Kastalskiy says: "Even if our equipment is superbly tuned we will still not be able to provide better than average quality. You cannot make old machines new."

The production of newspapers and its problems have sort of remained in the shadow despite the great attention the public pays to the press and a tremendous increase in press runs. For glasnost, it is something of a stepchild: It is swamped with work without any help from the outside.

The severely restricted domestic production of offset machines compelled the printing industry to make purchases abroad. At first sight, this appears to be a way out. Why build new printing equipment plants when printing machinery of a quite good standard may be purchased abroad? Many have been purchased. However, many more are necessary. Where are we to get hard currency for this? It is in short supply in our state.

Is this to say that we need to step up the development of our own machine building for printing? There are many problems involved in this: The training of high-quality cadres which you cannot do without in this industry, providing modern machine tools and rigging for the plants, and expansion of the facilities. However, nobody is about to solve these problems. After all, printing equipment is as much a stepchild as printing, except that it is the stepchild of different parents. For example, the NPO [Scientific Production Association] Poligrafmash which has produced quite respectable developments in the last three years has wandered among three ministries. Did anybody at all care about its scientists and engineers? In the course of this, the latter are even more

surprised at the patience of the production personnel who remain faithful to their profession under unbearable conditions.

V. Rumyantsev, department chief at the NPO Poligrafmash, says: "The Rybinsk Printing Equipment Plant has been accomplishing a collective labor feat year after year. No funds have been invested there in production or social and cultural development for a long time. People work out of dedication alone. The director does everything in order to keep the best specialists. However, this enterprise deserves better!"

However, it should be understood that a rapid increase in the stock of offset machines for newspapers will not come about even if we focus on implementing the promising developments of the NPO Poligrafmash now, even if we replace the entire pool of machine tools at the Rybinsk Printing Equipment Plant and provide all the amenities possible for its workers. The capacity of the experimental production shop of the NPO and the plant itself is too small.

There are several ways; however, we have not embarked on any one of them. Unfortunately, the idea of long-range integration-type cooperation with foreign companies delivering printing equipment to the Soviet Union failed to gain the approval of the Goskomizdat [State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade] due to bureaucratic delays. The steps taken in the sphere of joint ventures are timid. Conversion is yet another way. However, as of yet no defense plant has been found which would risk embarking on this precise, one might say capricious, production.

Under the circumstances, various decisive measures are needed to ensure that machine-building for the printing industry and the industry itself do not end up in an ultimate impasse. Have they been envisaged?

Yu. Proferantsev, chief specialist of the USSR Council of Ministers Buro for Machine Building, said: "A draft resolution of the government which provides for the rapid growth of capacity of machine building for printing, by a factor of more than three, has been ready for two years now."

Alas, the draft has not been considered to this day. The supreme executive organ of our country has many urgent matters in need of solutions as soon as possible. This is why matters which can still wait are postponed until later. Do the issues of newspaper production and the support for it belong in this last category? Specialists believe that they do not. The situation in this sector is close to critical. If this industry is left unattended in the future as well we will soon start talking about ensuring that the newspapers are published rather than about improving the quality of newspaper printing.

### Ukrainian Writers Protest Press Reorganization

90UN0759A Kiev *LITERATURNA UKRAYINA* No 47,  
in Ukrainian 23 Nov 89 p 1

[Article by Yu. Mushketyk, first secretary of the board of the Union of Ukrainian Writers, and O. Musiienko, first deputy secretary, Kiev organization party committee, Union of Ukrainian Writers: "To the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party"]

[Text] This republic's writers and entire literary community read with interest the Ukrainian CP Central Committee press center announcement of changes to be made in the structure of the party press. An important role is quite correctly assigned to the mass media in the complex processes of perestroyka. And since they are still frequently operating according to the old stereotyped patterns and routines, it is high time to make structural changes.

It is a good thing that it is planned to broaden the scope of such publications as SILSKI VISTI and ROBIT-NYCHA HAZETA: to reduce official materials in these newspapers to a minimum, and to diversify their thematic coverage. Correct changes are planned for the magazine PID PRAPOROM LENINIZMU. On the whole the proposed reorganization of the ministerial and governmental-agency press does not evoke objections. There is just one thing that seems questionable: merging of the newspapers KULTURA I ZHYTTYA and RADYANSKA OSVITA will scarcely be to the benefit of such a very important cause as upbringing of the younger generation. Our neglected educational system definitely needs a separate newspaper dedicated to professionals in the field, offering thorough presentation of model experience and know-how in education. Certainly RADYANSKA OSVITA should in the future devote more space to matters pertaining to revival of the Ukrainian language and national culture and to development of ethnic self-awareness, internationalist and patriotic feelings. Also praiseworthy is the intention to have some oblast newspapers begin publishing weekly supplements in the languages of the ethnic minorities residing on the territory of the oblast in question.

At the same time many things in the press reorganization plans arouse deep concern, which is the reason for this letter, which was discussed and adopted at a joint session of the presidium of the board of the Union of Ukrainian Writers and the party committee of the Kiev organization of the Union of Ukrainian Writers on 16 November 1989.

As we know, one of the most important areas of the campaign to remove obstacles in interethnic relations which have piled up over the course of decades is urgent concern about just and fair resolution of the language question, which has become exceptionally acute in the Ukraine. It is becoming obvious that the entire world will see how we handle this question and will see how capable we are of being realistic politicians, who are

called upon to concern ourselves with the fate of our people and the restoration of socialist ideals.

At the same time it is stated in the press center announcement that, beginning in the second quarter of 1990, the newspapers RADYANSKA UKRAYINA and PRAVDA UKRAINY (one of them, perhaps under a different name, will be the official organ of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, while the other will be the official organ of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers) "should be published in the Ukrainian and Russian languages."

We should state at the outset that adoption of the principle of bilingualism on the part of the republic's principal newspapers is simply unacceptable, if only because this patently impedes implementation of the Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR, which was just adopted by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, a law which, in particular, obliges governmental, party, and public organizations as well as the mass media to develop in citizens, regardless of their ethnic affiliation, an understanding of the social function of the Ukrainian language as a state language in the Ukrainian SSR. Bilingualism would greatly impede the process of returning to the Ukrainian language the rights which were crudely trampled by the Brezhnev-Suslov levelers and would block its natural functioning in all domains of life.

One can easily predict how such a move would be perceived by broad segments of the population. For that part of the population which has little ethnic consciousness, this would be like a signal to the effect that the Ukrainian language will continue in the future to be nothing but an ethnographic ornament. Chauvinistic attitudes, ethnic nihilism, and lack of spiritual and intellectual awareness, which today are of such concern to the community as a whole, would propagate even more aggressively. On the other hand, for that part of the population which is sincerely concerned for the fate of the Ukrainian language and for the fate of our people as well, such a step would prompt anger, resentment, and resistance, which on the whole would lead to even greater and definitely more dangerous polarization within society. As we know, however, the 19th All-Union Party Conference instructed the mass media to promote in every possible way the consolidation of the socialist society. Thus a bilingual newspaper decision would attest to political shortsightedness on the part of party leaders and that in the Ukraine perestroika is not only losing traction but is sliding back. And finally, this would not foster implementation of Lenin's well-known demand that every Communist who lives and works in the Ukraine is obligated to know the Ukrainian language and to make every effort to ensure that this language is not pushed into the background, that it serves the cause of Communist indoctrination. In short, with this state of affairs the most important points of the new Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR would remain purely a fiction.

People might retort: but many Russians live in the Ukraine. How can we not give them Russian-language

versions of the principal republic newspapers? To this one can reply: all central and western oblasts are heavily populated with Ukrainians. Even in such an "international" oblast as Donetsk Oblast, half the urban population is Ukrainian. As for the rural population, in most oblasts Ukrainians comprise more than 90 percent. Perhaps Crimean Oblast is the sole exception in this regard.

On the other hand, one must clearly state that the Russian-language press in the Ukraine functions not so much for Russians as for the republic's entire population. One might also ask why it is that the millions of Ukrainians who reside in the RSFSR do not have their own Ukrainian press or other mass media?

In the time of perestroika we have solemnly declared that the Ukrainian language should be returned to all areas of life. Our language is close to Russian, and practical experience has shown that every Russian-speaking resident of this republic can read and understand Ukrainian newspapers without difficulty, particularly if he has lived in the Ukraine for a number of years. Of course he can read and understand as long as he has not been blinded by great-power chauvinism, manifestations of which unfortunately can frequently be seen. In addition, in the present sociopolitical situation printing the main republic newspapers in Russian would only add fuel to the fire as regards unhealthy attitudes among the population of the Ukrainian SSR.

But how can we handle things in this situation so that the Russian-speaking population is not ignored? Perhaps toward this end we could leave the newspaper PRAVDA UKRAINY, which would provide Russian-language discussion of matters pertaining to party and soviet organizational development. We should also note that the entire central press, which reaches every corner of the Ukraine, continues to be available to Russian-speaking citizens. But RADYANSKA UKRAYINA, as official organ of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, should continue to be exclusively a Ukrainian-language newspaper. As for the newspaper of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, one would imagine that such a mighty republic as ours could manage to establish a new Ukrainian-language newspaper or, more precisely, could resume publication of the republic newspaper VISTI RAD DEPUTATIV TRUDYASHCHYKH (formerly VISTI VUTsVK), which was unjustly shut down in May 1941, a newspaper which published official statements and announcements of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and of the republic government, materials pertaining to building socialism, the life and affairs of the peoples of the USSR, as well as coverage of foreign news.

We emphasize that the practice of publishing a newspaper in two languages in the Ukrainian SSR should not be permitted. Experience indicates that translated issues of publications in two languages represent crippled language, distorted style, and absence of elementary philological sophistication.

A sharp decline in the Ukrainian edition of VECHIRNIY KYYIV after it was converted to a two-language operation unequivocally attested to the intention at all costs to strangle ethnic publications in the embrace of the official "internationalism" being fostered by the supporters of stagnation.

And yet plans to reorganize the local press indicate double-publishing a large percentage of oblast Ukrainian newspapers in a Russian-language version. This applies to those oblasts in which there have been two party newspapers up to the present time. In the future—following reorganization—there will remain a single, two-language paper. Together with those oblasts in which newspapers are right now being translated into Russian (and frequently the press run of the Russian-language edition exceeds that of the Ukrainian-language edition many times over), this will total 10 such oblasts. What is the reason for this? Is it so that the Ukrainian language will continue to occupy the status of a servant in its own home? Is it in order to continue classifying readers into those who respect the Ukrainian language and those who patently have no regard for it? The intelligent thing would be to do exactly the opposite: to maintain, wherever needed, separate Ukrainian-language and Russian-language newspapers, as well as, for example, Hungarian-language, Bulgarian-language papers, etc. By way of illustration, 95 periodicals were being published in literary Ukrainian in Lvov in 1938, while six were published in the Ukrainian language with an admixture of so-called "yazychiye." Several newspapers and magazines were being published in Kolomyya and other cities of the Ukraine. Dozens of periodicals were being published in Odessa before the revolution. The merging of newspapers and reduction in the number of newspapers presently being proposed, as well as what is essentially a freezing of the tiny number of magazines in this republic devoted to literature and the arts, can be quite readily assessed as a policy aimed at curtailing glasnost and narrowing utilization of the language of the indigenous population.

The overwhelming majority of the 44 city-based local newspapers in the Ukraine (both full-size and reduced-format) are Russian-language. Thus the Russian-speaking

population, which is concentrated chiefly in urban areas, is adequately provided with local newspapers published in Russian. And to double-publish oblast newspapers as well is a patently excessive measure at a time when we genuinely want to return to the Ukrainian language its legitimate rights, not merely to make a gesture for the sake of appearances. After all, Article 33 of the Law on Languages reads: "In the Ukrainian SSR the Ukrainian language shall be the language of the official mass media." This should be the principal guide in linguistic matters pertaining to needed changes in the structure of our republic's press. As for the other part of Article 33, where it states that mass media may also be in the languages of other nationalities and ethnic groups, this of course applies primarily to areas in which there is a compact population of members of such other nationalities or ethnic groups. To insist, however, that periodicals intended for entire large oblasts, let alone the entire republic, be published not in the official language constitutes in fact a direct violation of the law promulgated by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. These things must be considered if we wish to be internationalists not in word but in deed.

We give due credit to the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and the Republic Government, which have drawn up an entire aggregate of measures aimed at improving internationalist and patriotic indoctrination, at restoration of the rights of the Ukrainian language and at bringing it back into all domains of material, spiritual and intellectual affairs of society. It is true that not everywhere are these measures being implemented, and in this regard it is probably necessary to devise a mechanism of more effective monitoring and verification and to demand strict liability for implementation of decisions made in these matters. We have faith that in the matter of reorganization of the party press as well, decisions pertaining to its linguistic status will be thoroughly weighed with the consideration that our press serve in the most effective manner the cause of renewal and consolidation of society, becoming an "embodiment of the people's faith in themselves," serving not only by content but by language as well as a teacher and organizer of the people's life and affairs.

**Ukrainian CP to Publish Book on Famine**

90UN0761A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian  
No 3, 15-21 Jan 90 p 14

[Article by Stanislav Kulchitskiy, doctor of historical sciences, professor, and head of the history of building socialism section, Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences History Institute, translated from Ukrainian by Nikolay Baklanov, SOYUZ correspondent: "Famine—A Few Pages of Tragic Statistics"]

**[Text] Famine in the Ukraine in the early 30's is one of the tragic pages of history which to this day remains little known to the general public. Recently, thanks to glasnost and declassification of numerous archives, the veil of secrecy over the catastrophic events of those years is beginning to lift. This process, undoubtedly, will to a significant measure be facilitated by the new book on this drama which had such great consequences, prepared for publication at the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Institute of Party History.**

Today the weekly periodical SOYUZ is printing an abridged version of one of the chapters. Its author is Stanislav Kulchitskiy, doctor of historical sciences, professor, and head of the History of Building Socialism Section, Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences History Institute.

The information given in Soviet publications on this topic is exhausted by two facts. In 1974, a historical-demographic work by a most authoritative Soviet researcher in this sphere—the late B. Uralanis—came to light. After the 20th CPSU Congress, demographic science began to be reborn, but openness within it remained at the level of the 30's. Therefore, Uralanis studied the problems of demographic dynamics only for the post-war period. He devoted one of the book's sections to an analysis of the reliability of demographic predictions beginning with the pre-revolutionary period. Pointing out that the USSR Gosplan computation made in 1927 predicted the population numbers for April 1933 in the amount of 169 million people, he criticized it for its "unreliability" and gave as a comparison, in a hardly noticeable footnote in fine print and without any commentary, his own evaluation of the real population numbers after the famine of 1933—158 million people. This was the demographer's own figure, since official statistical data end at the beginning of 1933, when the country's population comprised 165.7 million persons. Only one person, not being a statistician, dared to cite the figure for the end of 1933: 168 million. This figure appears in Stalin's speech presented at the 17th VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Congress, and its origin is quite understandable: The official data for the beginning of 1933 plus the annual population growth rate, which at that time comprised approximately 2.5 million people. Today we can emphasize that which B. Uralanis could not: His data are 10 million lower than Stalin's faked figures.

Already during perestroika, in 1988, one of the well-known current researchers on Soviet rural history, V. Danilov, published in a scientific journal, and then in the column entitled "Pravdinskiye pyatnitsy" [Truthful Fridays] in the newspaper PRAVDA, his own interpretation of the discussion of the 1933 famine in the Western press, including also in regard to the number of its victims. He took a negative view of the evaluations on the order of 7 million and announced that the evaluations of historians R. Davis and S. Whitecroft—3-4 million, and of demographers B. Anderson and B. Silver—2-3 million, seemed to him to be more objective.

Concluding the overview of the literature on the question at hand, we cannot overlook the proposals of Western specialists, primarily of Ukrainian descent, on the overall losses to the Ukrainian population in the Ukrainian SSR and beyond its boundaries inflicted by the famine of 1933. V. Grishko, whose book was published in Toronto on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the famine, writes: "The total losses to the Ukrainian population throughout the USSR as a whole comprise 8.1 million for this period". R. Conquest, in his book "Harvest of Shame", concludes that the total number of persons who died of starvation among Ukrainians in the USSR reaches, by minimal estimates, 7 million. However, there are so many "assumptions" in his reasoning that the evaluation has no scientific significance. "Plus-minus" for R. Conquest is measured in millions, not only in the final figure.

We have already mentioned that after 1933 it was Stalin who assumed the task of informing Soviet society on questions of the mortality and birth rates and the total population numbers. Speaking out in January of 1934 with the reporting speech of the VKP(b) Central Committee presented to the party congress, among the list of achievements of the inter-congress period he emphatically stressed, in context with the data on the national income and industrial production, the increase in the population of the Soviet Union from 160.5 million persons at the end of 1930 to 168 million people at the end of 1933. It is characteristic that this figure was used only in propaganda publications. Time passed, but the data on population numbers remained at the level of early 1933.

Speaking in December of 1935 at a conference of combine operators, Stalin announced (quoting with the remarks printed in the 4 December 1933 issue of PRAVDA):

"Everyone is saying now that the material position of the workers has significantly improved, that life has become better and happier. This, of course, is true. Yet this leads to the result that the population has begun reproducing much faster than it did in the olden times. The mortality rate has declined, while the birth rate has increased. And it turns out that the net growth is incomparably greater. This, of course, is good. And we welcome this (lively

animation in the audience). Today the annual net population growth is around 3 million persons. That means that each year we realize a growth the size of all of Finland (laughter).

Stalin could allow himself to talk to the peasants in such a friendly-casual tone. Agriculture at that time had come out of the breach. The mortality rate from the famine and epidemics caused by the famine was no longer evident in the village. Publicists express pretensions addressed to the secretary general for calling the Soviet man a "screw". The verb "reproduce", in our opinion, testifies more eloquently to his attitude toward the working masses. From the standpoint of the problem under discussion, we should be interested in the last phrase: Each year the population numbers are increasing in an amount equal to all of Finland. If it was announced at the party congress that at the end of 1933 the population had increased to 168 million, then at the time of the speech presented to the combine operators, two Finlands should have been added to this figure. The next census of the population should have confirmed this fact.

At first there were plans to hold the census in 1932, so as to obtain a reliable base for computations in developing the 2nd Five-Year Plan. Then it was put off several times. Evidently, the demographic consequences of the famine worried Stalin. The population statistics became a secret, but a census would have immediately disclosed the truth. Nevertheless, a way was found: On 27 June 1936 the resolution was issued prohibiting abortions, which, by the way, remained in effect until November 1955.

The census was held in January of 1937 and led to a political scandal. After the demographers had made their preliminary computations within the frameworks of the oblasts, krays and republics and presented the results to the government, they were accused of under-estimating the population figures. The resolution of the USSR Council of People's Commissars dated 25 September 1937 qualified the census materials as being defective and nullified them. A repeat census was begun in January of 1939. The census cards were destroyed. Demographic science practically disappeared, and the majority of its representatives suffered repressions.

The first publication on the census of 1937 appeared only a half century later, in the next to the last issue of the journal OGONEK for 1988. Its author, M. Tolts, made a number of interesting observations. Specifically, he was the first to point out the evaluation of losses from the famine of 1933 secretly made by B. Urlanis. In the West there were many reports published about the enigmatic census. The first to mention this was G. Suvarin in his book on Stalin published in 1939. Referring to verbal testimony from "authoritative sources of Bolshevik origin", he reported that the census had recorded only 145 million persons. In one of the latest books devoted to the famine of 1933, Canadian scientist M. Tsarinnik cites a different figure—158 million.

If we could find the true final data for the census of 1937, the problem of the demographic consequences of the 1933 famine would be resolved at the level of scientific computation, and not hypothesis.

I began my scientific career as an archivist, and therefore knew that it is useless to seek the necessary data in the archives of the former TsUNKHU (Central Administration of National Economic Accounting). The order to erase from the service documentation all traces of the repressed census were undoubtedly fulfilled. We know, however, that institutions and organizations exchange information in the process of their activity, and that the data on the census could have been placed in the most unexpected archive collection. But in which one?

The first elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet were scheduled for December of 1937 in accordance with the new "Stalinist" constitution. The central electoral commission began its work long before September of 1937, when the resolution on the nullification of the census results was issued. Undoubtedly, the commission needed data on the population numbers in order to define the boundaries of the electoral districts. Thus, the archives of the Central Electoral Comission could contain data on the census.

The USSR Supreme Soviet collection was stored at the Central State Archives of the October Revolution, the highest organs of state authority and organs of USSR state control. It is not closed, but is among the collections which may be used only with permission of the collection-forming organization. The archive director is responsible for personally contacting the officials in the apparatus of our parliament each time a scientist armed with petitions from his place of work dares come close to this collection. If the question is resolved positively, the scientist receives several files corresponding to the topic formulated in the petitions.

I was given these few files which were thematically associated with the preparations for the 1937 census. If I had had a description of the collection, I would not have ordered these prepared materials. However, under such a regimen of using the archive collection, the description is not given out to outsiders...

One of my work colleagues helped me out. While searching for some other information, he accidentally came across a document entitled "Preliminary data on the population numbers by union republics, krays and oblasts (material for elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet)", which had been entered by TsUNKHU Chief Veremenichev. These were, as stated in the document, the preliminary data for the 1937 census. They showed that the population numbers for the UkrSSR comprised 30,157,609 persons. The number of the total USSR population was equal to 166,572,975 persons. The data on Narkompros [People's Commissariat of Education] colonies and NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] camps, where the census was not taken, was

listed in a separate column—1,956,217. Thus, the overall population of the Soviet Union comprised 168.5 million people.

Thus, the final census figure coincided with that which Stalin presented at the 17th Party Congress as reflecting the population numbers for the end of 1933. Three full years had elapsed between the Congress and the census. We may rightly ask: Where did three of Stalin's "Finlands" go?

As for the repeat census taken in January of 1939, it was already conducted by different people whose qualifications were evidently an order lower. The final data were published on 2 July 1939 in the form of official information which stated that the Sovnarkom had heard the report of the USSR Gosplan on the results of the census, notes that the census was conducted correctly and in accordance with government directives, and expresses its thanks to the census workers. Later tens of its organizers were awarded orders and medals.

Yet despite the dubious nature of the obtained results, even they showed that in the Ukraine, in Kazakhstan and in the Northern Caucasus the population numbers were lower than they were prior to 1933. No one explained either this deficit or the absence of the 6-year natural growth. No one focused attention on forbidden topics. After the terror of 1937-1938, it was evidently no longer necessary to specially disguise the demographic consequences of the famine.

An unexpected turn in the subject of the 1937 census occurred after the publication of the April 1989 issue of the journal VOPROSY ISTORII. In it, the director of the USSR Central State National Economic Archive, V. Tsaplin, published new data in the form of a letter to the editors. Having access through his work position to materials which are still secret, as he himself stressed, he found an extremely important document—a letter written by TsUNKhU Chief I. Kraval to Stalin and Molotov, "On the preliminary results of the all-union census of the population", dated 14 March 1937. The document was typewritten in four copies, of which two were found, including also the original—for some reason un stamped and without a signature. Soon afterward, as we know, I. Kraval was arrested and, in 1938, executed.

The letter states that the total USSR population on 6 January 1937 comprised 162,003,255 persons. These data are 6,526,000 persons lower than those cited by Kraval's successor as TsUNKhU chief, Veremenichev. Thus, the documents found in different archives allow us to easily reconstruct the course of events.

After the removal of I. Kraval and the persons directly responsible for conducting the census, the frightened TsUNKhU workers hurriedly corrected the summary data with a 4 percent mark-up, and presented them in this new form to the Central Electoral Commission.

If we proceed from Stalin's figure of 168 million persons by the end of 1933—which would be quite accurate had it not been for the famine, and even if we believe Stalin's careless remark about the "reproduction" of the population at a rate of "one Finland a year", and this remark is absolutely true, since the dictator himself took pains to "spur on" the natural growth by prohibiting abortions—then by the start of 1937 the population would be expected to number 177 million persons. The census showed a terrible inconsistency with the expected results, caused by the starvation from famine and the repressions: 15 million people!

Why did the TsUNKhU workers not mark up the summary data to the "necessary" figures, rather than adding on only 6.5 million persons? Evidently, they too knew at that time that in 1939 they would have to repeat the all-union census of the population and during this repetition—to "bring up" the results. To do this by a figure of 15 million would hardly be possible even in such a huge country. Therefore, the true census data were destroyed, and the falsified ones were made accessible to the highest organs of state control as top secret data.

Based on the real data of the 1937 census, we may compute the shortage of the population in the Ukraine caused by the losses from the 1933 famine. They comprise, without considering the repressions which became massive after the murder of S. Kirov—6,074,000 persons. This is an approximate demographic evaluation which bears a minimal character. It turns out that one in every four rural residents perished in the Ukraine. By relative losses from famine (computed per total number of residents), the Ukraine is in third place after Kazakhstan and the North Caucasus, and by absolute losses it is in first place. These losses are staggering in their scope.

**Belorussian Chernobyl Clean-up Criticized**

90UN0658A Minsk KOMMUNIST BELORUSSII in Russian No 12, Dec 89 p 64

[Article by special correspondent V. Samoylov: "The Radiation of Indifference, or the Story of Why Academician Ilin Has Nightmares about Two Belorussian Villages"]

[Text] *"Our institute has calculated the doses every locality has received in Belorussia, the Ukraine, and the RSFSR. But I must confess, there are two villages in the Mogilevskaya oblast—Chudyany and Malinovka—which we have nightmares about almost every night. Those areas have around 140 curies per square kilometer. I do not know why they have taken so long to relocate them. All of our calculations and recommendations for these localities have long since been in the hands of the republic's leadership."*

Academician L.A. Ilin

It is exactly ten years since I have been in the Cherikovskiy rayon. The last time was when we prepared a big television program here in 1979 with the optimistic title "Outlook." I remember how the rayon authorities insisted that we include more shots in the program of new settlements and sites of so-called cultural and communal facilities. They spoke a lot about the rayon of tomorrow. And one kolkhoz chairman invited us right on camera to come back in ten years. "You won't recognize our area," he said...

But all the same, I recognized Cherikov at once. Still the same dusty square in front of the Palace of Soviets, the same endless noise from the traffic along the main road. Although a few brick buildings had been added and a restaurant had appeared.

The prospects for this rayon appeared bleak, as is the case in many other corners of Belorussia, the Ukraine, and Russia over which a radioactive cloud had stretched its black wing. Perhaps it was auto-suggestion, but from my first step on Cherikov soil it seemed to me that even the air here had a peculiar smell. However, it is not my intention to ignite fears which are already on the verge of combustion. Radiation has no smell, so it could be that it only seemed that way to me. Unfortunately, to this day the population has no instruments, even the most rudimentary ones, for testing its suspicions and fears and for verifying official information, which has long ago exhausted its credibility. The population is not grumbling: it understands that it has only recently dealt with a shortage of every-day mercurial thermometers and is still unable to overcome a shortage of mustard plasters.

But we will be objective: no small amount of steps are being taken. In the middle of 1989 "170 well-built settlements were created for the evacuation of the population. In them 9,770 apartments were built in farmstead-like buildings with outbuildings. More than 600 sites designated for social, cultural, and production

activities have been built. For these aims more than 660 million rubles in capital allotments have been used.

"For the construction of medical establishments an additional sum of nearly 60 million rubles has been earmarked from the current five-year plan. More than 140 thousand children and pregnant women rest every year in sanatoria, holiday homes, and pioneer camps, for which around 30 thousand rubles per year are spent.

"For populations of areas in zones that have been subject to radioactive contamination, additional foodstuffs at a cost of over 115 million rubles are provided from the republic's fund. Working people will receive hardship pay increases. The aggregate sum for benefits and pay increases comes to 104 million rubles per year. Three hundred twenty kilometers of hard-top roads were built; 542 kilometers of electro-transmission wires, 933 kilometers of waterlines and 113 kilometers of sewer lines were extended; 388 artesian wells were dug; and 3,000 public water fountains were drilled..."

A lot was built in the Cherikovskiy rayon as well. But there is still no hotel here. And clearly there won't be one anytime soon. Indeed, the construction of a hotel is not, it seems, among the top-priority measures for eliminating the after-effects of the accident. Earlier a certain rayon chairman explained to me (I don't know to what degree he was serious) that they are in no hurry to build one, because they want to discourage oblast officials and people from the capital from coming through and checking up on them. This is how they have attempted in their somewhat idiosyncratic way to assert the rayon's independence. Whether for this or another reason, a hotel has still not been built in the rayon center. However, this has not at all kept the rayon center free of guests, whether invited or uninvited, welcome or unwelcome. But it seems that recently no guests' arrival has been awaited with more anticipation than that of experts from the World Health Organization. To be sure, they did not ask for a hotel: they stomped about a bit on the main square, spoke to a packed audience in the local Palace of Culture, and took off, leaving the rayon's population in a state of complete incredulity. This they did not with their somewhat vague speeches, nor with statistics and terminology, but rather with an analogy as simple as a boot: in the suburbs of Paris, it seems, life is even worse in terms of exposure to radiation than in Cherikov and its outlying areas. This piece of news made the rounds throughout the rayon within only a few hours. Cherikov, less ancient, but no less proud of its history, had never before been compared with the renowned Paris. And perhaps that is why, despite the enormous authority of the specialists from abroad, their other ideas evoked a certain scepticism as well.

Can we trust anyone, though, when for years we have remained suspended between complete ignorance and conscious efforts to disguise the truth which have been justified as attempts to preserve calm among the people?

Here are the words of I.I. Titenkov, first secretary of the neighboring Krasnopolskiy party raykom [rayon committee]: "In 1986 scholars were arguing that there was no radiation of any kind in this rayon. We believed them and told people the same. Then it became clear that there was radiation after all, moreover a considerable amount. But the scholars were telling us once again that everything would be alright. Professor K.I. Gordyeyev said in 1986 that by the following spring there would already be uncontaminated milk and that he himself, Gordyeyev, would come to the rayon and go into the forest to pick mushrooms and berries... And then a year later it turned out that the milk should not be drunk, the meat should not be eaten, and by no means should one go into the forest. At the end of 1986, physicians from Moscow paid us another visit. Why, they asked, have these children not been taken to an uncontaminated zone? They promised to make a report in the capital. Whether they made the report or not is unknown, but the children are still running around to this day in radioactive dust."

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How can we live? In whom and what should we trust? What can we hope for? These are not idle questions. How can we continue without knowing that human life cannot be used as a pawn in a scientific debate?

Frankly speaking, I do not want to become involved in controversies over maximum safety levels of exposure to contamination or other specialized issues. But I cannot help admiring those who can boldly state their viewpoints without in the least doubting their own competence. The time is clearly such that in the atmosphere of general confusion and confrontation, one can earn the reputation of an uncompromising defender of the truth on any question, not only on this one. But where is that truth when two scholars, endowed with the highest credentials and armed not only with modern instruments, but more importantly, with scientific (in other words, objective) knowledge, argue themselves hoarse, without listening to one another, in an attempt to prove clearly contradictory truths? And if only there were no more than two of them! There are as many opinions being presented these days as there are people presenting them. There's pluralism for you! The scholarly soldiers fight their cruel battle of Chernobyl polemics without regard for the shields and armour of scientific schools and movements. Doctors and deputies, party and soviet representatives, journalists, those who stagnated during the period of stagnation and now want to display their "principled" position—all of them are fighting each other. But it just seems that in battle we are at times forgetting about the most important thing: for those living on contaminated land and tormented by frightening conjectures about their future, it is not a particular position or design which is important, nor an official decision, nor even the amount of rubles allocated, but rather the result. Unfortunately, the results so far have been, to say the least, of little comfort.

This information is from the Cherikovskiy rayon "sane-pidstantsiya" [medical epidemiological station]. "During 1987 the total dose of radiation for a group of seven people in the 'strict regime' zone exceeded the established norm by three rems. During 1988 a group of 17 persons was exposed to a dosage 2.5 rems above the established norm.

"It was concluded on the basis of data from a thorough medical examination of children conducted in April, 1989 that the health of children living in areas with a concentration of cesium-137 at 15-40 curies per square kilometer or higher has a tendency to deteriorate. The health rate of one group of children was below the republic's index and showed a tendency to decline. The incidence of vegetovascular dystonia, chronic tonsillitus, and adenoid conditions increases, and a tendency towards developing anemic syndrome and endemic goiter is being observed in children who are becoming sick frequently and for long periods of time. The health of children born of mothers who were pregnant at the time of the accident is worse than that of children who were born in subsequent years.

"Anemia has appeared in 30 percent of these children, and the incidence of neurological problems is higher than the index for other rayons in the republic.

"Among adults an increase has been observed in neuro-circulatory dystonia, hypertension, ischemic insult, stenocardia, diseases of the liver and biliary tracts, ulcers of the stomach and duodenum."

This is the sad document handed to me by the chief sanitary inspector of the Cherikovskiy rayon, A.P. Busel. In the opinion of many residents, he is one of the most competent specialists (and more important, he is one of the most principled and honest, which is very important these days).

—Aleksandr Petrovich, how would you evaluate the conclusions drawn by VOZ [WHO—World Health Organization] representatives who visited the rayon not long ago?

—The concept of safe living in Western nations is based more upon economic considerations than on medical ones. As an example let's just take Chudyany. There are 140 curies here. That is around 104 rems of exposure for the next 70 years of its residents' lives. Let's calculate what it will cost to lower that level to 35 rems. If we use their methodology, it would require 200 dollars per year to lower the level by one rem. Lowering it to 70 rems, then, would require an expenditure of approximately 14,000 dollars per resident. That is what their safe life will cost.

There in the West, the culpable firm must pay for the elimination of the after-effects of any accidents. Therefore they have a higher established ceiling. These things differ from one country to the next, but on an average the level is about 80 rems for the next 70 years. It is entirely wrong to compare their conditions with ours. I think that

in this day and age life in a contaminated area is not a medical problem, but a composite problem.

Of course there are changes in people's health. And these changes are related not only to the direct effects of radiation, but also to general living conditions. They are subject to a stressful situation, psychological pressure...

—So it's not directly related to the radiation?

—I think that it's much more complicated than simple causality (i.e., the higher the contamination, the more illness). The fact is that the usual tenor of life is entirely destroyed. One cannot go into the forest; there is no individual farming; the stereotype is destroyed. That alone can bring on illness.

—But the children didn't see any stereotypes destroyed?

—Tell me that 12 hours in a closed school or kindergarten doesn't cause changes in a child's organism! Of course it does. And since 1986 our children live in these conditions. Beginning this year they have rescinded the ban on playing outdoors.

—Why did they rescind it? Have conditions changed?

—Conditions have not changed, but the lesser of two evils was chosen. Hypodynamia, a lack of fresh air—that strongly affects their health.

—Excuse me, but the following strikes me as strange. If, as the foreign experts claim, the radiation conditions in Paris are even worse than in Cherikov, then why don't they keep the school children locked up all day there?

—I have never been to Paris, so I won't presume to comment on the situation there, but the experts have claimed in all seriousness that the level there is just barely under 200 curies and that the concentration of radioactive contamination is much higher than here. They were speaking, it is true, about Parisian suburbs. But let's not talk about France now. They have their problems, and we have ours.

—But a comparison will clarify things...

—How can you and I compare Belorussia and France today when we don't even know in principle the social conditions in which people are living? I can only guess and assume that the quality of life in the Cherikovskiy rayon differs from that of a suburb of Paris. Doctor Pellerin said that the most important requirement (and here one cannot fail to agree with him) is that the population be supplied with uncontaminated food-stuffs. And this is a problem we have great difficulty with.

—Let's get back to Cherikov. What is your opinion on the so-called 35 rem plan?

—First of all, biophysicists should not be the authorities in devising a plan for safe living. Sociologists, psychologists, soviet and party organs should be involved as well. This plan should not revolve exclusively around maximum dosage.

In my opinion, that would not be a plan for safe living, but for safe exposure levels. They are not at all the same thing. Today it is not so much the amount of exposure which plays a role in the changes in the population's health, but rather, as I have said, stressful situations. People lack the right to choose. And the plan has been discredited because, in putting it into practice, it was necessary to take real steps and real actions...

—What do you mean?

—First of all, dealing with social problems: securing uncontaminated food, instituting additional payment so that this food can be bought, etc. But that has all been done in a slip-shod manner.

Therefore on June 1, International Day for the Defense of Children, a meeting took place here in Cherikov. A decision was made to send a delegation to the Congress of People's Deputies. And we went to Moscow. First we went to see our deputies, then we arranged a meeting with Belorussian CP Central Committee first secretary E.E. Sokolov. But when we met with the people's deputies, they gave us the impression that they are not allowed to speak about this subject. We demanded that someone among them be given the floor. After that Tkacheva spoke at the morning session. In Moscow we met with N.I. Ryzhkov. At this meeting V.S. Leonov, first secretary of the Mogilevskiy Belorussian CP obkom, spoke, to my mind, in a very principled manner, like a true representative of the Belorussian people. He criticised both sharply and, what's more, in a well-reasoned manner, the 35 rem plan. Then minister E.I. Chazov gave a speech defending the 35 rem plan and addressed issues of material and technical provisions for health establishments. Then B.E. Shcherbina took the floor and donned "rose-colored glasses." He talked until it seemed that all questions were decided, everything had been sacrificed for Belorussia, hermetically sealed tractor cabs were being adopted, etc.

—And how is it really?

—We have seven farms in the strict control zone. Each of them has only two or three cabs.

All of these plans are highly varied and contradictory—they are mostly developed in the quiet of offices. Take for example the 35 rem plan. It fails almost entirely to take into consideration the real conditions of people's lives. A lot has been said about that. But opposing viewpoints are also, unfortunately, not always grounded in a thorough knowledge of the subject. For example, in Moscow we met with Ales Adamovich. I respect his work, including his publicistic pieces. But tell me, how can one shed light on the problem without having been

to the site? Adamovich has not visited us once, but he writes a great deal about our affairs.

—Is what he writes correct?

—In essence it's correct, but he also includes many controversial positions, for example, his well-known announcement that the radioactive cloud had been "seeded." There is still no official data on that... I think that in order to write objectively, one should visit here and feel the radioactive soil with one's own hands. We could give that same Adamovich quite a bit of information if he were to come. Indeed, the problem is much deeper than he imagines. In my view many publicistic works are directed towards kindling fears...

—Yesterday I stopped in at the food store here at the rayon center. The food they had to sell was formula for nursing babies and sausage at nine rubles. The rest was a collection of things that can be found in all village stores. In other words, there was almost a complete absence of any foodstuffs.

—Truly, there's little variety. But something is being done. We have received additional funds for buckwheat, and we have gotten refrigerators, washing machines, vacuum cleaners...

—Have you gotten a large enough quantity?

—In conditions of general shortages there will never be enough. We have created very long lists. In order to provide everyone with these goods, we would probably need more than one five-year plan. But how are we to understand the fact that here, in a contaminated zone, the sale of cleaning agents is restricted? One bar of soap per month! And one of the safety requirements is strict observance of personal hygiene.

—Is agricultural work going on in the strict control zone?

—Yes of course. Immobilization of an area was only carried out at the sovkhoz Znamya, where the worst conditions prevail. In the villages Chudyany, Malinovka, Novaya Malinovka, and Kamenka part of the arable land has been withdrawn from rotation and trees have been planted.

In point of fact, I am certain that Shcherbina misled the USSR Council of Ministers. That is why they passed half-measures. This is the fourth year since the accident, and almost no real action has been taken. What have we done? We have put down asphalt here and there. Here and there we have built a few shower rooms. But let's look at a matter like providing fresh products. This does not come out of Union funds. The money was taken from Mogilev and Bobruysk and given to this zone.

—How is the problem of protecting the health of children being addressed?

—We have received additional sanatorium passes. But at the moment there are not enough passes for mothers

with children. Schoolchildren have been fully provided for. They are leaving for periods of one to one and  $\frac{1}{2}$  months. Of course, it would be better to take them out of here for a longer time period, but can you imagine the effect of a two to three-month absence on, say, a younger schoolchild? There are a great number of problems here. Again, stressful situations arise for both mother and child. Therefore, we need passes for the entire family.

If these problems are being solved to some degree in the zone, i.e., those localities with 15 curies and more, then in remaining areas the situation is fully unacceptable. I'm judging from my own collective. We were unable to obtain a single pass for mothers with children, despite the fact that our people almost constantly work in the zone. Only three sanatorium passes were distributed for adults. How were they distributed? Again, we only got three passes for the entire year.

—I have seen Civilian Defense troops working here in your rayon. What kind of impact is their work having?

—You mean the decontamination project? Here I can give an unambiguous response: the manner in which decontamination is being carried out here is simply a case of government money being thrown to the wind.

—Why?

—If at the beginning the decontamination had some effect, its effectiveness now is insignificant and, apparently, does not exceed five percent. Soldiers clean houses, cut weeds, etc. They assiduously cleaned, for example, a farmstead, and a fund is being created at the expense of adjacent areas. That's one matter. The other is: why is this decontamination being carried out in Chudnyany or Malinovka when their residents are to be resettled anyway? Once again, the plan contradicts common sense.

—So the decontamination project should be suspended?

—Decontamination should be carried out in areas where the contamination is above five curies and above all in pre-school establishments for children. But they are not listening to our views.

\* \* \*

...I planned to go to the Mayskiy settlement with a commission which told me it would evaluate the results of construction being done there. With this aim, the sanitary inspector S.V. Masyuk and I arrived at the doors of the rayon Palace of Soviets shortly before noon to wait for the better-equipped commission members to pick up those of us who were "without a horse." That was the agreement. But a wait of almost an hour proved to be in vain. After conducting extended inquiries and traipsing through offices it came out that the commission had neither met nor gone to the Mayskiy settlement. No one even bothered to inform us that the trip had been postponed. This incident was not a big deal, of course.

But in my view it was a characteristic one which reflects the style of our work in eliminating the after-effects of the accident.

Chudyan turned out to be a nice little village, like thousands of others in Belorussia. Who would have thought that it would become a kind of title-holder? It has the highest level of radioactive contamination—more than 140 curies per square kilometer. And those are only the average figures.

The strange emptiness and silence in the village were striking. But soon I met my first native resident, who was sitting on a fence, heartily eating some red berries which I could not identify. I asked him to introduce himself, and, without sliding down from the fence, he said that his name was Vitaliy, surname Petrachenko, and that he was in second grade but was now on vacation. In saying all this he did not neglect to pluck several dusty berries with a dirty hand and unceremoniously pop them into his mouth.

—Vitaliy, what do you know about radiation?—It's dangerous.—And is it okay to eat unwashed berries?—No one told us not to, so I guess it is.—Did they tell you about radiation in school?—Yes, they showed us a bomb exploding and everyone wearing gas-masks.

From house to house one could see signs of village life which was apparently once thriving, but was now dying out: farmsteads, overgrown with burdocks, rickety fences, benches on which no one had sat for a long time.

I stopped at one of the water pumps. I worked the handle, but the pump didn't work. I found another—the effect was the same.

I went up to some women who were seated on the porch of one of the still inhabited homes.

—Thanks to the government for thinking of us. They have installed a water line here.

—But it doesn't seem to be working.

—It often doesn't work, sometimes for days at a time, sometimes for weeks. For some reason it stopped working for two months in the winter. When that happens we take water from the well. How can you farm without it? The water in our wells has algae. It's downright green. But what can you do? We drink it. And the cattle need water too... What are our names? Mine is Vera Alekseyevna Ganchurina, and this is my mother, Anastasiya Ivanovna...

Anastasiya Ivanovna began to lament,—We were given 30 rubles each. I didn't want their coins. I cry every day. Do you think I want that hut in Mayskiy? I wouldn't want it if you gave it to me. I've lived here all my life. Once I was filled with joy. And now...

—I'm their neighbor, Varvara Danilovna Maydanova. May I say something? They built a lovely settlement for us. But how can we live there? I have my hut all to

myself now. Of course it's difficult even like this. But there? There are no one-room houses there. The chairmen says, "Old ladies, take a three-room house for three of you." How can we live the end of our lives this way? One kitchen for all of us, one bathroom, one cellar? How can we keep our dishes and utensils straight in one kitchen? And that's the thanks I get for working at the kolkhoz all my life?

It was hot, and as I prepared to go the women lifted a bucket onto the porch and scooped out water with a large mug.

—Have a drink. Never mind those curies, the water from our stream is tasty.

Together with me, a small girl who looked to be about three years old drank this indeed tasty water, smacking her lips the way children do.

I went along further through the village.

I had more encounters, and the recurrent theme was radiation.

—They make blood analyses in the clinic, but they don't tell you anything.

—How do you feel?

—I'm tired; my head aches; I have heartburn... Sometimes my bones ache. My hands are tied.

—What are you eating?

—Some things are from the store, and the rest is my own. You go to the store with two ten-ruble notes, but what is there to buy? Once a month they bring canned goods and allow two cans per person. In the summer they provided a kilogram of sugar per person, then two kilograms. Sausage sells for six to seven rubles. Meat is available once a month. There is no limit on milk or sour cream.

However, the store was closed that day.

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And once again I am at a familiar turn. As I attempt to hitch a ride with a passing motorist, I think about the strange characteristics of the "zone." Truly titanic efforts are required to help the people living here. But as if under the influence of some peculiar kind of radiating indifference and blatant bungling wherever you go, common sense seems to have turned into its opposite everywhere. The government is spending millions and billions of rubles to help the victims, but it is necessary to go to Chudyan in order to understand that the money is often spent on nothing—for example, on a road that leads nowhere. Or on a water line that doesn't work.

In a word... It was already evening when I reached Mayskiy. The view was simply splendid. Varicolored houses literally bathed in the rays of the setting sun.

Strolling through the streets, I remembered the words of the residents of Chudyan.

—How can we go there when even the sovkhoz director tells us that we cannot bring the children and there is not enough work there for everyone?

The opinion of the rayon's chief sanitation inspector confirmed their statements: "In the settlement Mayskiy they have just barely completed the hook-ups for the school and kindergarten. They haven't even begun construction. Therefore it will be necessary to transport children to school and kindergarten in Malinovka. In other words, they will be taken from an uncontaminated zone to a contaminated one."

The following is from a resolution by the Mogilev Belorussian CP obkom and oblispolkom [oblast executive committee]: "We have not received scientifically-based recommendations for long-range plans for construction, resettling and the development of localities and production in the zone and around it. For example, the republic's Gosagroprom [State Agro-industrial Committee] (Comrade Nikitchenko) and BelNII [Belorussian Scientific Research Institute] of City-building (Comrade Shpit) have not created the legally required scientific and industrial-economic foundation for the relocation of the settlement Mayskiy, which is being built in a zone with eight curies per square kilometer for the relocation of residents of the 'Znamya' sovkhoz of the Cherikovskiy rayon."

They say that around 12 million rubles have already been invested in the construction of this long-term settlement without prospects. And how much more will be spent? What does it cost to live in a settlement surrounded by radioactive land? No, the zone truly has some kind of effect on our common sense. In some villages which will be relocated, sites are being built which cost several million rubles. Why? In the name of what plan? So that we can report about what was wasted on the elimination of after-effects of the Chernobyl accident, and not wisely spent, but really squandered—more and more millions?

When I was getting ready to leave Mayskiy, several vehicles with construction materials were entering the settlement. I noticed the trucks' wheels—pounds of dirt had stuck to them from the road. In this way unseen radiation has been silently making its way into the settlement. Why not lay the asphalt on this road leading to the new settlement instead of laying roads for unknown reasons in Chudyan and other "dead" villages? And why are they doing everything backwards here? First they build houses, then roads, schools, and stores.

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While this material was being prepared to go into print, a number of events took place. The main one was the discussion of the Government Program for Eliminating the After-effects of the Chernobyl AES [Atomic Energy Station] Accident at a session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet. A number of sensible ideas were

expressed in presentations and in debates. It was apparent that among those speaking there were none who were indifferent. And then this theme did not escape the press' notice. But as I saw the reports on television or read the passionate statements in the newspaper, I thought about the residents of Chudyan who were probably losing their heads in the midst of this storm of debates, opinions and information. But as before, they cannot find an answer to the simplest question: how and in the name of what should we go on living? And rumors are proliferating about an experiment being conducted by an unknown person on them and on all those within the "zone."

I must confess, I don't understand either: what do we need to fight first and foremost? The after-effects of an atomic accident, or those of a more global catastrophe which took place longer ago and which has had such an effect on our reason? If such a catastrophe never took place, then what is the source of such an intensive field of all-pervasive indifference and destructive irresponsibility? How many curies or other units should be used to measure that field?

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The window of the party raykom building affords a good view of the main square of Cherikov. After it rains, huge puddles form there. And since the traffic is moving along at high speed—the Moscow main highway runs through the square—the asphalt must be replaced often. However, repair expenses could be significantly less if the drainage system worked. But the problem is that many, many years ago, they say a supervisor of the city economy worked alone on the construction of a drainage system. The money was acquired on time and in full, and the director and collective received bonuses. But then it came out that when they built the wells, the workers forgot to lay the drainage pipes. That supervisor is long gone, and the members of the commission who signed the act on introducing a drainage system cannot be found either. But the "memory" remains.

What is the relation to contemporary events, the reader will ask? Those were other times, events, and people. But why do our actions so resemble these, as if we were doing everything not for ourselves, but for someone we neither like nor consider one of our own?

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#### Estonian SSR Draft Law on Environmental Protection in Estonia

90US0351A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 6 Dec 89 p 3

[Law of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic "On Protection of Nature in Estonia"]

[Text] The opinions of over 40 departments, city and rayon executive committees, scientific research and design

institutions, public associations and individual experts were considered during drafting of the law.

The Expert Section of the Scientific Council of the Estonian Institute of Economic Development held a meeting on 20 October 1989.

The board of the Estonian SSR Gosplan held a meeting on 3 November 1989.

Opinions and proposals are to be sent in writing to the Estonian SSR State Committee for Protection of Nature at the following address: 200100, Tallinn, Toompuyestez, 24.

Working Group Leader, T. Nuudi;

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#### Preamble

Man's constantly increasing pressure on nature and ever-wider use of natural resources make it necessary for the state to implement measures to protect nature, to ensure suitable use of natural resources with regard for the needs of the present and future generations of people, and to form a living environment satisfying man's material and spiritual needs. Legislation on nature protection must ensure balanced development of relations between the society and nature, and protection of marine and terrestrial ecosystems, natural resources, regions of special scientific or esthetic value, natural monuments, and rare and endangered species of plants and animals. This goal can be achieved only on the condition that the fundamental principles of ecology and of a nature-conserving way of life are brought to the awareness of each individual, that the public is kept informed on the state of the natural environment, and that public associations and the public at large participate in solving the problems of nature protection.

The main goals of nature protection and sensible use of natural resources may be attained only through the simultaneous introduction of many measures. This law establishes the legal principles of safeguarding the habitat and environment and of thrifty use of natural resources; when applied together with economic, social, political and cultural mechanisms, these principles will make it possible to safeguard the capacity of biological resources for reproduction for an indefinitely long period, create worthy living conditions for society, and perpetuate Estonia's historically inherent form of nature use that is sparing of nature and man, and the cultural environment that promotes such use.

#### I. General Provisions

##### 1. Essence of Nature Protection

Nature protection entails organizing thrifty use of nature and its individual components, and protection of their interrelationships.

##### 2. The Goal of Nature Protection

The goal of nature protection is:

- 1) to provide man with an environment suitable for life;
- 2) to preserve the species diversity of the plant and animal world, and to preserve the gene pool;
- 3) to preserve the diversity of ecosystems and landscapes;
- 4) to preserve rare natural objects.

##### 3. The Objective of the Law on Protection of Nature in Estonia

The objective of the Law on Protection of Nature in Estonia is to regulate relations in the area of nature protection and nature use.

##### 4. Estonian SSR Legislation on Nature Protection

Estonian SSR legislation on nature protection consists of this law and other standards of the Estonian SSR.

##### 5. Ensuring Attainment of the Main Objectives of Nature Protection

Attainment of the main objectives of nature protection is ensured primarily by organizing nature use based on local natural conditions and customs. Nature protection measures enjoy priority in the organization of economic and social activities.

##### 6. The Essence of Nature Use

Nature use is defined as the interrelationship between human activity and nature, which is expressed:

- 1) in the use of nature without removing natural resources from their natural location, or without disturbing them;
- 2) in removal of natural resources from their natural location or change of their natural structure and location;
- 3) in establishment of protection of natural objects;
- 4) in utilization of territory, including water basins, the subsoil and the airspace;
- 5) in disposal of wastes in nature.

##### 7. The Estonian SSR's Ownership of Natural Resources

- (1) In accordance with Paragraph 2, Article 11 of the Estonian SSR Constitution, land, subsoil, airspace,

inland and territorial waters, the shelf, forests and other natural resources and natural wealth are the property of the Estonian SSR.

(2) Natural resources and natural wealth located on the territory of the Estonian SSR, in its territorial waters and on the shelf, and on and beneath these waters, belong to the Estonian SSR, and may be granted only for the purposes of their utilization.

(3) Deals which directly or secretly violate the Estonian SSR's right of ownership of its natural resources and natural wealth are invalid.

#### **8. Competency of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers in Regard to Nature Protection**

Development of the general policy of nature protection and nature use, development of international relations and relations with union republics in this area, planning of nature protection, regulation of intercity and inter-rayon nature protection relations, organization of efforts to correct the consequences of natural disasters and major accidents, and regulation of the use of natural resources of republic significance are within the competency of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers.

#### **9. Competency of Local Self-Management Organs in Regard to Nature Protection**

The signing of agreements determining the means and extent of nature use, organization of nature use, granting of territory, including water basins, for utilization, and organization of protection of ecosystems and individual natural components are included in the competency of local self-management organs.

#### **10. Competency of State Nature Protection Organs**

Development and implementation of a general policy of nature protection and programs of action, the accounting of natural resources and assessment of nature use, observation of the state of nature, monitoring of nature use and protection of natural objects, organization of the distribution of natural resources based on nature use contracts, and allocation of territory, including water basins, are included in the competency of state nature protection organs.

#### **11. The Competency of Contracting Nature Users**

Nature may be utilized by enterprises, institutions, organizations, including military units, and citizens in accordance with contracts signed with local self-management organs, which determine the competency of contracting nature users in terms of the conditions and procedures of utilizing a natural resource.

#### **12. The Right of Every Citizen**

(1) Every citizen is entitled to commune with nature and utilize the gifts of nature, if by doing so he does not inflict harm on nature or on a contracting nature user, and his peace is not disturbed.

(2) The right of every citizen is invalid in preserves and national parks, on closed lands of institutions, in farm-yards and in places subjected to special regulations.

#### **13. Management of Nature Protection in the Estonian SSR**

Nature protection is managed in the Estonian SSR by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, local self-management organs and state nature protection organs.

#### **14. The State System of Nature Protection in the Estonian SSR**

The state system of nature protection in the Estonian SSR consists of state organs empowered to act with such purpose.

#### **15. Mandatory Nature of Decisions of State Nature Protection Organs of the Estonian SSR**

Decisions of state nature protection organs of the Estonian SSR must be carried out.

### **II. Nature as Man's Living Environment**

#### **16. Man's Living Environment**

Man's natural environment is a resource ensuring man's well-being, his physical and mental health, and his shelter and tranquility.

#### **17. Standardization of the State of Man's Living Environment and Observation of It**

(1) Harmful influences upon man or upon his living environment are subject to standardization. Self-management organs are entitled to make existing norms more stringent in accordance with the particular features of the region.

(2) The state of man's living environment must correspond to norms existing in the given region. The state of man's environment is constantly observed by a monitoring system.

#### **18. The Rights of Citizens and Public Associations in Regard to Protection of the Natural Environment**

Every citizen or public association is entitled to require administrative or legal organs to cease any activities disturbing the natural environment or creating a corresponding threat, and to require them to compensate for damages, if they have already been inflicted by such activities.

### **III. Nature Use**

#### **19. The General Goal of Nature Use**

The general goal of nature use is to satisfy man's physiological and mental needs and support his economic and social activities.

**20. Permissibility of Nature Use**

Nature use is permitted on the condition that the natural environment is maintained suitable for life, and that natural resources are utilized within limits corresponding to the goal of nature protection. Activities disturbing the natural environment are tolerable within limits set by standards.

**21. Compensation for Nature Use**

Nature is utilized with or without compensation. Payment for nature use consists of payment for a natural resource and payment for pollution of nature.

**Utilization of Territory****22. Territory as an Object**

(1) This law considers land, inland water basins and marine water basins bordering on the Estonian SSR as territory within the bounds of the Estonian SSR.

(2) Territory is utilized in accordance with the Estonian SSR Land Code.

**23. Conditions for Utilization of Territory**

Territory is utilized on the condition that:

- 1) this does not cause changes which are dangerous to nature and which are irreversible;
- 2) the diverse landscape typical of Estonia is preserved;
- 3) man's welfare and normal development of living nature are ensured;
- 4) areas disturbed by human activity are restored.

**Utilization of the Subsoil and Minerals****24. The Subsoil and Minerals as an Object**

(1) This law defines:

- 1) as subsoil, the space located beneath territory;
- 2) as minerals, mineral and organic deposits located in the subsoil, and soil.

(2) The subsoil and minerals are utilized in accordance with the Estonian SSR Subsoil Code and Land Code.

**25. Conditions for Utilizing the Subsoil and Minerals**

The subsoil and minerals are utilized on the condition that:

- 1) when minerals are extracted, integrated and thrifty utilization of extracted minerals and accompanying minerals is ensured, and disturbance of the land is prevented;
- 2) renewable minerals are utilized within the limits of their natural renewal;

3) extraction of minerals is followed by recultivation of the land;

4) biological production is not diminished in the course of economic activity.

**Utilization of Water****26. Water as an Object**

(1) This law considers surface, underground and sea water located on the territory of the Estonian SSR.

(2) Water is utilized in accordance with the Estonian SSR Water Code.

**27. Conditions of Water Utilization**

Water is utilized on the condition that the necessary quantity of water is maintained in the natural cycle, and that its standard purity and preservation of aquatic flora and fauna are ensured.

**Utilization of Atmospheric Air****28. Atmospheric Air as an Object**

(1) This law defines, as atmospheric air, air in the airspace above the territory of the Estonian SSR.

(2) Atmospheric air is utilized in accordance with the Estonian SSR Law on Protection of Atmospheric Air.

**29. Conditions for Utilizing Atmospheric Air**

Atmospheric air is utilized on the condition that its standard purity and stability is maintained.

**Utilization of the Plant and Animal World****30. The Plant and Animal World as an Object**

(1) This law defines, as the plant and animal world, natural vegetation, including forests and animals living wild in nature, and cultivated vegetation and domesticated animals to the extent that they have an influence on the state of nature.

(2) The plant and animal world is utilized in accordance with the Timber Code of the Estonian SSR, the Estonian SSR Law on Protection and Utilization of the Animal World, and the Estonian SSR Law on Protection and Utilization of Vegetation.

**31. Conditions for Utilizing the Plant and Animal World**

(1) The plant and animal world is utilized on the condition that:

- 1) its reproduction is safeguarded;
- 2) the diversity of species and the integrity of communities are safeguarded throughout all of the territory of the Estonian SSR;
- 3) biological pollution of nature does not occur.

(2) Cultivated vegetation and domesticated animals are utilized on the condition that this does not have a harmful influence upon the state of nature.

#### **Wastes and Production Refuse**

##### **32. Wastes and Production Refuse as an Object**

Wastes and production refuse are defined as unutilized substances or energy, including noise, radiation and residual heat, arising in the course of economic and social activity.

##### **33. Low-Waste Production Processes**

Low-waste or wasteless production processes must be used in the national economy.

##### **34. Disposal of Wastes and Production Refuse**

(1) Wastes and production refuse are disposed of from production and the home by:

- 1) reclamation;
- 2) storage;
- 3) dispersal;
- 4) burial.

(2) Production refuse is disposed of by the enterprises responsible for its creation.

(3) Disposal of household wastes is organized by local self-management organs.

##### **35. Conditions for Disposal of Wastes and Production Refuse**

Wastes and production refuse are disposed of under conditions ensuring the possibility of their subsequent economic utilization, or their safety.

#### **IV. Special Means of Nature Protection**

##### **36. Special Means of Protection**

Establishment of state protection of species of plants and animals, natural objects and territories by legally foreseen procedures, coupled with introduction and application of more severe protection measures, is a special means of protection.

##### **37. Establishment of State Protection of Plant and Animal Species, Individual Natural Objects and Territories**

(1) The state protects:

- 1) rare and endangered species of plants and animals, as well as those of special scientific or esthetic value;
- 2) rare forms of topography, parks and other individual natural objects deserving of scientific, cultural, historical or esthetic attention;

3) landscapes of scientific or esthetic value, territories having important significance to protection of the natural environment or as the place of growth of plant species, as the habitat of animal species or as the location of other natural objects, and places having cultural and historic significance.

##### **38. Procedure for Establishing State Protection**

(1) State protection of plant and animal species, of state natural and biospheric preserves, of national and natural parks and other territories having special significance is established by the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers.

(2) Protection of other territories requiring state protection is established by local self-management organs.

(3) State protection of individual natural objects in accordance with their scientific, economic, cultural or historical value is established by the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers or by a local self-management organ.

##### **39. Organization of Special Means of Protection**

(1) Requirements imposed on protection of protected plant and animal species or other natural objects, including territories, are established by the organs establishing their protection.

(2) Observance of protection requirements is ensured by the enterprises, institutions, organizations and other land users on whose territory protected plant and animal species, objects or territories are located.

#### **V. Observation of the State of Nature and Its Evaluation**

##### **40. State Nature Protection Organs—Possessors of Information**

(1) In order to evaluate and predict the state of nature and ensure thrifty nature use, state nature protection organs concentrate, collect, process, store and issue information on the state of nature and nature use.

(2) Observation and evaluation of the state of the natural environment is ensured by a monitoring system consisting of observation posts belonging to different departments. Observation (monitoring) of the activity of an enterprise having an influence on nature is carried on at the enterprise's own expense.

(3) State nature protection organs are entitled to receive complete information on the results of investigations associated with Estonia's nature and nature use, as well as on the state of the natural environment.

##### **41. Utilization of Information on Nature Protection**

(1) Information concerned with nature protection in the Estonian SSR is unclassified, and its basic indicators are regularly published by state nature protection organs in the mass media.

(2) Detailed information on nature protection is issued in a manner which would ensure that the author's rights of the information collector and processor are upheld.

#### **42. Accounting of Natural Resources and Their Use**

(1) The Estonian SSR maintains state accounting of natural resources located on its territory, and of their use; this includes maintenance of cadastres.

(2) In regard to all natural resources, the economy of the Estonian SSR is organized and developed on the basis of the indicated cadastres.

### **VI. Responsibility for Violating Legislation on Nature Protection, and Dispute Resolution**

#### **43. Responsibility for Violating Legislation on Nature Protection**

Persons violating nature protection legislation bear—depending on the nature of the violation—disciplinary, administrative or criminal liability, as well as civic liability, in accordance with Estonian SSR legislation.

#### **44. Disciplinary Responsibility for Violating Legislation on Nature Protection and Nature Use**

Workers of enterprises, institutions or organizations who violate the prescriptions or requirements of nature protection and nature use by the performance of their official responsibilities or by their failure to perform them are subject to disciplinary liability.

#### **45. Administrative Liability for Violating Legislation on Nature Protection and Nature Use**

Officials and citizens violating legislation on nature protection and nature use are subject to administrative liability, as are workers for the same violation who by their performance or failure to perform official duties violate the prescriptions or instructions of their superiors.

#### **46. Criminal Liability for Violating Legislation on Nature Protection and Nature Use**

(1) Officials and citizens who, by acting in violation of nature protection legislation, deliberately inflict harm on nature or carelessly inflict significant or especially great harm on nature are subject to criminal liability.

(2) Responsible officials of ministries, departments, central institutions and self-management organs guilty of failing to carry out acts adopted for execution on the basis of international agreements (conventions) for the prevention, reduction or cessation of pollution of the natural environment, and of failing to create the conditions necessary for this, are subject to criminal liability, if as a result significant or especially great harm is inflicted on nature.

#### **47. Compensation for Harm Inflicted Owing to Violation of Nature Protection Legislation**

(1) A person guilty of inflicting harm on nature owing to violation of nature protection legislation is obligated to make full compensation for the harm by making payment out of a nature protection fund for the total harm or forfeit.

(2) A person guilty of inflicting harm on a citizen or on his health owing to violation of nature protection legislation is obligated to make full compensation for the harm. If it is impossible to clarify who is at fault, the harm is compensated by the state.

(3) Legal persons or citizens guilty of unwarranted use or disturbance of natural resources granted to other enterprises, institutions, organizations or citizens for use foreseen by law must pay demanded compensation or forfeit to the account of the legal user.

(4) All legal persons of the Estonian SSR and every citizen of the Estonian SSR may sue for harm inflicted on nature.

#### **48. Responsibility for Surrendering Products Acquired Unlawfully in Nature**

Products acquired unlawfully in nature and articles manufactured from them are subject to uncompensated confiscation. Income from their sale is transferred to a nature protection fund, except for the value of the raw materials, which is credited to the lawful user.

#### **49. Closure of Enterprises Inflicting Harm on the Natural Environment**

Activities of enterprises and shops polluting the natural environment to an extent beyond maximum standards are stopped or terminated by a resolution of a state nature protection organ or by a decision of a people's court made at the demand of a labor collective, an assembly of residents or a public movement, or at the request of a procurator.

#### **50. Forfeiture of the Right to Utilize a Natural Resource**

The right to utilize a resource may be forfeited by users of a natural resource who systematically violate the requirements on utilization of the natural resource.

#### **51. Resolution of Disputes Concerned With Nature Protection and Nature Use**

Disputes concerned with nature protection and nature use which are not within the competency of people's courts or state arbitration are resolved by state nature protection organs.

## VII. International Relations

### 52. Responsibility of Legal Persons and Citizens of Foreign States, and of Noncitizens, for Protecting Nature and Natural Wealth in the Estonian SSR

Legal persons and citizens of foreign states as well as noncitizens are obligated to protect nature in the Estonian SSR and safeguard natural wealth on par with citizens of the USSR, in accordance with Estonian SSR legislation.

### 53. International Agreements

If by making an international agreement effective in the Estonian SSR nature protection requirements different from those foreseen by Estonian SSR legislation on nature protection and nature use are imposed, the requirements of the international agreement are applied, except in cases where stricter requirements are already in effect in the Estonian SSR.

### Uzbek Researcher Links Chernovtsy Illness to Nonchemical Cause

18120107A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 2, 21-18 Jan 80 p 11

[Article by Vladimir Luskanov: "Chernovtsy: A Poor Joke on a Medical Theme"; For previous reporting on Professor Dekhkan-Khodzhayeva's mycological research in Uzbekistan, see pages 114-120 of the JPRS series SOVIET UNION: POLITICAL AFFAIRS, JPRS-UPA-88-010, dated 1 March 1988.]

[Text] The telephone rang in our office on December 5. "I'm from Chernovtsy," shouted an anxious woman. "We're in Moscow, at the Institute of Pediatrics. The children are again losing hair. I've four of them. All ill. They're fading right under my eyes. I'm also going bald, but I haven't told anyone. Let them treat the children. I've no money, nor has my husband who has to pay the rent. You wrote about Chernovtsy, please help us."

After we published the article "Intoxication" in issue No 37 of MN, we got an official reply from A. Baranov, deputy Minister of Public Health of the USSR.

"In autumn 1988, a mass-scale disease hit the children of Chernovtsy in the Ukraine. Research by the country's leading specialists has shown that it was a result of chemical pollution. The September 17 issue of Meditsinskaya Gazeta analyzed the situation there.

"Taking into account the author's intent to doubt the competence of the Ministry of Public Health commission set up to investigate the 'Chernovtsy disease' headed by A. Baranov, and the charges of concealing evidence, I'd like to give an explanation...

"The vast research into the infectious nature of the disease didn't produce results. The author's suspicion is groundless.

"The declaration... that 'results were found to fit a predetermined answer' insults dozens of scientists at various institutes.

"When assessing the commission's work retrospectively it is possible to find error, but not stemming from 'organizational helplessness' (the definition given by Professor L. Sandulyak, people's deputy of the USSR, D. Sc. (Medicine), of Chernovtsy University—Ed.), rather from the extraordinary nature of the incident and the lack of an analogue in world and Soviet medicine.

"In conclusion, I'd like to stress that, unfortunately, some journalists... prefer to use not facts, but unchecked data, and not to study research data, but lay opinion.

"Isn't that why the medical problem has turned into a political one (the original lacks a question mark—Ed.)."

What could I tell the woman from Chernovtsy? Quote the above letter? Refer to an issue of Meditsinskaya Gazeta which said, "all the ill children were tested and treated at the leading clinics in Moscow and Kiev" and "today, they are approaching normal health"? Your story about being kept with four children in an isolation ward at a Moscow institute is again fiction? Your story about another mother from Chernovtsy in the ward who went on hunger strike after seeing "treatment at leading clinics", and who has already been visited by people from a mental hospital is a fabrication, an attempt to turn a medical problem into a political one?

Fortunately I had another letter on my desk. From Professor N. Dekhkan-Khodzhayeva in Tashkent, a recognized scientist.

We had over 400 patients, children and adults, with total or focal alopecia in the ward for protozoan diseases at the Research Institute of Medical Parasitology. The disease is caused by an unknown fungus which lives in blood vessels and affects all elements of the blood. Animals used for testing have lost hair totally or focally. We've been treating alopecia for a long time now and with results.

"I think a certain chemical has been causing pneumonia, bronchitis, hepatitis and bronchial asthma in addition to alopecia in Chernovtsy and other cities. A commission from the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences has finally confirmed its existence. Chernovtsy is closely connected with our fungus."

"We've worked out everything concerning the mycotic version. If the fungus were the reason for alopecia," competent people were telling the journalists, "it would have been very easy to find as it can be seen under a microscope."

They were right. Professor Dekhkan-Khodzhayeva found "zaminella" (the name of the fungus) using a microscope. True, it took her several years to do it. I don't think there is any use reproaching the others who saw nothing because they were sincerely out to "determine the disease's nature in the shortest possible time".

I also agree that in conditions of acute scarcity of time, the leading specialists could hardly go digging in the heaps of research works to find 40 articles by Dekhkan-Khodzhayeva and her assistants. The question is different. Why didn't the USSR Ministry of Public Health say anything about the research done in Uzbekistan during the 5 years of glasnost? Forty commissions sent to Tashkent couldn't disprove the existence of Zaminella and the 41st even confirmed it. And alopecia is just the beginning. Like imported AIDS, our home-grown fungus hits the immune system and causes irreversible changes in the lungs, liver and brain. It camouflages its destroying activities under already known diseases, which the doctors try to treat using traditional methods, often inadequate. The study of patients who died in Tashkent's clinics showed that zaminella was present in 57 out of 100 cases. Why, then, while speaking almost with pride about the Chernovtsy events "having no analogue in the world", were we so shy of enriching world medicine with the revelations made in soviet Tashkent?

As soon as she learned about the details of the trouble in Chernovtsy and Sillamae, Dekhkan-Khodzhayeva sent letters to the USSR Ministry of Public Health, and to the Estonian SSR Ministry of Public Health, proposing to test her hypothesis that the mass diseases among children in the cities were caused by zaminella. Why did "progressive" Estonia and "conservative" Moscow react to her appeal in the same way—with silence?

The "chemical version" quite suited the USSR Ministry of Public Health, because it relieved it completely of responsibility. You see, the chemists are to blame, the military, terrorists and aliens—why not? And the Estonian Ministry was pushing the radiological version, because that was most suitable. Where are the sources of

radioactivity? Naturally at enterprises subjected to the Union, in Sillamae. So, Moscow is guilty of everything.

Professor Dekhkan-Khodzhayeva went to Sillamae anyhow. Zaminella was discovered in 15 children with focal alopecia in their blood. Four of them had been given the first stage of treatment. The results are hopeful.

Eight children from Chernovtsy were brought to her Institute on December 6. Zaminella was found in all of them.

"I didn't expect the clinical picture of the disease in Chernovtsy to be so much like what I saw in Sillamae," she said on the phone. "It is exactly the same thing we saw in Tashkent."

And what are the children "poisoned with" in Mariupol, Kemerovo and other cities where cases of mass alopecia have been registered in the last few years? How do people become contaminated with zaminella? How widespread is it in the USSR? How do you prevent it? Where is it from? The questions are purely medical. What will the answers be like?

P.S. From an interview with a Moscow physician looking after patients from Chernovtsy:

"Do you know the reason for the disease?"

"No."

"Can you treat it?"

"No."

"Why, then, were patients sent precisely to you?"

"We didn't want to get involved with them. But there was an order from above. So we took them. You see, they've nowhere else to go in Moscow."

Funny, isn't it?

**Latvian Komsomol Head on Crisis of Communism in Youth Union**

*90UN0639A Riga KOMMUNIST SOVETSKOY LATVII in Russian No 12, Dec 89 pp 34-39*

[Article by Latvian Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary I. Prieditis: "The Crisis of 'Abstract' Communism in the Youth Union: Notes on the Eve of the Latvian Komsomol 24th Congress"]

[Text] The Komsomol, as the communist youth league, is experiencing a crisis of faith in communist ideology as a whole. What are the communist milestones today, and do they correspond with the existing model of the mass youth organization? We shall seek the answers to these questions. We, meaning those who work in the Komsomol, as well as those who have already departed by virtue of their age, and even those who have not entered our ranks by reasons of principle.

It would be a mistake to separate what is going on in the Komsomol from what is taking place in the country and in our entire society. When I was a delegate to the 27th CPSU Congress it seemed to me, and not only to me, that in a short time—just a little longer, everything would be all right. At that time we did not even suspect the true scale of the collapse of the economy and the seriousness of the approaching problems. Those taking part in the 20th Komsomol Congress, which announced the active participation of young people in perestroika also unwittingly contributed their mite to glossing over the true situation.

And when at last the cracks from the settling foundation crept throughout the house, it turned out that we were not prepared. Those at the leadership of the Komsomol stubbornly refused to notice that the processes of democratization in the neighboring socialist countries are hastening the disintegration of the youth organizations, which by virtue of the age and psychological peculiarities of their members found it the most difficult to bear such shocks in society. The Komsomol, like the party, had apparently shut its eyes and ears because it believed in its exclusiveness and hoped that the social laws of development would pass it by, for—we are special...

Let us take up the Hungarian variant of Komsomol. At its latest congress this year, the Communist Youth Union of Hungary declared for self-admission [samopropusk]. This event caused a sensation in the press, on the "death" of the Hungarian Komsomol. But the journalists were somewhat hasty in making the funeral preparations. Right now the Hungarian Komsomol is nevertheless experiencing a rebirth. Certain rayon and urban organizations have maintained their structure in spite of the decision from above. Re-registration of members is in progress. But will this be the very same Komsomol which announced the self-admission? Of course not. Now an organization is taking shape which is truly political and will hardly be a mass organization. Apparently the Komsomol will enter the Democratic Youth Union of Hungary as one of the youth organizations.

The impossibility of a youth organization being both a political and a mass organization at the same time is one of the serious lessons from Hungary for our youth union.

This point is confirmed by the situation which is taking shape today in Lithuania. The new youth organization formed this summer—the Komsomol of Lithuania (KSM of Lithuania)—has not joined the All-Union Leninist Komsomol [VLKSM]. And this was verified at the 9th Komsomol Central Committee Plenum held in Moscow. Re-registration of Lithuanian KSM members is under way in the republic. In October they numbered nearly 40,000 persons. Is that a lot or a few? In comparison with the old way, that is only one-tenth of the membership in the republic Komsomol organization. And if one places the factor of conscious membership on the scales, I do not think that our 200,000-plus-member Leninist Komsomol of Latvia [LKSM] membership would outweigh them. It is hard to forecast even the near future of the Lithuanian KSM; the moreso, since members of the VLKSM remain in Lithuania, along with the new organization. But I am convinced that our Lithuanian colleagues have gained, both in terms of reality and time. Today their Communist Union already has a militant membership, and without reliance on the real members rather than those merely on the list it is not possible to even speak of any kind of youth organization. The Komsomol of Russia and Estonia are also faced with establishing independent organizations.

The Latvian LKSM September Plenum adopted a resolution on convening the 24th Congress of the republic Komsomol in January of the following year. At the same time drafts of the Regulations and Program of the Latvian LKSM were adopted and were published in the youth press, as the basis of discussion in the republic Komsomol organization. For the first time in our practice, these documents contained variant formulations, including alternatives, on important questions of principle.

Thus, Point 2 of Section II of the draft Program of the Latvian LKSM, "Basic Directions of the Activities of the Latvian LKSM," states: "While verifying the general and profound crisis from decades of an officially-supported demagogic and essentially vulgar approach to Marxism-Leninism, the LKSM of Latvia sets itself the task to study and participate in the dialectical elaboration of the ideals of the founders of Marxism-Leninism on the basis of their application to the contemporary political, economic and ideological development of Latvia and its future prospects." And in the second variant of this same point we read: "The LKSM of Latvia sets itself the task of mastering our contemporary political, economic and ideological heritage and its scientific and creative interpretation."

From this example one cannot yet conclude just what the Latvian Komsomol wants, and what the basic directions will be in the future. But what the youth union will not accept is already clear. I am confident that our youth will not march in lock-step toward any goal, the essence of

which we ourselves do not understand. Another thing is also clear—no organization is now capable of uniting us within strict limits.

In this situation there is a contradiction. On the one hand, an organization without a strong, and I would even say strict internal structure, will collapse. On the other hand—a strict structure will automatically lead it to self-isolation.

In my view, a youth organization must have a certain degree of freedom for development of the individual. Until now, we have had only "democratic centralism" in the Komsomol—in effect, a huge leading pyramid, without feedback. It was namely in connection with such a model for the Komsomol that participants in VLKSM Central Committee plenums have at times have argued whether the proper title for our organization is "All-Union Leninist..." or "All-Union Stalinist..." Unfortunately, from the moment of its formation the totalitarian nature of the Latvian Komsomol was predetermined.

The situation in rayon and city Komsomol organizations in the republic allows defining a "vector of perestroika," but one cannot yet state definitely what kind of structure would satisfy all of us. First of all, only a congress of the Latvian LKSM has the authority to do this. And secondly, because an optimal model for such a structure has not yet been found, although discussion of draft program documents for the republic Komsomol has been going on for nearly two months.

There is great danger of superficial decisions here: in changing the name of the organization, for example. Of course, for a certain time this would permit "purging ourselves" of the old Komsomol sins. That is just what they did in Ludzenskiy Rayon, where a draft regulation for a Union of Active Youth of Latvia (SAML) was introduced. This draft does not differ in principle from documents adopted at the last LKSM Central Committee Plenum. Furthermore, the authors propose building the new union on the existing base of the Latvian Komsomol—both organizationally and materially. But the problems will not be solved by changing the signs on the Raykom building in Ludza or on the LKSM Central Committee building in Riga.

The Dobelskiy Rayon Komsomol Conference proposed its own variant for restructuring the republic Komsomol organization. Its participants drafted a proposal, addressed to the forthcoming Latvian LKSM Congress, on establishing a Union of Young People of Latvia. This idea is an attractive one for many, since it follows the course of the rebirth of self-awareness of the Latvian people and acquiring republic sovereignty. But does it pay to rush from the strict schema of centralization to the other extreme—the amorphousness and omniverousness of simply "youth" as such? Such a title would be more suitable for a movement or a union of young peoples' societies, one of which might be communist.

An extensive search is currently under way in the Komsomol for not only an optimal organizational structure for a youth organization, but also for new forms and methods of work. After numerous arguments the bureau of the Latvian LKSM Central Committee "legitimized" the idea of extending the term of office of a number of Komsomol committees on the basis of an "experiment on a new practice for forming elected Komsomol organs." Komsomol Raykoms in the city of Riga, the initiators of the experiment, suggested that the forthcoming reporting and election conference be held in two stages. The first is already under way. This stage is—examination of the state of affairs in primary organizations, discussion of drafts of the Regulations and Program of the Latvian LKSM and the VLKSM, election of deputies for rayon conferences, and finally, candidates for delegates to the Komsomol Congress. This stage will conclude with rayon Komsomol conferences, at which the question will be resolved of extending the term of office of elected organs of raykoms and gorkoms until March 1990. And only then, in March, is it planned to hold the second stage of the conference, at which, in consideration of the resolutions of the Congress, the elected organs of the Komsomol organizations shall be formed, and the work program approved.

The basic goal is to depart from the evolved "stereotype of reproduction" of Komsomol cadres and aktiv in the course of the reporting and election campaign. The leading organs must correspond to the renovated republic Komsomol and therefore must be formed after the Congress. It is still too early to speak of results, but I see in the experiment the gradual democratization of the activities of the youth union. The Leningradsky, Kirovskiy and Leninskiy Raykoms of Riga, the Yelgava Komsomol Gorkom, and a number of other Komsomol committees share my point of view.

But on this count there are also other opinions among Komsomol officials. For example, Andrey Belgorodskiy, first secretary, Moscow Raykom, Latvian LKSM proposes extending the term of office of Komsomol committees and turning the reporting and election campaign into a pre-congress campaign. He believes that the course of the experiment is not sufficiently democratic, and defends the right of every primary Komsomol organization to have direct representation at all levels—whether that be the rayon Komsomol conference or the Latvian LKSM Congress.

The pre-congress campaign and discussion of draft Komsomol program documents are not going smoothly everywhere. But the process is gaining strength, even though it has not generated the same amount of stir and interest among the mass information media that has characterized many events in Latvia's socio-political life of late. Here too inertia can be seen, and not in the Komsomol but on the part of society, which has labeled the Komsomol a state-bureaucratic monster.

I think that what might arouse the genuine interest of society in us is—a declaration of self-admission [samopropusk]. However, this does not reduce the number of problems facing young people and they cannot be resolved on one's own—much less right now, as the state policy on young people is just now being worked out. The Commission on Youth Matters at the republic Supreme Soviet has just given a hearing on the problems, but has not solved them. And that is the way it will be, until the study of youth problems is placed on a scientific basis, and until special institutions and centers are opened for the study of the social problems of young people, and not only the social problems, which will finally destroy the myth of the unusual politicization of Soviet youth. I will cite just one example: according to results of sociological research among Komsomol members, 80 percent have expressed disagreement with the jingoistic cliche, "The Komsomol Unites the Best Part of the Young People;" and 83 percent of those surveyed believe that the Komsomol has no prestige in society.

Today, I fear, our society might be on the verge of a youth revolt. Conflicts in the lives of young people have been stretched to the limit. A young person wants to honestly earn money for a proper life, but has no real opportunity to do so; he dreams of seeing the world, but lacks the means to make the most modest trip; he wants to establish a family, but the problem of housing remains. Juvenile crime, growth in the number of young recidivists, adolescent prostitution—and above all in Riga—these are but the initial signs of the coming threat. The newspapers and television have convinced us of the fact that the Mafia is joining together "from the top." And it has long since put down roots among "lower-class" youth—which remains its cadre.

What would it mean to "close" the Komsomol in such circumstances? At the very least, to allow everyone to drift. And then behind the political, personal and other ambitions of the leaders newly brought to light, the vacant lots and their young inhabitants, brought together by khozraschet [cost accounting] from Zherovskiy [translation unknown] youth clubs, would once again be left on the sidelines.

It is not just a matter of "crime prevention," as we have learned to delineate the sphere of moral ferment. The Latvian Komsomol is today helping set up new children's and youth organizations. The first sessions of the parliament of the Union of Pioneers of Latvia (SPL), organized in May of this year at the republic pioneer rally, have already taken place. An SPL symbol has been created, symbolizing the unity of the four lands of Latvia. I stress that the republic pioneer organization was not established in a vacuum and was not transferred from the USSR onto Latvian soil by force, as certain people think. Among its sources in the republic was Raynis, which was a children's social-democratic movement. Another new social formation, the Republic Student-Komsomol Council, offered proposals on demilitarizing the society, and sent them to the commission at the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Thus the republic Komsomol is striving to overcome the alienation which had evolved over a period of years, between the organization's leadership and its members. And the sooner the young men and women sense their "right to vote" and the guarantee that their voice will be heard, the better.

For the time being there are essentially no youth organizations in Latvia as an alternative to the Komsomol. An attempt by a Liepaya group, "Tevzemey un brivibay," to establish a Union of Democratic Youth Organizations has not yet succeeded. But, judging from the energy and enthusiasm of certain members of this and other newly-emerging organizations, I would like to stress the word "for the time being." The apportionment of forces among the young people in the republic is very dynamic.

In recent months we have often been subjected to criticism in the press for our passivity with respect to the idea of a young people's seym—expressed, incidentally, by USSR People's Deputy and Komsomol member Andris Viltsans. The VLKSM Central Committee of Latvia is accused of all but boycotting a seym. Here we must provide the necessary explanation right away. The ideas of a young people's seym and a republic youth parliament are quite popular among the young people and have been discussed at Komsomol plenums and aktivs. But one should not think that a young people's parliament could be established in place of the Komsomol, or become its successor. A young people's parliament is not an organization, but a form of interaction with already-existing youth organizations. The secretariat of the Latvian LKSM Central Committee looks upon it as a voluntary union of youth organizations, possessing certain rights, which expresses the opinion of the broad spectrum of young people. And of course, such a parliament might work, under the leadership of the new republic Supreme Soviet.

Such an approach to this idea generates a requirement for a complete set of studies: ensuring the genuine rights of a youth parliament; a mechanism for interaction between organizations; and others. But that is not the only complexity. The very idea of establishing a parliament (seym) contains a real danger, which the Komsomol has already pointed out. This is the attempt of its organizers to first create a structure, and only then think about its function and content. For many years the Komsomol was criticized for just such methods, and on this question we do not wish to return to the old positions.

Establishing a youth parliament is an important strategic task for the further development of the youth movement in the republic. And it can be taken up only after the 24th Latvian Komsomol Congress lays the foundation for renewal of the Komsomol, or its political successor.

The closer we get to the congress, the more questions are heard on the subject of "the Komsomol and the party." At the last republic Komsomol Central Committee plenum, which examined the draft Regulations of the

Latvian LKSM, the opinion of its participants was divided. Therefore, two versions of the draft Regulations appeared. In the first, "The Latvian LKSM shall carry out its activities on the basis of ideological unity with the Latvian Communist Party." And the second version proposes, "to exclude the paragraph." The draft Program of the Latvian LKSM presents three versions in contrast. The first states, that "The Latvian LKSM, being a voluntary socio-political youth association, interacts with the Latvian Communist Party on the basis of ideological unity and partnership." The second version proposes, "to exclude the paragraph." And the third states, that "The Latvian LKSM, being a voluntary socio-political youth association, interacts with social organizations and parties on a partnership basis.

It seems to me that the third version is the closest to reality. We live in a declared one-party state. But we are practically operating in multi-party conditions, which came to pass in Latvia under the influence of the People's Front, Interfront, and other socio-political organizations. Election results of People's Deputies of the USSR showed that the relationship of these organizations to power places them on a level with a political party.

All the influential democratic organizations in the world, just as, by the way, the people's fronts in our country, have their own youth groups, to which the parties provide ideological leadership and support, out of concern for worthy successors. One would think it is also time for our republic party organization to speak out openly—about what kind of Komsomol it needs today. If we agree with the old slogan, "militant supporter and reserve," then this would not be a youth organization, but a sect, taking in only a small percentage of the young people in the republic. And then a still more perplexing question arises: how to extend party influence to the remaining 90-odd percent?

The answer to this question must be sought with the help of the Komsomol, but it is the party itself that must do it. My sense of humor leaves me when party officials greet Komsomol members with the standing question, "What, you haven't broken up yet? The Komsomol is still alive?" I don't understand what they are so happy about. In turn, I am greeted with mutual misunderstanding on the part of party members, when we have a serious discussion on the question of whether a young man has the right to continue his Komsomol work if he joins the party. At present several Komsomol raykoms have already been endowed with "non-party" Komsomol secretaries. And the positions of the Komsomol and the party differ significantly on a number of questions, by virtue of conflicts in the party itself and other reasons: for example, the reaction of the Latvian LKSM Central Committee Secretariat to the Declaration of the CPSU Central Committee on the situation in the republics of the Soviet Baltic Littoral.

"The Komsomol and the Party," has become one of the main topics on the agenda of the rayon and urban

pre-congress conferences. Many of the secretaries who head rayon and urban Komsomol organizations have been elected for a second term. In other words, the people working in the Komsomol are those who are trusted by today's Komsomol-nihilists and usurpers. But here, to all the woes of our organization one can also add the conflict between the generations, which previously had been dealt with in a purely administrative manner. Today even the Central Committee Secretariat is almost twice as old as the statistically average Komsomol member. "You don't understand the young people"—directly or indirectly I hear this reproach, and I often reproach myself. But all of us—both the young and the old Komsomol members—understand, that we must decide how to right our listing vessel. And the time allotted for all-hands-on-deck is swiftly running out.

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**Ukrainian SSR Women's Political Role Discussed**  
90UN0647A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
7 Dec 89 p 3

[RATAU report: "Women's Councils Should Have An Activist Point of View"]

[Text] The Soviets of People's Deputies will become truly democratic and populistic when women are represented in them on an equitable basis. Their participation in the local organs of people's power will allow the work of the Soviets to be enriched by a balanced approach to solving society's vital problems, to taking more fully into account the social consequences of the decisions being adopted. These ideas constituted the leitmotif of the speeches delivered at the plenum of the republic-level women's council which was held in Kiev. Discussed thereat were issues concerning the participation by this republic's women's councils in the campaign to elect people's deputies of the Ukrainian SSR and local soviets.

The report delivered by M.A. Orluk, deputy chairperson of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers and deputy chairperson of the republic-level women's council, noted, in particular, that among the many problems requiring immediate solution—throughout the entire country as well as in our republic—one of the most important is improving the status of women, children, and the family. A great deal is already being done at this level by the USSR Supreme Soviet. At the behest of the country's first Congress of People's Deputies, an appropriate state program is being worked out; it is aimed at strengthening the legal and social protection of women, the family, and children.

Nowadays, when the nomination of candidates for the office of people's deputy has begun, it was emphasized at the plenum that it is difficult to overestimate the role to be played by women-deputies in the complex but necessary process of perestroika. As a result of the past elections, women lost half of their seats in the union-level parliament; they now comprise 15.6 percent of the

USSR people's deputies. Only 19 women were elected from the Ukraine, while another 19 became deputies from public organizations. It must be said in all honesty that the women's councils and women in general were not ready for the last election campaign. The following conviction was, unfortunately, widespread: it is sufficient to be nominated and people will elect you. But this principle will no longer work now. Under the new conditions a passive point of view is unacceptable; we must conduct active campaigning and explanatory work.

The authority of any public organization, including a women's organization, it was noted at the plenum, depends not only on boldness in speaking about what is difficult and unsolved. It depends, above all, on the ability to set forth specific, realistic, and well-founded proposals, to find a way out of difficult situations, to support what is intelligent and sensible, to act with initiative, and not to shift the burden of the matter to other people's shoulders.

The plenum adopted a platform for the republic's women's councils to be used in the elections of the Ukrainian SSR people's deputies and to the local soviets.

Taking part in the plenum's work were: Z.P. Pukhova, chairperson of the Soviet Women's Committee, A.M. Lukyanenko, Ukrainian SSR minister of social security, as well as important officials of the Ukrainian Communist Party, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers.

### Importance of Vocational-Technical Schools

90UN0420A Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 5 Dec 89  
Second Edition p 3

[Interview with V. Konkin, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee on Public Education, by E. Shcherbanenko: "Busy Time at the Vocational-Technical School"]

[Text] [Shcherbanenko] I'll begin with figures that provide the necessary reference point for a discussion of the vocational-technical school's fate. According to economists' estimates, hidden labor surpluses amount to 13-19 million persons in today's economy, while at the same time there is an acute shortage of highly skilled workers capable of functioning effectively in the context of new technologies and progressive forms of labor organization—a shortage of 700,000 persons. Tomorrow, the shortage of such personnel will be even more acute.

All of which means that the talk here and there about the vocational-technical schools getting cut back is mistaken, at the very least?

[Konkin] Definitely. Of course, yesterday's vocational-technical school, which was oriented toward the achievement of gross-output figures in rubles and consequently toward extensive-type development of the economy, is not satisfactory to anyone today. Vocational-technical education is in need of restructuring.

Recently, the USSR Supreme Soviet's subcommittee on educational questions met to analyze what had been accomplished since the February (1988) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and considered the prospects for an updating of the vocational-technical school. It was noted that there have been quite a few innovations in vocational-technical education. Above all, a conception for the development of that type of education has emerged. What are its principal attributes? A policy of maximum professionalism on the students' part; an end to rigid regimentation of the educational institutions' activities; and the creation of multivariant-types of vocational-technical schools.

We consider it a matter of fundamental importance that the former system of wholesale recruitment and graduation of students has been replaced with a new concept: direct contracts between the vocational-technical school and the enterprise.

[Shcherbanenko] And that brings us, Vladimir Ivanovich, to some sore spots in vocational-technical education. It would appear that a panacea had been found, an optimal model of the "trained-personnel producer and consumer" relationship. But in actual fact, what emerged was a pretty "design" for action, but nothing more than that.

[Konkin] A lot of enterprises are, in fact, avoiding the conclusion of contracts for the training of workers—avoiding it for reasons that have to do with local advantage, rather than the good of the state. And enterprises aren't the only ones involved—many public-education agencies are also treating the matter with a complete lack of understanding; apparently they can't be bothered.

[Shcherbanenko] It seems to me, however, that that's not a cause but an effect. The contracts are not legally binding. The Ministry of Justice has not approved them, and the Ministry of Finance has provided no funding for them. Consequently, at the local level nobody is in a position to force the enterprises to operate on the new terms.

[Konkin] They should be "forced" to do so by an understanding of the fact that this approach makes sense—by the economic and social competence of the employees' and executives' councils. But from the standpoint of the law the "direct contracts" are indeed still just recommendations—intelligent, correct recommendations, but recommendations nonetheless. At the same time, the officials in vocational-technical education must understand that in present-day conditions, only quality training for workers will make possible a change in business executives' attitude toward the vocational-technical school.

[Shcherbanenko] Vladimir Ivanovich, many letters from veterans of the vocational-technical education system are predicting a collapse of that system—unless, of

course, a way can be found to offset the negative processes that are presently under way in and around the system's schools. Are there grounds for such a pessimistic forecast?

[Konkin] Indeed, there has been a drop-off in attention to vocational-technical education. Here are just a few figures to characterize their present status. Vocational-technical schools have already lost a half-million students: There was a drop of a quarter-million last year, and a quarter-million this year. The figures on construction in vocational-technical education are catastrophic: Just 12 percent (!) of the plan was fulfilled in the first nine months of the year. And a most alarming sign: Last year, more than 40,000 vocational-technical employees left us to go elsewhere.

All this is a barometer of the state of affairs. It results from an unprofessional attitude toward vocational-technical education—from a want of vocation, if you'll pardon the pun. But what else can one expect from decisions that have not been carefully checked out, to say the least? The first SOS was sounded when the transfer of the schools to enterprises first got under way. A directive was issued: Transfer no less than 3,000 schools, and transfer them immediately! That directive is more than a year old. According to data from the USSR State Statistics Committee, about 300 schools were transferred. The USSR State Committee on Education immediately began receiving alarm signals. Some places set about reshaping the educational institutions to suit narrowly parochial, short-term interests and tasks, as well as personal tastes and notions. The enterprises that received the schools were unable to provide the youngsters with a suitable education and had no desire to do so. Scaled-down terms of study and compressed curriculums were the result: The terms were dictated by enterprises whose main concern was to turn out narrowly trained production workers. This approach empties the vocational-technical school of its pedagogical content and turns it into something akin to an industrial training combine that serves, not human needs but the enterprise's staffing requirements.

Unemployment, you say. I'm convinced that tomorrow's unemployed worker will be a poorly trained worker (that's precisely the sort that economic accountability and competition will eliminate first) or a worker trained in skills that are no longer needed. If the enterprise, in order to close its staffing gaps, turns out a narrowly trained production worker today, then that person will be a candidate for unemployment the day after tomorrow. And if only 1.6 percent of our vocational-technical schools' equipment is of the most modern sort, then that is a sorry road to the very same destination.

[Shcherbanenko] What tactic is the USSR State Committee on Public Education employing in this situation? Has it been able to achieve any results in combating this incompetent decision?

[Konkin] Naturally, we sounded all the alarm bells. The All-Union Congress of Public Education Employees supported our position. And local party bodies and Soviet agencies showed good sense. The upshot is that the USSR Council of Ministers has decided to suspend the transfer of vocational-technical schools.

But what does "suspend" mean? The process of tearing the system apart is still ongoing at the local level. In the latest such event, Kharkov's Monolit Plant decided to take over its school's premises and close the place down.

[Shcherbanenko] Haven't there been a lot of mistakes and ill-considered decisions? Readers write about still another mistake where the vocational-technical schools are concerned. Though connected to the rayon departments of public education neither legally, economically nor where methods are concerned, these schools were nonetheless put under the rayon department's jurisdiction.

[Konkin] True, and the results are easily reckoned. Having no qualified specialists at their command, the rayon departments of public education are, for all practical purposes, incapable of exercising a beneficial influence on the quality of student' vocational training.

By the very same token, one can hardly regard as sensible the transfer of vocational-technical schools to the local budget. At first sight, the decision is logical: The role of the territorial administrative units is being expanded. But there are problems that go unsolved in that framework too: both the global one—the interbranch and interterritorial training of workers—and the purely applied ones, such as the gift that the people in Kharkov presented to their schools on the occasion of the October holidays, by almost failing to pay the schools staffs because there was no money in the local budget. A solution was found: The staffs were paid with the students' money—the money they had earned in the work part of their work-study program. But is that really a solution? Here's another example: The Alma-Ata vocational-technical schools have failed to claim a quarter of a million rubles' worth of equipment for lack of money in the rayon department of public education's budget.

[Shcherbanenko] True, there are quite a few problems, as we can see. And by no means all of them are unavoidable. Just the administrative reorganizations are too numerous to count. Meanwhile, the schools are groaning for want of administrative protection. There are too many unresolved questions in the vocational-technical area.

[Konkin] I still consider the breakup of the old administrative machine to be a progressive step. But for the sake of complete objectivity, I will say that the present perplexity on the part of many who are associated with the vocational-technical schools, and their desire for corporative protection are readily explainable.

In many territorial units, there are at most five to seven people who are directly concerned with the vocational-technical schools' affairs. The service staffs that assist the schools with questions of teaching methods have been cut to the maximum. Here and there, vocational-technical education's Houses of Culture and Houses of Technology are being eliminated. But I'm no supporter of the suggestions being put forward to the effect that we need to go back to the State Committee on Vocational-Technical Education. There's no sense in bringing back the past. We need new structures that are appropriate to the present day. I see a kind of optimal administration. Its real prototype is presently taking shape in Krasnoyarsk.

[Shcherbanenko] The country's first training-and-production association has made its appearance there. How does its administrative apparatus differ from the usual type that has been done away with?

[Konkin] It differs first in that it is self-supporting, and second in that it's not engaged in "paperwork."

The fact that vocational-technical schools earn money by producing output is something we're aware of. What's new is that they'll be using part of that money to support their administrative apparatus—but only if there is real benefit from this apparatus, of course. Schools, united on the basis of the occupations they teach, are creating industry-wide groups, and together they constitute a concern of sorts, made up of individual firms in the form of associations of like vocational-technical schools. The partners agree on the extent of the services to be provided and the prices to be charged for them. On the basis of contracts concluded with the schools, the administrative staff assumes responsibility for ensuring the supplies of materials and equipment needed for production, studies market conditions, solicits orders for the vocational-technical school, ensures that there's a market for the output, organizes construction, etc. Even the specialists in teaching methods have a role to play in this chain of events. If they help in teaching the youngsters to master their lessons, they earn their pay; if not, the school won't simply keep them on staff for nothing.

An organization has come into being that no longer manages by the bureaucratic rules but leads in the modern sense of the word.

Incidentally, the Krasnoyarsk initiative is finding increasingly widespread support. As of this moment, decisions have already been made to create an Azerbaijani Republic, Ternopol Oblast', Volgograd Oblast', and a number of other oblast' training-and-production associations.

One would think that the initiative born of perestroika would be cause for celebration. But already there are complaints that "The vocational-technical school is trying to stand apart, it's pushing for autonomy!" In all of this, it's not difficult to spot signs of the old stagnation-days mentality: "Can't be done!"

[Shcherbanenko] The difficult experience of the past year is truly a persuasive lesson for the administrators to the effect that they must not nod their heads in assent but defend their sound ideas. A second characteristic sentiment today takes the form of a burst of initiative, an obvious increase in independence in decision-making at the local level.

[Konkin] True, in working out the new relationship between the central apparatus and those actually operating the schools, we are striving to teach people independence—we are teaching democracy.

#### Counternarcotics Measures in Turkmenistan's Mary Oblast Noted

90WD0141A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 22 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by D. Musayev (MARYYSKAYA PRAVDA): "Operation 'Poppy'"]

[Text] Each year more than 100 people "take the drug test" in Mary Oblast. Just under half are prosecuted. Today, 1,389 users of the terrible drugs, including juveniles, are on record. One of the campaigns for the elimination of the raw material base of drug addiction—Operation "Poppy-89"—has come to an end.

During the operation around a dozen "couriers"—drug transporters and dealers—were arrested in the oblast. More than 50 cases were brought to trial, and more than 50 people incurred administrative penalties.

In addition, 33 illegal plots of narcotic plants were discovered and destroyed. This is equivalent to around 30 kilograms of dope in "pure" form. The owners of the largest plots included G. Rakhmetov, who lives on the Kommunist Kolkhoz in Iolotanskiy Rayon; A. Kharlamova, who lives in Takhta-Bazar; and T. Khodzhaberdyyev, a teacher at Secondary School No 25 in Takhta-Bazarskiy Rayon.

Around 1,500 opium poppy plants were destroyed on the grain field of work crew No 4 of the third division on the Moskva Sovkhoz in Karakumskiy Rayon. Investigators proved that they belonged to I. Ovezberdyyev, a crew leader on this farm. A worker on the Sovkhoz imeni 50-Letiye SSSR in the same rayon, Kh. Khaitmamedov, had raised more than 55,000 opium poppy plants on a sovkhoz plot. It took dozens of employees from the rayon internal affairs department and three rented trucks to gather and destroy the "harvest"....

There was something seriously disturbing about the campaign, however. The temporary commissions set up by the executive committees of local soviets did not assist the militia effectively in Operation "Poppy." They did almost nothing in Maryskiy, Parakhatskiy, Vekil-Bazarskiy, and Sakar-Chaginskay rayons. This indicates that the general public and work crews still do not want to become involved in the problem of drug addiction.

**Soviet Operation Interdicts Afghanistan-Iran Drug Dealing**

90WD0141B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 16 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Ye. Kharchenko, border guard captain, and A. Bushev, correspondent: "Where Three Borders Meet"]

[Text] After selling a large shipment of opium in Iran, the smugglers were going back home to Afghanistan. They did not have far to go—only another 15 kilometers or so—but they had to cross Soviet territory. They were carrying the money they had made by selling the drugs....

Captain Vladimir Budnik's detail had begun a 3-day patrol the day before. The detail saw the smugglers on the night of the second day. Fully armed, they were riding across our territory on horseback. They responded to the conventional warning "Stop, or I'll shoot!" with a burst of submachine gun fire. This left Vladimir Budnik no choice but to order his men to fire. Two of the smugglers were killed and the rest got away, leaving their gear behind. The saddlebags were full of money. This was not the first time the border guard had detained smugglers here as they returned home after a lucrative deal, but the amount of money was unprecedented. According to the official rate of exchange, 18 million rials are equivalent to around 120,000 rubles, but if the amount is converted into the European price of the drugs sold here, the figure is just over 10 million dollars.

The international drug mafias chose this spot at the juncture of the three borders long ago. Even in the tsar's day this territory was guarded by cossacks, and even then their job was the prevention of drug trafficking. Secret paths, gorges, and caves still exist here.

A direct connection between the mujahedin and the drug dealers now seems evident. The "rebels" have not given up their plans to overthrow the legal government of the Republic of Afghanistan, but this will require weapons, and these can be bought with the money earned from the sale of drugs.

**Recent Counternarcotics Operations in Turkmenistan Detailed**

90WD0141C Moscow TRUD in Russian 18 Jan 90 p 4

[Article by Yu. Dmitriyev and V. Svirin (Termez—Moscow): "With a Bag from the Other Side of the Cordon"]

[Text] Dusk falls quickly in the south: It gets dark as soon as the sun goes down. It was at that time of day that a dark-green Zhiguli, raising thick clouds of dust on the country road, raced toward the border—or, more precisely, to a specific spot on the border chosen in advance. Thick clumps of reeds hid the bank of a small river running through the Turkmen dunes. The other bank—

the Afghan one—had also been concealed by reeds. Some thin men in robes and turbans were hiding in the reeds.

Were the passengers in the Zhiguli planning to cross the border illegally? Were the men in turbans alert guards who were waiting to catch them? Here is what happened: The car stopped, in an obliging manner, as if by command, and the doors opened. The people who had been in the car plunged into the reeds, clutching heavy bundles to their chests. The owners of the striped robes rushed toward them, but what they were holding in their outstretched hands were not weapons, but small cellophane packets.

There was a brief and hurried exchange. The people who had come from our side quickly handed over their gold rings, silver glass-holders and spoons, and antique necklaces....

They received hashish in return.

But later.... Later the personnel of the Turkmen SSR internal affairs department arrested the owners of the dark-green Zhiguli, although the "traders" were already far from the border and felt safe. After all, they had come back home from the dunes! They were arrested when they were selling the poisonous weed.

There was an investigation and a trial, and then sentence was passed on Kovsy Ekberov, a former cotton irrigator from the Kolkhoz imeni Kirov in Takhta-Bazarskiy Rayon, a drug profiteer, and on his accomplices Khommat Kurbanov, Gurbanyaz Aganazarov, and Agadzhuma Tikiyev.... All of them had made impressive amounts of money by supplying their clients with poison at "black-market" prices. It was for mercenary reasons that they had blazed the secret trail near the state border of the USSR and had crossed the border illegally to establish dependable contacts with suppliers of the raw material from the Afghan village of Maruchaq.

The commanding officers of the Central Asian Border District helped us gain entry to this restricted zone. The territory is almost uninhabited. The border troop sub-units are far apart. The criminals took advantage of this, and not only the ones listed above—after all, the amount of opium smuggled into the country has increased dramatically in recent years. Dozens of kilograms of the drug, and not just grams as in the past, are being found on those who have made the distribution of the drug their "business." The confiscation of the lethal merchandise is the final chord in the latest and far from last customs or militia operation.

We can recall several accounts in TRUD of encounters between border guards and armed groups of hashish traffickers who tried to use Soviet territory for their transit expeditions. This was at the spot where three states meet—Afghanistan, the USSR, and Iran. At that time the drugs were not being brought into our country, however, but into Iran, from which smugglers then took them to Western countries. Our soldiers lay in wait for

days in remote canyons. We later learned that the "guests" were accompanied by guards, and that, in anticipation of a meeting with Soviet border troops, expert marksmen had their English rifles aimed at each meter on both sides of the caravan so that they could immediately shoot anyone who tried to stop the convoy. In spite of all this, they fell into the trap. Their "cargo" did not reach its destination.

What is happening now? Have the border sentries lost their skills? Of course not. It is just that the situation has become much more serious. Dozens of dushman gangs have invaded our southern frontiers in the hope of making money in the illegal drug trade. They are making use of literally each "gap" in our border "fence." In addition, many professional drug dealers have come to the Soviet border regions, and they are willing to do anything at all for money. There have been reports, for example, of more frequent attempts to bribe soldiers and officers: The dealers give them gifts and promises in the hope of winning their good favor, so that they will "overlook" the operations of their generous new-found friends or even help them on occasion. Regrettably, some do give in.

One of the drug mafias once had its eye on a young soldier, driver S. Vinnik: He was promised a large sum of money for taking care of what he was assured would be a trivial matter.

Sergey Vinnik frequently went to the Afghan border as a member of a military column transporting food and materiel.... He seemed to be the perfect candidate in all respects to carry out the "merchants'" plans. They thought it would be quite easy for a driver to hide a few bundles of gold coins and ornamental silver items in a truck. After he had crossed the border, he would be approached by those for whom the bundles were meant, and they would surreptitiously remove their goods and give him something in exchange. "Then we will no longer be in debt," his petitioners vowed, and then they literally foisted an assortment of contraband items on him one day. They also included some flat cellophane packets to be filled with hashish from the other side of the cordon.

Sergey Vinnik did not want to practice the criminal trade. The gang was neutralized.

No one kept this incident and its outcome secret; nevertheless, it happened again soon afterward. This time the criminal case was investigated by Uzbek internal affairs officials. It began near the famous Termez Bridge, across which our soldiers from the 40th Army came home from Afghanistan last February. Remember the dust-covered and wind-lashed armored troop carriers and combat vehicles of the infantry, the happy faces of the soldiers under the red star insignia, the trembling hands of mothers greeting their sons....

Besides all of this, there was an official Volga belonging to the Soviet consulate general in the Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif, which went through the Ayratam checkpoint of the Termez customs service on an overcast

January day and was greeted by no one. It was carrying two of our diplomats and their wives back to the Union. Driver Gennadiy Khatskevich was behind the wheel. Imagine how surprised the border guards and customs officials were when they found a metal container with 19 kilograms of raw opium hidden under some rags in the trunk of the car!

"According to the results of the preliminary investigation," the official file later said, "Soviet citizens Avlikulov and Karimshakov, who lived in Termez, decided to derive personal monetary gain from the considerable difference in the prices of illegal drugs in the Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. They made a deal with G. Khatskevich, a driver from the consulate general of the USSR in Mazar-e Sharif who frequently drove from Afghanistan to the USSR and back on official business through the Termez border district."

In short, it was a permanent and lucrative arrangement for the acquisition of drugs in Afghanistan. They cut another one of their countrymen in too—A. Karimov. They divided up the work: Avlikulov, Karimshakov, and Karimov bought gold and diamond rings in jewelry stores in Termez, Tashkent, and Dushanbe and turned them over to Khatskevich, whose job it was to take them across the state border into Afghanistan and exchange them for drugs. Khatskevich did his job well: Avlikulov regularly received hashish and opium from him. They sold the drugs in Termez and happily divided up their sizable earnings. But they did not give a thought to the great trouble they were causing for those who became addicted to the dope, even though they were certainly aware of it: Drugs slowly but surely kill people. A person who tries them just once out of curiosity and "gets hooked" will die soon afterward.

It would be wrong to assume that these suppliers of poison are the dregs of our society and that nothing is sacred to them. Khatskevich had a secondary education and what he described as a highly moral family. In general, he had been living a comfortable and carefree life. Farkhad Avlikulov had a higher education and was on the faculty of a pedagogical institute. Abdusattor Karimov, the chef at the Oror Restaurant in Termez, was also an exemplary family man, according to his neighbors, and a loving father to his four small children. All in all, they were absolutely respectable citizens. Why did they suddenly become obsessed with these criminal manipulations even though they must have known that they would eventually be caught? Could the rustling of 10-ruble bills be loud enough to drown out reason and deafen the conscience?

After all, after this "easy money" has been spent on a car, a new home, and imported finery for the wife and child, it must be a constant reminder that each tire, seat, and steering wheel, each brick in the foundation, essentially represents nothing other than someone's ruined life. This is terrible.

The behavior of former consulate employee V. in this incident seems particularly indecent. He branched out and was accused of trying to "make a little extra" by reselling 300 meters of brocade he had bought in Afghanistan....

At a briefing in the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, we were told that the drug business was making preparations for an all-out offensive. The statistics are still alarming. At this time, 121,700 people are on record in the country for the non-medical use of narcotic drugs; 60,000 of them are seriously ill; 1,240 people were hospitalized against their will after they refused voluntary treatment.

The people we are discussing today are partly to blame: Their "commercial operations" produce drug addicts. The infection the poisoners are spreading is being caught by more and more new "consumers," and indirect proof of this can be found in the following figures: Just 8 or 10 years ago, as we were told at the briefing, the price of a kilogram of opium in the crime world ranged from 5,000 to 6,000 rubles, but now it can be as high as 100,000. The demand is rising!

Yes, internal affairs organs and the Soviet militia are trying to stop the drug dealers and producers. Last year they found and destroyed 2,700 hectares of such wild crops as poppies and cannabis in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. The militia, according to reports, kept 1.3 million rubles' worth of drugs from reaching the "black market" in this region alone. But who can say exactly how many millions of rubles' worth of drugs in bags from the other side of the border are regrettably overlooked and are not confiscated?

Of course, these millions are probably of little interest to the readers of TRUD, especially those who have already had to deal with the scourge called drug addiction, those whose children, relatives, or friends have become addicted to the dope that is ruinous to their health and are now torturing themselves and the people around them. Something else is much more important to these readers: They want to know whether a law will be passed or some other measures will be taken to keep them safe from the encroachments of drug dealers. We will need severe penalties to stop the spread of drug addiction....

#### **Belorussia Extends Chernobyl Relief Allowance**

*18120111A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 2, 21-28 Jan 90 p 2*

[Unattributed article: "Byelorussia After Chernobyl"]

[Text] Byelorussia's Council of Ministers has decided to pay 15 roubles a month to each resident in those villages where the consumption of locally-produced food is limited due to radioactive contamination from the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. Until recently, 30-rouble monthly allowances were paid only where the radioactive contamination with caesium was higher than 15 curie. From now on, allowances will also be paid to those living with

lower contamination levels. Over 86,000,000 roubles will be paid to people living in 1,500 settlements in "Chernobyl-contaminated" zones of Byelorussia.

#### **Church Charitable Activities Censured**

*90UN0628A Moscow SOVETSKAYA TORGOVLYA in Russian No 155, Dec 89 p 4*

[Article by Lyudmila Raykova: "A Tax on Charity"]

[Text] In opening Gospel House on Borovaya Street, the believers chose good works as the principal task of their community. As early as May they took on the functions of nurses and nurses' aides at the Hospital imeni Karl Marx. In November the church turned over 10,000 syringes for one-time use to Leningrad's medical personnel. They also decided to open a charity-type dining facility.

That was in April. Since that time people have been bringing sugar, tea, and groats to the church. Believers living in Finland and Sweden purchased and shipped canned goods for the dining facility. But what the future dining facility needs, above all, is indoor space for its operation.

This problem has now been solved with the help of the Frunze Rayispolkom: the address of the future dining facility is 52 Borovaya Street. At one time this house was owned and administered by the Cathedral of Our Patroness, the Most Holy Virgin, but nowadays eight Leningrad families are living there. The building is in need of repair. Therefore, the believers are confronted with a complicated problem—to resettle these families and purchase the apartments from the city for...hard currency.

The leading officials of the production repair-and-operational division who set forth such requirements explain their "entrepreneurial spirit" by the fact that the city's housing business is in a catastrophic situation nowadays. Undoubtedly the entire world ought to restore, repair, and save this city on the Neva River. But not at the expense of poor people....

Here is another example. Finland's believers have collected clothing for poor families in Leningrad. While the items of clothing were still en route, the people in the church thought over how best to distribute them. Should they simply be handed over for free? But people could be insulted by such outright gifts. They decided to sell the items to the poorest people at a minimal, or even just a token, price.

Religion forbids trade within the walls of a church, and so they began to seek a suitable space. And there were some people in Leningrad who proposed to set up...an auction for the purpose of selling items which had been contributed!

The Evangelical churches of Sweden, Finland, and the FRG have sent and are continuing to send to Leningrad

building materials for repairing the house and the church, as well as foodstuffs for the charity-type dining facility, money, and hard currency. But it has not been decided whether customs duties will be imposed on these items. The church still has no means with which to pay them....

Today we know that there are persons in this city who are living on 20 rubles a month. It would seem that in such a situation we might ask whether there is really time to think about the amounts to be paid for a lease or to talk about an auction of clothing items.

What do we want to obtain a profit on?

What do we want to tax?

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#### Orthodox Church Reorganized in Belorussian SSR

90UN0628B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian  
6 Jan 90 p 4

[Interview with Maksim, Archbishop of Mogilev and Mstislavl, by A. Gulyayev, correspondent: "At the Request of the Believers"]

[Text] Four Orthodox dioceses have been created in Belorussia—those of Minsk, Polotsk, Pinsk, and Mogilev. What has occurred is essentially a reorganization of the Orthodox Church in this republic. How this came about is the subject of the interview printed below which was conducted by our correspondent with Maksim, the Archbishop of Mogilev and Mstislavl.

[Correspondent] Your Eminence, how are such changes to be explained?

[Maksim] Above all, by the need to restore historical justice and fairness. You know, this very same Mogilev Diocese was in existence from 1632 until just before the Great Patriotic War, when it was shut down. But the time came to restore that which had been in a state of neglect for such a long time. I'd like to point out that Belorussia has always had a great deal of sorrows and difficulties in its ecclesiastical life. During Polish rule here there was a dominance by the Uniats. At that time the Orthodox people were subjected to persecutions; it was even impossible for them to study in their own language in the schools. Not only the peasants but even the clergymen remained illiterate. Of course, though, every rule has exceptions. Are you familiar with the name Georgiy Kanisskiy? He was not only a clergyman but also an educator, about whom A.S. Pushkin spoke with admiration.

[Correspondent] Judging by how well you know the history of this republic, along with its traditions and culture, you must have been born here. Is that correct?

[Maksim] No, I was born in Bashkiria. But I did work in Belorussia prior to my present assignment. I taught at the Minsk Seminary beginning in 195? [last digit illegible]. I became a candidate in theology and took monastic vows in 1948. I served as dean of the Minsk Cathedral. From there I was called to serve as a bishop. On 26 March 1972 I was consecrated Bishop of Argentina and South America. After this came the Omsk and Tula Dioceses, and only then that of Mogilev.

[Correspondent] How have you found the present state of affairs here?

[Maksim] The diocese now has 23 active chuches. That is not enough to satisfy the needs of our believers. At one time Mogilev had the splendid Cathedral of the Pious Iosif. A hotel was built on its site. Only the rather small Church of Boris and Gleb has remained. Its location is inconvenient; no transport runs to that place.

[Correspondent] Your Eminence, in this matter a great deal depends on the position taken by the authorities. Have you turned to them for help?

[Maksim] I must say that good relations were established with the civil authorities right away. A decision was recently adopted to turn over a church in the center of the city to the believers; people received this response to their request with gratitude. After repairs have been made, our cathedral will be located there. Repairs are being finished up on the Cathedral of Aleksandr Nevskiy in Mstislavl. Six newly organized parishes have begun operating in the places where the people wanted to have them. And everywhere the authorities have shown an understanding attitude toward our laws. Matters are approximately the same in Belorussia's other dioceses which have been restored by a Decision of the Diocesan Council. I think that this will help the church to actively participate in restoring spiritual health to our society.

#### Writers, Editors Censure RSFSR Writers Union Plenum

90UN0669A Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 51,  
16-23 Dec 89 pp 31-32

[Untitled response of OGONEK Literature and Arts Department to letter from RSFSR writers]

[Text] The editors have received a letter from a group of speakers at the recent plenum of the board of the RSFSR Writers Union. Yu. Bondarev, S. Mikhalkov, S. Vikulov, S. Kunyayev, S. Voronin and the other signatories of the letter do not challenge the authenticity of the quotes from their addresses printed by OGONEK, but they are irked, because, they claim, the quotes are "incomplete" and the author of the report has violated an "immutable rule" by allegedly "ascribing whatever he wants to the speakers." The newspaper LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, which represents the speakers' interests, is also irked. Confronted with a fairly unequivocal alarmed public reaction to the plenum, the paper published an extremely circumscribed, feverishly edited text of the

stenographic report and even felt constrained to print an abridged version of the resolution adopted at the plenum.

Like the authors of the letter, we too advise our readers to look at the December 1 issue of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA and compare its published stenographic report with OGONEK's. Let them reflect why writers whose freedom-loving spirit has always so actively rebelled against editorial interference are this time so indignant over OGONEK's desire to preserve and exactly convey their living vocal intonations, flights of thought, vivid and imaginative speech. To be sure, V. Krupin, for one, fails to reprove us for omitting his speech altogether, or LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA for printing it with significant omissions. Despite the fact that it contains some fascinating ideas, like the following observation, which the newspaper edited out for some reason: "Let us compare how many organs [of the press, naturally.—Ed.] Gorbachev has at his disposal and how many we have at ours. He can dispose of PRAVDA and still have PIONERSKAYA PRAVDA left for himself, but what about us? (Applause.) If we give up one organ after another, where will we be able to talk about our troubles, sorrows, and our national sacred relics, which constitute the mainstay of any people, to say nothing of Russia?" The accuracy of the quote is guaranteed by the tape we have at the editorial offices and the complete (really complete, unlike LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA's version) stenographic report of the Plenum, which the RSFSR Writers Union apparently considers suitable "For Official Use Only," not the reading public. Though we did have one inaccuracy: the address by V. Timofeyev was erroneously ascribed to Yu. Borodkin, for which we offer our apology.

As for adding anything of our own, OGONEK did nothing of the sort. In fact, what for? As they say, he couldn't have said it better to save his life.

Responses to the plenum of the board of the RSFSR Writers Union are continuing to come in. One of them is from Moscow writers, with more than 300 signatures, including secretaries of the board of the USSR Writers Union, chief editors of magazines, and People's Deputies of the USSR:

#### Address

To the writers of Moscow and Russia, to the Board of the USSR Writers Union.

In its debate and resolutions the recent 6th plenum of the board of the RSFSR Writers Union has graphically demonstrated how far one can go in chauvinism, immorality and literary ignorance. The plenum supported and organizationally established a group of separatists from the Leningrad writers organization. In its decision it insists on the removal A. Ananyev as head of OKTYABR magazine<sup>1</sup>, while behind the scenes of the plenum the leadership of the RSFSR Writers Union is doing everything to remove Ye. Averin from the KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE weekly.

In the course of the plenum added prominence was given to murky and at times openly anti-semitic trends. But we are convinced that far from all Russian [rossiyskiye] writers support the line adopted by the board of the RSFSR Writers Union.

We the undersigned members of the USSR Writers Union denounce the proceedings and decisions of the 6th plenum of the RSFSR Writers Union. We feel that the account of the plenum in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and the newspaper MOSKOVSKIY LITERATOR has been sanitized and demand publication of an honest stenographic report of the 6th plenum of the board of the RSFSR Writers Union.

We ask the writers of Moscow, Russia, the Union and Autonomous Republics to express their attitudes towards the 6th plenum of the RSFSR Writers Union and its decisions.

We consider it necessary for the secretariat of the USSR Writers Union to urgently give its assessment of the positions taken by the leadership of the Russian [rossiyskiy] Writers Union.

We consider it our duty to warn our colleagues that the position adopted by the leadership of the Russian Writers Union can, we firmly believe, lead to a split and is fraught with many unpredictable and dangerous consequences.

Respecting the internationalist traditions of Russian literature, we consider that the current leadership of the RSFSR Writers Union does not express the views of the writers of Russia and therefore deny its right to speak on our behalf.

And finally, one more document:

"After discussing the report of V.K. Arro, chairman of the board of the Leningrad writers organization, about the plenum of the board of the RSFSR Writers Union held 13-14 November, inst., the general meeting of Leningrad writers categorically rejects the assertion that an abnormal situation exists in the Leningrad writers organization and voices its protest to the secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers Union, which has engaged behind the backs of 400 Leningrad literati in protracted, deliberate splitting activities.... The meeting does not oppose the formation of new structures within the Writers Union, however in this case the plenum's decision sets a dangerous precedent for splitting the writers' ranks according to a contrived ethnic principle and does not contribute to the improvement of the literary process.

"As is apparent from press reports, the general debate at the RSFSR Writers Union plenum was pervaded by a spirit of extreme intolerance, hysteria, and conducted in an offensive tone with regard to the Leningrad writers organization and its leadership.

"...The meeting categorically rejects the suggestion of the RSFSR Writers Union that the restored journal LENIN-GRAD be given over to the 'Sodruzhestvo' group, all the more so as this is contrary to the CPSU Central Committee secretariat decision of 24 October 1989."

The foregoing is an extract from a decision of the general membership meeting of the Leningrad writers organization dated 29 November 1989.

Denunciations of the plenum of the RSFSR Writers Union and the force methods used against the chief editors of some magazines and newspapers were issued by the staffs of the magazines INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA, DRUZHBA NARODOV, ZNAMYA and YUNOST, veterans of the Leningrad writers organization, and the constituent conference of the Leningrad Museum Workers Union.

What has been said has been said, the accents have been placed, and the truth is quite obvious. There is one point we would like to clarify: What is the stenographic report that LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA and the RSFSR Writers Union say we should go by? A documentary reflection of an actual event (as we assume) or a palatable media version "for history"? The "writers of Russia" obviously prefer the latter version, because they know that what has been written with a pen cannot be excised with an axe, though they have forgotten another wise adage about the word which is not a bird [so you can't catch it if it flies out]. We can also understand the writers' ire, for whereas in their professional newspaper they appear as they would like to be seen, OGONEK has presented them in their true light. That is why the LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA issue with the plenum materials came off the press a week after our magazine: the editors were busy screening them, touching them up, polishing them, so that they would appear "more thoughtful," "less crude," "more intellectual"... But OGONEK went ahead and demeaned it all by publishing verbatim.

As LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA claims in its introductory note, it is invariably concerned with its "professional rectitude." Only it doesn't clarify what profession it has in mind. More is the pity...

Of course, it's so convenient: to say whatever you think at the plenum, among your own, and then carefully doctor and apply makeup to the stenographic report in the anatomical—that is, editorial—room. As Stanislav Kunyayev said at the plenum: "One can forgive Dantes..."

#### Footnote

1. The number 48 issue of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA carries a decision of the secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers Union to relieve A. A. Ananyev of his duties and endorse V. V. Lichutin as editor-in-chief of OKTYABR (OGONEK readers will remember the latter's proposal to think about establishing reservations for ethnic minorities) and also to appoint V. N. Krupin, who stated his position at the latest Russian writers plenum with utmost frankness, to replace M. N. Alekseyev, the retiring

editor-in-chief of the journal MOSKVA. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in its 49th issue carried a commentary on these personnel replacements by S. M. Mikhalkov, who clarified that it was, allegedly, "the will of representatives of Russian Federation literary circles." It is obvious that the entire "fuss over the journals" is an attempt to beat the Press Law, which is designed to put an end to the political wheeling and dealing of overzealous administrators.

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#### Women Writers Federation Adopts Resolutions

90UN0669B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 2, 13-19 Jan 90 p 7

[Report: "Constituent Conference Resolution"]

[Text] LITERATURNAYA GAZETA has previously informed its readers about the establishment of the Women Writers Federation within the USSR Writers Union (Nos 50, 51, 1989). Today we are publishing the full text of the resolution adopted by its constituent conference.

After hearing and discussing the report of the organizational committee chairperson and the addresses of delegates and guests, the women writers gathered for the constituent conference have adopted the following decision:

1. To set up within the USSR Writers Union a Federation of Women Writers. The purpose of the Federation is to promote a better moral climate in society, strengthen creative ties, and support young talent.

The Women Writers Federation sees its duty in developing interethnic relations in the sphere of culture and creative art on the basis of the principles of mutual respect, humanism, and compassion towards the environment and one another.

2. The Federation envisions the formation of independent organizations of women writers and the establishment of ties between women writers and women in other creative professions in union and autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, cities and townships.

3. To coordinate its activities, the Federation shall set up a council for a three-year term, which shall include representatives from each organization.

4. The Council will have working groups for handling current affairs.

5. The Council shall convene once a year.

6. The Council shall be headed by a chairperson and deputies:

—for organizational questions and contacts with other similar organizations;

—for interethnic cultural and creative questions;

- for publishing affairs;
- for work with talented young people;
- for social security problems;
- for human and environmental ecological problems;
- for legal problems and contacts with the press;
- for contacts with foreign countries;
- for contacts with peace committees and women's organizations.

7. To decide the question of publishing a literary and arts monthly as an organ of the Women Writers Federation.

8. To facilitate the publication of almanacs, journals, and pages in local newspapers devoted to women and women's creativity in all parts of the country: republics, krays, oblasts, cities.

9. To find ways to reserve a certain number of positions for the work of women writers in the plans of central and local publishing houses.

10. To request the management of central and local publishing houses and magazines to include representatives of the Women Writers Federation on their editorial councils and boards.

11. To request the All-Union Radio and Central Television to involve women writers more actively in the creation of new programs and literary and arts channels.

12. The Federation draws the attention of writer organizations to the fact that there are no women writers on a number of boards, secretariats and Litfond departments, and this situation must be rectified.

13. To consider it necessary to have a help fund for women writers in need of it in accordance with the activity of Litfond.

14. To adopt the Federation's Charter and Rules as a basis and instruct a working group to review them in the light of comments and suggestions made by participants in the conferences.

#### Burlatskiy Recalls Backlash Against Criticism of Culture Ministry

90UN0669C Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 2, 13-19 Jan 90 pp 5-6

[Interview with F. M. Burlatskiy, people's deputy of the USSR, by correspondent N. Zhelnorova: "Those were the ways..."]

[Text] Fyodor Mikhaylovich, it is known that you suffered during the stagnation years for criticizing the Ministry of Culture and defending the Taganka and Sovremennik theaters. Not long ago N. Gubenko, chief director of the Taganka Theater, was appointed Minister of Culture of the USSR. What did you think of this?

I had a feeling of public vindication. In 1967, L. Karpinskiy, then a member of the PRAVDA editorial board, and I, one of its political columnists, wrote an article called "The Road to the Opening Night." PRAVDA refused to print it, so it appeared in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

We wrote how state and party agencies implemented their repertoire policies, how representatives of the Ministry of Culture attended previews organized specially for them and then hurried away without a word, because the opinion of the higher echelons hadn't yet been formulated...

That opinion would be formulated later. And a performance into which the cast had put so much effort would suddenly be banned. In such cases even the leading directors didn't know against whom, or with whom, to lodge their complaints.

We cited specific examples of banned performances in those two and several other theaters. And we also criticized the Minister of Culture, Ye. Furtseva.

The indignation with us was especially great because of some general ideas we had expressed in the article: that there were two ways to approach social problems. One was to conceal them and pretend that nothing was happening. Ultimately they would only get worse and worse, until they exploded.

The other way was to expose problems. Then it would be possible to prevent negative development and, with good policies, come up with the necessary solutions.

The article aroused considerable public controversy. It was widely commented in the foreign press and on "radio voices." And it had rather grave consequences for everyone involved. Len Karpinskiy and I lost our jobs at PRAVDA. He was moved to IZVESTIYA as a correspondent. I had received my doctorate by then, so I went to work as a research associate at the Academy of Sciences.

In a special editorial in connection with a resolution of the VLKSM Central Committee, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA not only disassociated itself with us but sharply denounced our article.

#### Who was its editor-in-chief?

The editor-in-chief was Boris Pankin. Several members of the paper's editorial staff were reprimanded for printing our article. But Pankin, on the contrary, became chairman of VAAP [the national copyright administration] a short while later.

Those were the ways.

The article suggested that theaters should be fully independent in determining their repertoires. That the Ministry of Culture, usually heavily staffed with incompetent people, should have nothing to do with determining repertoires. That is the duty of the director and actors. And if a production appears to be lacking, the question should be decided in the press, by professional critics.

The article aroused not only Furtseva's displeasure, but Brezhnev's as well. He saw it as a direct attack against his style of work. Later we learned that it was his prescription to create the appearance of no problems in the country. And that all questions be resolved on the basis of confidential telephone calls and instructions. Cultural workers found that telephone method of work extremely aggravating. I should note that our article's publication had been preceded by a meeting with many leading stage directors from Moscow theaters. They all complained of their complete lack of any rights. So virtually all members of the creative intelligentsia—with a few exceptions—supported the article.

I would like to speak of the few exceptions. The intelligentsia are sometimes viewed as a uniform mass of progressive people. Actually, that is not the case.

There were progressives, like Yu. Lubimov, O. Yefremov, M. Zakharov, and others. But there were others as well. Notably, when the question of reprimanding us was discussed at PRAVDA there were some intellectuals who spoke out against the publication and against us.

**Really? But you were essentially supporting them!**

The discussion itself was very typical of those times. It was like an auto-da-fe during the Inquisition. There were 14 people present, and the editor-in-chief demanded that each one "take his stand." The members of the editorial board got up one after another and denounced us. Since professionally the article was written well enough and it was hard to point out any specific flaws, the denunciations were political, with the participants displaying their loyalty to the instructions from "above." However, two members of the editorial board had the courage of their convictions. One was G. Kunitsyn, now a doctor of philosophy, a well-known expert in aesthetics (who headed the literature and arts department at the time). He said he objected to the methods of castigation, which reminded him of the persecutions of 1937, and he voted against. (Several months later he was dismissed from PRAVDA, and for two decades was subjected to pressure, intimidation and interference. Even to this day he has not yet regained the position he could expect according to his intellectual potential). The other was Yu. Voronov, PRAVDA's managing editor. By that time he had already been previously hounded, dismissed as editor-in-chief of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and transferred to PRAVDA.

Voronov had the courage to abstain during the vote. And he, too, was punished. The apparatus is rancorous. Especially those who have done you bad...

**Name those who hounded you especially at the time.**

It's not the members of the editorial board I'd like to speak of. They have all departed: some to a better world, others, like former editor-in-chief M. Zimyanin, into political oblivion. There is no need to recall them. But I can't help recalling the positions taken by such major writers, whom I had till then held in high regard, as K. Simonov and B. Polevoy. Both were on the roster of the PRAVDA party organization, and during the discussion of our case commented: "We writers and creative workers do not need such defense of our positions. Therefore we take a negative attitude to the publication."

So there are conservative people among the intelligentsia as well, although by and large its representatives judge our problems knowledgeably and progressively.

That's why I wholeheartedly welcome the appointment of N. Gubenko as Minister of Culture.

At one time M. Romm was appointed deputy minister of culture, and he took to his job with tremendous enthusiasm. But soon he ran up against a wall, saw that he was helpless, resigned and went back to his creative affairs.

N. Gubenko will encounter enormous problems—fiscal, administrative, psychological—and there is the danger that, like Sisyphus, he will have to endlessly carry up rocks which will keep rolling down. I would like to wish him the courage of a politician. This courage is acquired in the course of protracted, difficult struggles. I wish him the ability to find his way in the intricate corridors of power. Without that it will be impossible to implement the program he set forth at the Supreme Soviet session. It is important for him to preserve himself as a bright creative individual, and that in his role as minister he would be pluralistic, tolerant and broad-minded, giving scope even to trends which he might think not so interesting or progressive.

**What do you think of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY and the waves that have been stirred up around us?**

I hold your paper in high regard, and my feelings are readily understandable, because with a minimum of resources this paper has managed to acquire such a huge readership in such a short time.

Like every publication, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY probably has its drawbacks and shortcomings. But as my own experience indicates, shortcomings should be overcome not with administrative measures but by comparing views and with the help of good-faith, benevolent criticism.

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